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EPA at 30: Fairness in Environmental Protection
by Eileen Gauna

D eflecting (on the U . S .

Environmental Protection
�gency 's EPA's) arrival at its 30th birthday, it is dif
ficult not to anthropomorphize. This idealistic love child
born of a strange affair between populist zeal and political
1
atnbition has developed into a conunanding agency whose
decisions reverberate through the economy and signi fi
cantly affect individual J ives. Yet it is still difficult for stake
holders who routinely encounter this mature behemoth to
grasp its essential "pe rsona." Charged with the unenviable
mission of implementing most of the maj or environmental
statutes and administering hWldreds of regulatory pro
2
grams , it should come as no surprise that its character
would be complicated, and conflicted. Although this
mega.agency 's internecine struggles over policy and imple·
3
mentation remain hidden from the outside observer, the
contradicting institutional messages subsequently emerging
from EPA causes it to appear to have a severe multiple per
sonali ty disorder. This tendency is particularly acute when
the subject of fairness arises, in particular the vexing distri ·
butiona1 issues . A t tha t point, an outside observer may see
one of the more benevolent alter egos emerging, one insist
ing that the Agency's priority is to ensure environmental
4
regulation that is protecti ve and equitable. As sincere as
this sentiment is for many individuals within the Agency,
however, seemingly contradictory actions may issue from
this institutional Janus. In some instances, for example,
Agency actions evidence greater attention to protecting the
Agency politically than addressing the plight of overbur-

deoed communities, 5 In addition , high level Agency offi
cials at times articulate an overridi ng commitment to reg u1a·
tory relief for indus try stakeholders and greater autonomy to
state regul ators , goals that, when examined closely, poten
tiall y undermine the goals of distri butional and procedural
6
fairness to heavil y impacted comrnuni ties. In this respec t,
more is invol ved than the public relations spin of an agency
maneuvering among special interest groups. Rather, these
mixed messages reflect deepe r institutional conflicts that
impede the A gency 's ability to provide comparable levels of
environmental protection for all communities without de
pleting institutional resources or causing undue damage to
compe ting interests. At stake in this clash among agenc y al�
tere gos is the integration of fairness into environmental reg
ulation, in other words , environmental p rotection for all.
Endeavoring to assess the successes, failures, and limita
tions of EPA's various attemp ts to manage fairness claims
over the last 30 years would be a formidable task. Fairness
and distribution issues in environmental p rotection are var
ied. There is an issue of re gulatory fairness that arises when
some poJluting sectors of the economy go virtually unreg u
lated while others are subject to the torturous ratcheting of
ever ti ghter standards. Closel y related to this are property
rights issues, fairness claims that arise when private prop
e rty of the few appears to be constructivel y confi scated, via
reg ulation, for the benefit of the many. There is a fairness is
sue that arises when environmental laws are enforced by
criminal sanctions that effectively negate the types of mens

Eileen Gauna is a Professor of Law at the Soulhwestern Univenity School
of Law. She is grateful to the organ1zers and participants of the conference
EPA at Thirty: Evaluating and Improving !he Environmental Protection
Agency, held a1 Duke University School of Law on December 7-8, 2000,
in particular commente r& Sheila Foster, Michael Gerrard, James Hamil
ton, and Marie Lynn Miranda. For their helpful comments on earlier ver
sions of this Article, she also thanks Carlos Fisher, Alice Kaswan, Brad
Mank, Cliff Rechtschaffen, and John Walke. Professor Gauna would also
like to thank ShaMon Tool and Rod Eva� for their resean:h assistance,
and Southwestern Univer.,:ity School of Law for providing her with a sum
mer research grant. Part of the cont.cols of this Article wHJ be adapted as a
chapter in the forthcoming book. EPA AT TutRTY, ro be published by RFF
Press/Resources for the Future, 2001.
J. MARC C. LANDY ET AL. , THE ENVIJlO NM RNTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ASKINO l'H'E WRONO QUESTIONS FROM NIXON TO
CLINTON 22-33 ( 1 994).
2. See U.S. EPA. Alphabetical Listing of Projects and Programs, aJ
htrp://www.epa.gov/epahome/abc pgram.htm (lasl modified Nov. 6.
2000),
3. For a oolleccion of fascinating insider accounts, see LANDY ET Al .. ,
supra nole I .
4. See Deputy Administrator Speeches, EPA Deputy Administraror
Fred Hansen 's Remarks Prepared/or Delivery to rhe Martin Luther
King Tribute 1998 (Jan. 211 1998), at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/
a.sadspch.nsf/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2000); see al:ro U.S. EPA, ENVI
RONMENTAL Jusncs 1 994 ANNUAL REPORT: FOCUSING ON ENVI·
RON M ENTA L PROTECTION PO R ALL PEOPLE 3 ( 1 995) (EPA
200-R-95-003),

5. Recently, for example, EPA sources <;Jaimed that in the mid- 1 990s,
EPA "buried" memos that outlined 11 comprehensive plan to Use its
existing legal auth.ori ty 10 better address racially dispara te impacts
because of antici pated opposition from industry, states, and lhe Con
gress. See John Stanton, Special Report, EPA "Buried" 1994 Plans
for Major Enviro�nJal Justice Roadmap, INSIDE EPA, 1-2, 24
( Mar. 3 , 2000). Industry sources noted that was probably a wise
choice given cong ressional opposition. Id However, if these memos
were withheld due to the activism of the 1 04 th Con gre s, there is no
ex planation why the memos did not re-surface after congressional
pressure subsided. Perhaps more telling is an intcmal EPA memo in
the early years of the environmental justice movement, whic h
showed a similar wariness and cautioned against a potenlial coali
tion berween environmental j ustice activists and conventional envi·
ronmental organizations. In that memorandum, an official rcpon.·
edl y urges action IO allow EPA to gain recognition wilh such groups
before " the peop le of color fairness issue reache [ s. ] !he
'flashpoint'-that state in an emotionall y charged public contro
versy when activists grou ps finally succeed in persuading lhe more
influential mainstream gro ups (civil rights organizations. unions,
chwches) to take ill-advised actions.' ' See The Real Story Behind
EPA •s "Environmental Equiry" Report, 2 RACR, POVERTY & ENV'T
5, 18 (California Rural Lcga.1 Assistance Found. & Earth Island Inst.
Urban Habitat Prog r.im, San Francisco, Cal. ) ( Fa ll/Winter
1991- 1992) (also quoting rh.e EPA official as tating "our goal is 10
make the agency's substantial investment in envuonmental equity
and cultural diversity an unmistakable matter of record with mnin
s�am groups before activists enlist thom in a campaign rhal could
add lhe agency . . . as a potential largel"),
6. See infra notes 234-373 and accompanying
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rea requirements familiar to criminal law and theory. 7 Then

there is environmental j ustice, which presents some of the
most perplexing fairness and distributional issues to con
front the Agency thus far.
Rather than attempt a sweeping treatment of fairness in
8
these various contexts, this Article instead takes a look at
gi
how EPA is mana ng the fairness issue in a discre te but
highly charged context: pennit issuances that affect heavily
impacted communities . This examination could prove help
ful for several reasons. First, it is by now fairly well estab
lished that environmental risks are disr roportionately vis
ited upon the poor and people of color, although pinpoint7. See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Dem4nds of Integration in the

Evolution ofEnvironmen.tal Law: Reforming Environmental Crimi
nal Law, 83 GEo. L.J. 2407 ( l 99S).

8. For an e >.:ploration of these issues, see Richard J. Lazarus, Fairness
in Environmental Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 705 ( 1 997).
9. lNsnru·n; OP MEDICINE, TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 6
( 1 999 }. People of c-0lor and Lhe poor disproportionately Ii ve near i n
dustrial sites, haz.ardous waste sites, and other risk-prod ucing land
uses and, tlierefore, are subject to greater e nvironmental risk. See 2
U .S. EPA, SUPPORTING Docu MENT 1 7 ( 1 992) (discussing income
and racially dispamte exposure to environmental hazards from con
taminated soil, air pollution, and water po ll ution) [hereinafter SUP
PORTING DocUMENT]. See alJ·o I U.S. EPA, WORKGROUP REPORT
ro nm ADMINISTRATION ( 1992). See also RACE AND THE INCI
OllNCf. OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIM E FOR DISCOURSE
166 ( Bunyan Bryanl & Paul Mohai eds., 1 992) (table summarizing
studies incticating exposure to air pollution disproportionate by race
and income). For example, African-American children have a sig
nificantly higher percentage of unacceptably high blood lead levels.
SUPPORTING DocUMENT, al 9-20. Ethnic mi norities lll'C likely to
consume more fish caught from waters that are contaminated with
pollutants. Id. at 1 2 . People of color have disproportionate-ly greater
e11posure to pesticides because of agriculturul work. Id. at 10 (using
descri p tive term "racial minori ties, lo i nclude Latino," Afri
can-Americans, Blnck Caribbeans, Pueno Ricans, Fili p inos, Viet
namese, Laotians, Koreans and Jamaicans, and indicating that as
many as 3 1 3,000 farm workers experience pesticide- related ill
nesses each year). See also Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "En11iron

mental Justice ": The Disiributwnal Effects of EnvironmenJal Pro
tectiOIJ, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787, 792-806 ( 1 993) (discussing evi

dence regarding dispari ties) .
The issue Qf racially d. ispmponionate siting near hazardous waste
facilities bas generated several studies and an on g oing debate about
methodology. For studies 1hat conclude there is racial and/or income
di. parity, see. U.S. GENERl<L ACCOUNTING OmcE ( G AO), SITING
011 HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CoRRELATION
Wrrn RACIAL ANO ECONOMJC STA1'1JS OF SUIIROIJNOlNG CoMMU
N rrtES ( J 983) (location of off-site hazan:lous waste facilities in EPA
Region IV); CoMM ISStON FOR R.ACIAL JUSTICE, UNITE D CH U !ICH
OF CHRIST, Toxic WASTES AND RACE IN we UNlTED STAtts: A
NATIONAL REPORT ON RACIAL AND Soc10-ECONOM IC CHARAC
TERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE S ITES
( I 987) (findin g racial disparities for peop.l e livin g near hazardous
waste facilities); BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN & LAURA F1TrON, Toxic
WASTES AND RACE REVISITED 3 {1 994) (oaliona) study of existing
and abandoned hazardous waste sites finding racial dispari ty); Vicki
Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Bar
rios? A longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24
EcoLOOY L.Q. I , 27 ( 1 997) (conc luding that the analysis support�
the claim that 1he siting process was affected by the percentage of
Hispartics in potential host communities at the time of the siting);
Vick.i Been, Aruilyzins Evidence of EnvironmenJal Justice, l l J.
LAND UsE & ENVTL. L. I , 21 ( l995) (national study of544 commu
nities indicating that "certain types of nei gh borhoods-those with
median family incomes between $ 1 0,001 and $40,000, those with
African American populations between 10% and 70%, those with
Hispanic populations of more than 20%, and those with lower educa
tional atlainment-are being asked to bear a disproportionate share
of Lhe nation'& facilities"). For contrary findings. see Douglas L. An
derson et al., Hai;ard.ou!I Waste Facilities; "Environmental Equity"
friues in Metropolitan Areas, Ev ALUA 110N REV., Apr. l 994, at 1 23
(asserting that prior studies are not def initive and concluding other
wise based upon comparison using different g eographical areas).
For discussions of methodology used in &i ting studies, see Michael
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ing the interrelating causes of the disparity remains illu
10
sive. This is an area where the need for regulatory reform
is evident. However, permit challenges often pit the regula
tory fairness claims of the facili ty sponsor against the fair
ness claims of the community affected by the facility. In
some respects, state agencies have their own fairness claims
11
to pursue as well, thus providing a study of EPA's manage
ment of these multiple and competing claims. In addition,
environmental justice claims in this context reflect various
conceptions of j ustice, providing candidates for what types
of fairness-oriented reforms have a better chance of suc
cessful implementation. Contemplating fairness in the per
mit process raises two related questions: whether the
Agency is willing and able to undertake aggressive mea
sures solely by resort to its discretionary authori ty under en
vironmental statutes, or whether constitutional doctrines,
the Civil Rights Act, executive orders, or mote targeted en
vironmental legi slation become i ndispensable catal ysts to
support, prompt, or mandate these efforts. Lastly, looking at
the pennit process provides an interesting peek at the Janus
itself, includin g the multi p le agency alter egos that emerge
when the goal of environmental j ustice appears to conflict
12
with other high-priority endeavors within the Agency.
This in tum allows us to
about the kinds of program
matic reform that might be necessary for EPA to better man
age and resol ve these important fairness issues.
This Article first provides a discussion of how fair
ness-oriented reform might evolve within the permit pro
cess. This section also examines permit issuances that were
appealed to the U . S . Environmental Appeals Board (EAB)
on environmental j ustice grounds. These cases address the
central issue of Agency authori ty to respond to environmen
tal j ustice concerns, indicate how several EPA regional of
fices attempted to resolve these disputes under the authori ty
of environmental statutes, and provide an examination of
the emergi ng role of reviewing bodies in this context. Pro
ceeding one step beyond environmental Jaw, the Article
looks at how EPA is res po nding to claims of dis p arate i m
pact under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. However, rather
than focus on the intricacies o f leg al doctrine under Title VI
law, this Article instead examines the anal yti cal framework
that the Agenc y devised to investi gate dis parate impact
claims. Because EPA's Ti tle VJ re g ulations are g eneral and
ope n-ended , the A genc y enj o yed wide latitude jo detennin-

think

Greenberg , Proving Environmental Inequity in Siting locally Un
wanted lAnd Uses, 4 RISK: ISSUES IN HEAL1U & SAPETY 235
( l 993 ) ; Been, at 2 1 ; Colin Crawford, Anayl ting Evidence of Envi
ronme111a/ Justice: A S1,gges1ion for Professor Been, 1 2 J. LAND
Use & ENvrL, L. 103 ( 1 996) , See also James T. Hamilton, Testing
for Environmental Racism: Prejudice, Profits, Political Power? 1 4

J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. I 07 ( 1 995 ) ( refined stud y of hazardous
wa.�te facili ty e,c p ansions to test three economic theories of wh y dis
tributions may vary b y race ) .

1 0. See Robert W. Collin , Environmental Equity: A lAw and Planning
Approach to Environmental Racism, 1 1 VA. ENvn.. L.J. 495,
506- 1 0 ( 1 992 ) ( discussin g historical roning practices , such as
exclusionary and expulsive zonin g , that resulted ln the placement of
industrial and commercial facilities in minority neig hborhoods ) . But
see Vicki Been, locally Undesirable Land Uses in Mirwrlry Neigh
borhoods: Disproponiona1e Siting or Market Dynamics ? L 03 YALE
L.J . 1383 ( 1 994) [ hereinafrer Di�proporrionate Siting or Market Dy
namics?] (q uestioning assum ption of discriminatory siting practices
and p ro posin g mnrket dy namics as a po tential ex planation for exist
in g disparities ) .
1 1 . See infra notes I J 1 -233 and accom pan y ing texl ( discussi ng Title
claims).
1 2. See infra notes 234-373 and accompanying text.

vr
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ing the criteria to apply in a Title VI investigation. Equally
important is the process by which this framework was de
veloped. lt was within this process that EPA had to mediate
among the fairness claims presented by communities of
color, the regulated communi ty, and subnational regulatory
agencies (state, regional, and tribal).
But the Title VI guidance is even more significant when
viewed in a broader regulatory context. Proceeding in a tem
poral lock-step to the development of the Title VI investiga
tory fratnework was the development of other high-priority
programs within the Agency. This Article briefly examines
three of these initiatives, focusing primarily on the point
where EPA, its regulated constituency, and the states per
ceived there to be the potential for Title VI claims to disrupt
or even derail these nascent programs. The three areas ex
amined are brownfield initiatives, the "Tier 2 refinery pro
posal, ' which is an aspect of implementing the Clean Air
Act {CAA) mobile source provisions that necessi tate new
air pennits at refineries, and "White Paper Number 3, "a re
cently proposed guidance that pertains to efforts to reform
13
new source permitting under the CAA. This Article exam
ines the Agency's response to this potential conflict and, ul
timately, how its guidance for investigating Title VI claims
reveals in part the resolution of this conflict. Although this is
a story that is still wifolding at EPA, a few predictions can be
made, as well as observations about who appear to be the
winners and losers ultimately. The Article then concludes
with exploratory suggestions for alternative approaches to
fairness-oriented reform in permitting.

Environmental Justice and Permits
At the onset, it is noteworthy that environmental justice is
sues do not arise only when facilities are first sited, a com
mon assumption when environmental justice issues first
14
garnered national attention. Disparities in environmental
protection have also made their appearance in enforce
16
17
ment, 15 cleanup, and standard-setting endeavors and can
13. For consistency, this Article uses as examples cases and initiatives
involving air pennits. However, the same sorts of issues arise in
other media pennining contexts.
1 4. The early environmenial justice campaigns focused on in09uitable
siting of hazardous waste facilities, which was the subject of several
Jaw review articles on environmenta.1 justice. See, e.g. , Rachel D.
Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 M ICH. L. REv. 394
{ 1 99 1 ) (examining reform of siting procedures): Naikang Tsao,

Amelioratillg Environmental Racism: A Citii.eTLf ' Guide to Com·
bating the Discrimina1ory Siting of Toxic Wasu Dumps, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV, 366 ( 1 992); Lois Marie Gibbs & Brian Lipsett, The Siting
Game: A NIMBY Primer, 8 F. APPLIE D REs . .it Pue. PoL'Y 36
(1 993): Vicki Been, What '.1· Fairness Got to Do With It? Environ
mental Justice and the Siting of l.LJcally Undesirable Land Uses, 78
CoRN ELL L. REv. 1001 (1993) [hereinafter What's Fairness Got to
Do With It?}; Rodolfo Mata. Hawriious Waste Facilities and Envi
ronmental Equity: A Proposed Siting Model, 13 VA. ENvn. L.J.
375 ( 1 994): D/spr-oportionate Siting or Mark£t Dynamks?, supra

noce I O. The later articles on the siting include: Michael G. Gerra.rd.
De=ns arid Angels in Hazardous Waste Regu/a1ion: Are Justice,
Efficiency, and Democracy Reconcilable ? 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 706
( 1 998); Christopher Billias, Environmental Racism wuJ Hawrdous
Facility Siting Decisio11S: Noble Cause or Political Tool?. 4
RACE & ETHNIC ANc. L.J, 36 ( 1998); Roger C. Field, Siting, Jus·
tice, andthe Environme1ital lAws, 1 6 N. ILL, U. L. Rev. 639 ( 1996);
Lawrence J. Straw Jr., EnvironmertJal Justice: Racial Gerryman
dering for E,1vironmen1al Siting Decisions, 1 4 VA. ENvrL. L.J. 665
(1 995).
1 5. See Marcia Coyle et aJ., UMqual Protection: The Racial Divide in
Environmental I.Aw, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21 , 1 992 , at S l -S 1 2 (report
ou investigation of EPA enforcement activities indicating that for
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implicate agency policy throughout all of these institutional
functions. However, most environmental justice challenges
appear in the pennitting context for good reason. First is the
immediacy of the adverse impacts. Responding to local con
ditions that not only affect health but significant! y impair an
already tenuous quality of li fe, residents in overburdened
communities often view a new facility or a fac ility expan
sion as the proverbial straw that breaks the came l's back. In
addi tion, permit proceedings also raise concerns about com
pliance and potential contamination, as well as the adequacy
of the permit conditions and by implication, the associated
standards. Therefore, not only questionable siting practices
but inadequacies that exist in enforcement, cleanup, and
standard setting all come to bear upon the permit process,
making permit proceedings the most vigorously contested
genre ofagency actions by environmental justice activists.
The bottom-up, grass-roots nature of geographically scat
tered environmental justice challenges has given the envi
rorunental justice movement an wiwieldy character. Thus,
activists involved in this relatively new movement have
been criticized for not articulating a clear, consistent con
18
ception ofjustice. By virtue of the movement's concentra
tion on cornmwiity empowerment and social justice, the ar
gument continues, it is ideologicallx unable to pursue a fo.
19
cused environmental policy agenda. The empirical obserfederal air, water, and waste pollution laws, penalties in white com
munities were 46% higher than in minority communities. Penalties
under hazardous waste laws were about 500% nigher in predomi
nantly white communitles than in predominantly non-white commu·
nities) (hereinafrer UMqual Protecrion] : but see Evan J, Ringquist.

A Question of Justice: Equity in Environmental Litigation
1 974-1 991, 60 J, PoL. 1 1 48, 1 162 ( 1 998); M. Atlas, Rush to Judg 
ment: A11 Empirical Analysis of Environmental Equity in U.S. Envi
ronmental Protection Agency Enforcement Actions, 35 LAw 61'. Soc'y
REv. (forthcoming 200 I ) , See also Robert R. Kueh.n, Remedyi11g the
UMqual E1iforce1Mnt of Environmenlal Laws, 9 ST. Jo1:1N's J. LE
G AL COMMENT. 625 ( 1 994); Eileen Gauna. Federal ErivironmenJal
Citit#n Provisions: Obstacles and lncenJives on the Road 10 Envi·
ronmental Justice, 22 EcoLOGY L.Q. I , 40.79 ( 1 995) (discussing

obstacles communities of color and the poor might have in utilizing
privare citizen suit provisions to address compliance problems).
1 6. Valerie J. Phillips, Have l.LJw Income, Minorities Been Left Out of
the Environmental C�anup ?, 38 Aovoc. (Idaho) 1 6 (1 995);
Deeohn Ferris, Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste
Cleanup: Expanding Public Participalion in the Federal Superfund
Program, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 67 1 ( 1994); Samara fl. Swanston,
An Environmental Justice Perspective 011 Superfand Authorization,

9 ST. JollN 'S J, LBG A L CO MM.E NT. 565 ( 1 994); James T. Reilly, En

vironmenlal Racism, Site Cleanup and Inn.er City Jobs: Indiana '�·
Urban In-Fill Incentives, 1 1 Y ALB J. ON Rso. 43 ( l 994); Decohn
Ferris, An Examination of the S14perfand Reform Act of I 994, 9 ST,
JOHN'S J. LEGAL CoMMENT. 609 ( 1 994); Vicki Been, Conceptions
ofFairness in Proposalsfor Facility Siting, S MD. J. OF CONTE MP.

LEGAL ISSUES 13 ( 1 993- 1994).
17. Catherine A. O' Nei11, Variable Justice: Environmental Standards,
Contaminated Fish, and ''Acceptable '' Risk to Nati!le Peoples, 19
STA N, ENm... L.J. 3 (2000).
1 8. This position was first articulated by Professor Vic.ki Been, see
What 's Faimess Got ro Do Wirh lt?, supra nore 1 4, at i 027-28 (nol
ing failure to articulate a specific conception ofjus1ice), and 1.ater by
Christopher Foreman. See CmusroPEIBII. H. Folll!MAN JR., THE
PKOMISE AN D PERIL OF ENVlRONMENTAL J USTICE 9, 1 1 ( 1 998) (ar·
guing that faimoss is too vague to serve as an actual policy and fur.
ther nocing that academics who write about environmental justice
are strikingly unconcerned aboul the ancient scholarly and philo·
sophical literature on justice),
1 9. Foreman, supra note 18, at 3, 1 22-26. This book contains a variety of
challenges to the studies that support charges of environmental ineq
uities, several criticisms of the environmental justice movement, and
advice to the movement co adopt an "epidemiological perspective."
Id. ac 70. Foreman was subsequently criticized for his failure to ac
knowledge su,dles with better methodology that suppo� the (crili·
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vations that support these criticisms are fairly accurate.
Whether·as a matter of deliberate strategy or simply because
the movement is a grass-roots one, it has �ibited a consi s
tent resistance to being pi geon-holed into a narrow concep
20
tion ofj ustice. Robert Kuehn has examined environmental
j ustice claims and explains how they are grounded in differ
ent theories of j ustice, such as distributive, procedural, cor
21
rective, and social. Nor does the movement have a targeted
policy agenda that is articulated with a high degree of speci
ficity. This could be due in part because there is no hierarchi
cal leadership structure or centralized effort within the
22
movement. Al though there are networks oflocal organiza
tions and activists who are prominent nationally, these activ
ists consistently maintain a position that residen ts of im
23
pacted communities speak for themselves.
The question remains, however, whether these asserted
deficiencies belie the need for, or present insurmountable
obstacles to, substantive fairness-oriented regulatory re
24
form. The criticism that "j ustice" is too vague a concept to
translate into a policy di rective may be misplaced in the en
vironmental context. In this arena, broad principles generate
cized) seminal studies of erwironmental i nequities, bis failure to ac
knowledge the work of environmentl\ljustice scholars- who advocate
refonn (rather than abolition) of risk assessment, and his "indulgin g
in a superficial psychological deconstruction of the movement."
AJan Ramo, Book Review, The Promise and Peril of EnviroMutntal
Justice, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 94 1 , 942 (2000). See also David
Lewis Feldman, LAW & PoL. BOOK REV., Feb. 1 999, at 2, 66-69 (ac
knowledging contribution but questioning Foreman's reliance on
risk-based studies tha t are inconclusive and also noting that the use
oflhe emotion-packet rhetoric with which activists have been attrib
uted is commonly heard among n wide ran g e of stakeholders) .

20. Kirsten H. Engel, Brownfield Initiatives and Environmental Justice:
Second-Class Cleanups or Market-Based Equity?, 13 J. NAT. RE
SOURCES & ENVTL. L. 3 1 7, 320 ( 1998) (notes refusal to be ''pi
geon-holed"); Ramo, Book Review, supra note 1 9, at 94 1 ( noting
grass-roots nature of movement),

2 1 . Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxono111y of Environme !llal Justice, 30 ELR
I 068 1 (Sept. 2000).
22. Ramo. Book Review, supra note 1 9, at 954-5 5 .

2 3 . In l99 l , activists convened and adopted a s e t of 1 7 principles,
among them the right to panicipate at every level of deci�ionmak.ing.
From this p rincipal, em<ironmenlal justice activists proclaim that
residents of impacted communities must have a role in the decisions
that affect their environments and speak for them elves. PROCEED
rNOS, THE FIRST NATIONAL PEOPLE OP COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL
LEAD.ERSHIP SUMM IT, xiii, Oct, 24-27 (Principles of Environmental
Justice 1 992).

24. Procedural regulatory refonn is an important component of the envi
ronmental j ustice initiative, 1md there have been efforts to expand
public participation opportunities. See U.S. EPA, Draft Publ ic In
vol vement Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. 82335 ·45 (Dec. 28, 2000): U.S.
EPA, PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITS: A
RE.FERENCE GUIDE (2000) (EPA-500-R-00-007), available ar
ht1 p './/www.e p a.gov/pennits/publicguide. htm (last updated Oct.
16, 2000); Public Participation & Acco untability Subcommittee
of the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, Envi

ro n m e n tal Ju sti c e Public Pa rticip a t i o n Check l ist, a t

http://es.epa.gov/oeca/rnain/ej /nej ac (last visi ted Dec. 29. 2000). I n
some instances, early involvement has even l ed to the project spon
sot' s willingness to incorporate protective measures into the design
of the facility. See infra note 258 and accompanying text (discussing
Brownfields Title VJ Case Studies). However, the primary focus of
this Article is on substantive proposals for more protective measures
because lbese proposals have met with the most resistance and pres
ent the fairness conflicts under considera tion. For a discussion of the
limitations of public participation mechanisms. see Scott Kuhn, &·

panding Public Participation ls EssenJial to Environmental Justice
and till! Democratic Decisionnwking Process, 25 ECOLOGY L,Q.
647 ( 1 999), and Eileen Gauna, The Envirc.mm4nJal Jll.ftice Misfit:
P14bl/c Participation and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN . ENvrL.
L.J . 3 ( 1 998).
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and anchor significant reform. In international environmen
tal law, for example, the precautionary principal has been in
fluential in shaping approaches to decisionmaking, despite
the lack of a uniform definition of the te:rm. 25 More specifi
cally, in the domestic environmental regulato ry context, the
plea for "efficiency" has sheparded signi ficant regulatory
initiatives. EPA, without demanding a more precise concep
tion of effic iency has for years pursued efficiency in multi
ple forms, such as adopting simple goals o f cost effective
ness to the development and use of more sophisticated
cost-internalizing strategies , cost-benefit analysis , perfor
mance-based standards , and market regimes. Leaving to
others the issue of whether these measures do in fact result
in more efficient regulation, the central point is that the mea
sures originated in fact and are j ustified on general notions
of efficiency, without Agency officials appearing to wony
too much about the comparative merit of traditional welfare
.
'
26
or
economics
and mo dem env1rorunenta } economics,
.
whether proposed efficiency-oriented proposals are consis
tent with accepted theoretical models.
Although proponents of efficiency-oriented reform are
well organized and have considerable resources to pursue
their interests, there is little to suggest that a focused , disci
pl ined, or central policy agenda preceded many effi
ciency-oriented regulatory reforms. For example, one of the
earliest and arguably the most influential market-based re
form came directly from the regulatory grassroots. In 1 975,
the statutory deadline to comply wi th national ambient air
quali ty standards (NAAQS) bad passed and it appeared that
s
new air pennits for large indu trial facilities could not be is
27
sued without further violating the standards. Permit app li
cants and pennit writers devised a way to allow st.ate reg ula
tory agencies to issue pennits for newer, c J e-aner faci lities
while demonstratin g pro gre ss in attaining NAA Q S. At the
marg i ns of statutory authority, the offset s trate y of
nonattainment new source review (N SR) was born. The
regul atory appro ach was subse q uentl y affinned by the Con
29
gress and codi fied in the CAA Amendments of 1 977. In

5

25 . See Emnt BROWN WEISS ET AL. , INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONM EN
TAL LAW AND POLICY 1 57-59 ( 1998 ) . One can see the influence of
other broad and vague prir,ciples of stewardship and sustainability ir,
the Endangered S pec ies Act ( ESA), 1 6 U.S.C. §§ 1 53 1 - 1 5 44 , ELR
STAT. ESA §§2- l 8 , and other statutes protective of natUral resources.
26. See generally GLOBAL ENVlRONMENTAL EcoNOMtcs: E o um AND
THE LIMITS TO MARKETS ( Mohammed H.I. Dore & Timothy D.
Mount eds., 1999); A. Dan Tarlock. City Versus Countryside: Envi
ronmental Equity in Context, 2 1 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 46 1 , 467
( 1 994) ( discussing modem environmental economics).

27. 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS JR. , ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WA
TER § 3. I B n . J ( 1 986 ) ; RICHARD A. LtROPP, AIR POLLUTION OFF
SETS, TRADING , SELLING , AND BANKING 6 ( 1 980) (describing the
e it pa n s ion needs of the s teel indus t r y , loca ted mostl y i n
nonattainment areas) ; The Steel lruwsrry and E,iforcing tlie Ckan
Air Act, in LANDY ET AL., supra note I , at 204.

28. In res po nse , EPA p romulg ated an "emission offset policy" to allow
new sources of si g nificant poU ution in noncompl y io g are11S. 4 1 Fed.
Reg. 55525 ( Dec. 2 1 , 1976 ) ; 4 1 Fed. Reg. at 55556 ; Lnt0FP, supra
note 27 , at 8 n.20.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 7503( c )( l ) , ELR STAT. CAA § J 73(c )( I ) . Part D was.
a mended b y t h e CA A A m e nd me n t s of 1 990. 42 U . S .C.
§§ 7470-75 15 , ELR STAT. CAA §§ 1 60- 1 93 . The offset ap proach was
also refined in a 1979 offset rulin g , 44 Fed. Reg . 3282 ( Jan. 1 6, 1979 )
(codified as Emission Offset Inte rp retive rulin g , 40 C.F,R. § 5 1 , app .
S ( 1 979 )) , in NS R rules p romul g ated in 1 980, 45 Fed. Reg . 52676
( Aug . 7, 1980) , and ag ain in a 1 986 Emissi. o ns Trad ing Policy State
ment. 5 1 Fed. Re g . 438 14 ( Dec. 4, 1986) . These regulations have un
dergone revisions from time to time. See, e.g., 46 Fed. Reg . 50766
( Oct. 1 4. 198 1 ) ( nettin g on a plantwide basis) ; 49 Fed. Reg. 43202
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this case necessi ty was the mother of invention, and theory
later caught up as scholars contemplated the market-ori 
ented nature of the newest member of the family of regula
tory toots.3°
Thus, although proponents of efficiency-oriented re
forms did not initially pursue a well-defined agenda, few
would seriously argue tbat the plea for more efficient regula
tion, vague as it was, had little effect on environmental pol
icy. More to the point, no proponent of efficient regulation
would prefer that reform efforts await the consensus of a
more precise definition of effici ency. This is a wise choice 1
for the holding power of effic iency does not lie in any par
ticular formulation of the term. Efficiency-oriented reform
enj oys conti nued public support s i mply because col lec
tively we dislike wastefulness, and rew . ation that purports
31
to be ''cleaner, cheaper and smarter'' has cons iderable
32
nonnative appeal. And in lumbering toward efficiency,
EPA is surely integra ting and i nsti tutionalizing effi
ciency-oriented reforms into environmental regulation to
an unprecedented degree.
S i mi larl y, in spite of the vagueness of the terms "j us
tice" or "fairness," EPA should be able to respond to envi
ronmental j ustice claims and pursue fairness-oriented re
fonns as a pol i cy obj ective i n a comparable fashion, as
sum i ng the commi tment to environmental j usti ce is at
least equi val ent to the Agency's commitment to efficient
regulation. And j ust as the effectiveness ofefficiency-ori 
ented reforms are often evaluated ex post, fai rness-ori
ented refonns can be evalua ted in a similar fashion. The
lessons to be learned from regulatory history, i f anything,
tell us that innovation does not generally originate in the
upper strata of an internally consistent theoretical frame
work or even well-fonnulated policy, but in the trenches,
here, the exigencies and conflicts presented in the course
of permit proceedi ngs .
Within this contentious context. the EAB i n recent years
3
has addressed environmental j ustic e concerns in 1 0 cases.3
These cases involved three federal environmental statutes
and four EPA regional offices (Regions II, V, Vll, and IX).
(Oct 26, 1 9 84) (fugitive emissions in applicability deternunations);
54 Fed. Reg. 27274, 27286 (June 28, 1 989) (federal enforceability of
emissions controls); and 57 Fed. Reg. 323 1 4 (July 2 1 , 1992) (pbysi
cal or operational changes at electric utility plants and exclusion pol
lution control projects at utility plants). For recent efforts to reform
this air permitting program, see infra notes 32 1 ·73 and accompany
ing text
a

30. See generally Emission-Offset Banking: AccommodaJing Industril
Growth With Air-Quality Standards, 1 28 U. PENN. L. Rev. 937
(1 980); Jorge A. de! Calvo y Gonzales, Markets in Air: Problems
and Prospects of Controlled Trading, 5 HARV. L. REv. 377 (198 1);
Stephen P. Winslow, Transplaming Emissions Trading ro Interstate
Area$; Will It Take Route ?, 5 PACE El"/Vll.. L,. REv. 297 (1987);
Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Pennits: Lessons
for Theory and Practice, 1 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 36 1 ( 1 989); Robert W.
Hahn & Oordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go ? An Anal
ysis ofEPA 's Emissions Trading Prog_ ram, 6 YALE J , ON REO. 109
( 1 989); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hestcr, lncenltve·BasedEnvi
ronmental Regula/ion: A New Era From an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1 ( 1991).
3 1 . See U.S, EPA. Office of Policy Economics and Innovation Home
Page, at http://www.epa.gov/opei (last updated Dec. 2 1 , 2000).
32. This is not to say that the appeal is always a good thing. Cf Gerald E.
Frug. Euphemism as a Political Strategy, 30 ELR 1 1 1 89 (Dec. 2000)
(cril.iquing use of "smnrt growth" rhetoric as obscuring difficult but
imponant issues).
33. See U.S. EPA, Environmenlal Appeals Board Formal Opinions, at
http:/lwww.epa.gov/eab/chrono.hun (last visi!td Sept. 29, 2000)
(EAB slip opinions).
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Six of the cases involved CAA prevention of signi ficant de
34
terioration ( PSD) permits. Two cases involved Resource
35
Conservation and Recovery Act permits, and the two oth
ers involved Safe Drinking Water Act underground inj ec
36
tion control permits. Because Regions may differ in their
approaches to environmental j ustice issues, it would not be
fair to generalize from cases i nvolving four regional offices
to EPA at large. Nor would it be fair to form conclusions
about general environmental j ustice policy in any particular
Region as there ma� be other Agency initiatives outside the
7
permitting process.
These cases are not irrelevant for purposes of our inquiry,
however. Without further legislative action, the ultimate
success of fairness-oriented regulatory reform in the permit
ting context is largely depe ndent upon three considerations�
(a) the sco pe of authori ty to address envi ronmental justice
issues in existing environmental laws , (b) the willingness of
EPA to institute such reforms, either directly or by gu idance
to delegated state and local agencies ; and (c) the level of
scrutiny afforded these cases by reviewing bodies. Some
tentative generalizations may be made by examining the
early develo pment of the environmental j ustice case law
emerg ing in the EAB decisions.
Since none of the federal environmental statutes exp lic
itly address envi ronmental j ustice, such authori ty must lie in
more broadl y worded provisions. Richard Lazarus and
Stephanie Tai have identified several sources of authority
presently existing in environmental statutes , reg ulations,
and guidance documents that may provide authority to ad
dress environmental j ustice concerns in permit proceed34. The earliest case was from Michi gan ( Region V): In re Genesee
Power Station , L.P. , PSD Appeal Nos. 93· 1 et al., 1 993 WL 484880
(Genesee /), modified by In re Genesee Power Station, L P., 4 E.A.D.
832, 1 993 EPA A pp . LEXIS 23, ADMIN. MAT. 40969 (Oct. 22,
1993) (Genesee II). Three were from Puerto Rico (Region I I): In re
Puerto Rico Elec. PoWer Auth. (Cambalache Combustion Turbine
Projec t) , PSD Appeal No. 95-2, 6 E.A.D. 253, 1 995 EPA App.
LEXIS 38, ADMIN. MAT. 40452 (Dec. 1 1 , 1 995) ; In re EcoE16;trica,
L.P., PSD Appeal Nos. 96-8 , - 1 3, 7 E.A.D. 56, 1997 EPA App.
LEXIS 5, AotiU N, MAT. 40632 ( A pr. 8, 1 997 ); In re AES Puerto
Rico, L.P., PSD Appeal Nos. 98-29 et al., 1 999 EPA A pp. LEXIS 1 7,
ADMrN . MAT, 4 1 1 32 ( Ma y 27, 1 999) . Two were from California
( Region IX) : In re KnaufFiber Glass, GmbH, PSD A ppeal Nos. 98-3
et al., post remand appeal EPA A pp. LEXlS 2, ADMIN. M AT. 41 053
( Feb. 4, 1999) (Knauf I) , In re Knauf Fiber Glass, GmbH. ADMIN.
MAT. 4 1 2 1 8 ( Mar. 1 4, 2000) (Knauf II).

35. One was from Indiana and involved a landfill (Region V). In re
Chem. Waste Mgmt. of Ind. , Inc .• RCRA Appeal Nos. 95-2, -3, 6
E.A.D. 66, 1 995 EPA A pp. LEXIS 25, ADMIN. MAT. 40392 (June
29, 1 995) . The other was from Kansas and involved hazardous waste
combustion ( Reg ion Vtl). In re Ash Grove Cement Co., RCRA Ap
peal Nos. 96-4, -5, 7 E.A.O. 387, 1 997 EPA A pp. LEXJS 30.
ADMIN. MAT, 40732 (Nov. 1 4, 1997).
36. Both of these cases were out of Michi gan (Re gion V). In re
Envotech, L.P. • UIC Appeal Nos. 95-2 et al, 6 E.A.D. 260, 1996
EPA App. LEXIS 4. ADMIN. Mu. 40454 (Feb. 15, 1996) ; In re
Envtl. Disposal Sys. , Inc., UIC A ppeal Nos. 98- 1 , -2. 1 998 EPA
App. LEXIS 1 05, AoM1N. MAT. 4 1 073 ( Oct. 15, 1998).

37. See U.S. EPA, 1998 EN VIRONMENTAL JusncE BIANNUAL RE
POKT: MOVING Tow.uos CoLLABOllATJVE/CoNSTKUcnvE PROB
LEM SoLVINO ( 1 999). For links lO environmental justice initiatives at
the regional level, sec hnp://www.epa.gov/swerosps/ej/indcx. Un
doubtedl y imponant as many of these programs are, however, it is
difficult for an y outside observer lO assess the true effectiveness of
the programs absent an intimate involvement with each program.
For a discussfon of how the environmental j ustice movement has ef
fected a "renegotiation" of environmental law and polic y and its ef
fect on BPA initiatives in particular, see Richan! J. Lazarus, Sympo
sium: lnrrovatfons in Environ,,u1ntal Policy: n Environmenlal Rac
ism.! ThaJ 's What It /s," 2000 U . ILL. L. REv. 255, 263-73 (2000).
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38
ings. In an extensive analysis of the EAB·s cases that have
addressed this authority, they conclude that the EAB is in
creasingly willing to find discretionary authority to allow
EPA or its state delegates to consider environmental j ustice
when deciding on the issuance of a permit. In the cases de
cided by the EAB thus far, the authori ty was contained in
broadly worded "omnibus clauses , " such as clauses direct
ing the permitting official to consider permit terms neces
39
sary to "protect health and the environment. " The EAB 's
approach has been to examine this authority in light of Presi
dent Clinton's 1 994 Executive Order on Environmental Jus
40
tice. The Executive Order by its tenns does not create addi
tional procedural or substantive rights, nor is a federal
agency 's com �liance with the Executive Order subj ect to j u
1
dicial review. However, the EAB has taken the position
that it has the obl igation to review the Regions' compliance
with the Executive Order as a matter of policy or exercise of
discretion to the ex .tent relevant under the particular envi
42
ronmental statute.
38. Richard J, Lazarus & Stephan ie Tai, lntegrming Environmerual Jus·
rice Imo EPA Permitting Authority, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 6 1 7 ( 1 999);
see also Shella R Foster, Meettflg the Enviro11111ental Jw;tice Chal·
lenge1 Evolving Norms in Environmental Decisionmaking, 30 ELR
30992 (Nov. 2000); Memorandum from Gary S. Guzy, U.S. EPA
General Counsel (Dec. I, 2000) (on file with author) (regarding stat·
utory and regulatory authorities under several environmental stat
utes that are available to address environmental j ustice). In this
memorandum, the Office of General Counsel declines to take an am·
biguous policy pasition, stating "(a] Hhough the memorandum pres·
ents interpretations of EPA's statutory authority and regulations that
we believe are legally permissible, jJ does not suggest that such ac
lions would be uniforml y practical or feasible . . . . " Id. at I .
39. See, e.g., In re Chem. Waste Mgmt., supra note 3 5 , at * 1 9 , AOMIN.
MAT. at 40394 (, noting that the administrator had the opportunity to
executD the policy behind the Executive Order by usi ng an omnibus
clause. under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
that allowed the permit to "contain such terms and conditions as the
Administrntor (or the State) determines necessary to protect human
bcalth and the environment.'' 42 U,S.C. §6925(c)(3}, ELR STAT.
RCRA § 3005(c )(3 )); In re Envotech, supra note 36, at *47, AnMTN.
MAT. at 40460 (UIC omnibus authority to impose, on a case-by-case
basis, permit conditions "necessary to p revent mi g ration of fluids
i n to u ndergrou nd sources of d ri n k.i ng wa ter." 40 C. F.R.
§ I 44.52(a)(9)). Lazarus and Tai no!e this to be an important case be
cause the UIC om11ibus authority wa.� conuiined "in the regulation�
-rather than In the statute. Lazarus &. Tai, supra note 38, at 666.
40. An exception was the Genesee litigation, which p redated the Execu
·ti ve Order, In the initial case, lhe BAB narrowly interpreted a provi
�ion that non-air quality impacts must be considered in detenninin g
the applicable best available control technology (BACI). Genesee I,
supra note 34. The EAB determined that the BACTprovision did not
ext.end to generalil.Cd community opposition, even on environmen·
tal j ustice grounds, as the siting decision was a matter involving local
land use and zonin, g decisions. Id. at 1 9-22. lo an opinion reissued lo
respond to a motion for clarification by the EPA' s Office of General
Council, lhe BAB excised some of its original order, noting that
"[a] ssuming without deciding that Mr. Dick' s environmental racism
argumept is within the scope of the Commission' s authori ty to con
sider under applicable air quality rules and regulations (for Mr.
Dicks does not challenge any of the emissions limitations prescribed
for the facility but rather challenges the proposed location of the fa
cili ty nefil' the Flint/Genesee neighborhood), we conclude that the
Commission 's action was proper in that there is no basis in the record
for concluding that it acted with a racially discriminatory intent."
Genesee 1/, supra note 34, at 20, AoMIN. MAT. at 4097 1 . Thus, the
BACT provision at issue would be interpreted to allow for the con
siderution of non-air quality impacts as they pertained to the ulti mate
emission limit selected. For a discussion of the evolution of the
EAB ' s initial resisLance lo environment.al justice claims lo a more
accommodating per.;pective, see Lazarus & Tai, supra note 3 8 , at
-655·77.
4 1 . See Exec. Order No. 1 2898. 3 C.P.R. 859 ( 1995), AoMIN. M.u . 4507S.
42. /n re Chem. Was1e Mgm1., supra note 35, at 7, •24-25, ADMIN. MAT.
at 40395 .
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The EAB cases also provide a gl immer of important pol
ky choices underl yi ng some of the Regions' approaches to
envirorunental j ustice claims. For example, when broadly
worded omnibus clauses were used, the permi tting authori �
ties tended to be fairly conservative in abiding by con
straints plausibly inherent in the language of the omnibus
43
clause, an approach that the EAB affinned. For ex� le,
in In re Chemical Waste Management ofIndiana, Inc. , the
EAB noted that the Region correctly detennined that the
omnibus clause did not allow the pennitting authority to
deny a RCRA permit based "solely'' upon al leged social or
economic impacts. Thus, the permit could be conditioned to
prevent adverse health or environmental impacts, but could
not be conditioned to "redress impacts that are unrelated or
only tenuously related to hwnan heal th and the envirorunent
such as disproportionate impacts on the economic welJ-be
45
ing of a minori ty or low-income communi ty ." In so find
ing, the EAB ignored the fact that the petitioners had also re�
q uested a risk assessment because of their concern with ex
posure to toxic chemicals, a measure that clearly would
46
have fallen within the scope of the omnibus clause. Ac
cordingly, what remai ns unclear from these decisions is the
outer bounds of regulatory discretion to condition or deny a
permit based on environmental j ustice considerations. All
of the cases to date involve challenges by environmental
j ustice advocates 47 who claim that the permitting agency did
not exercise its discretion in a sufficiently protective man
ner. '.However, no cases involve an appeal by the pennit ap
plicant contending that the agency exceeded the sco p e of its
authori ty in responding to environmental j ustice claims an
appeal that would likely ensue if the omnibus cl auses had
48
been used aggressively by the permitting authori ty . In al l
43. In a similar vein, see also In re Envotech, where the EAB similarly
noted thal the UIC regulatory omnibus authority did not give the Re·
gion the autl1ority "lo redress alleged negative economic impacts on
the conununity, diminution in property values, or alleged prolifera
tion of local undesirable land uses." Supra nore 36 at *"48 ADMJN,
MAT. at 4�0. However, the communi ty was also concerned aboul
poor compliance history, which permit conditions- might have ad·
dressed with enhanced monitoring. Id. at *30, ADMIN. MAt. at
40457. Some petitioners also took the position that the Region could
deny the permit on the grounds 1hat there were already numerous
land uses. If the Region had wanted to more aggressively use and tesl
the limits of its discretionary authori ty , it could have decided that the
risk of migration posed by the hazardous waste injec tion wells-n.1thoug h pe rha ps accep table in isolation-when combined with the
ex.isti. ng agg re g ated risks p resented sufficient g rounds for denial of
the permit.
44. RCRA A ppe al Nos . 95-2, ·3, 6 E.A.D. 66, 1 995 EPA App . LEXIS
25, 5, ADMIN. M AT. 40392, 40394 ( June 29, 1 995 ).
45. Id. al 6, AnMIN. MAT. at 40394.
46. Id. at 4, A)}M JN , MAT. al 40393 .
47. I use the term "environmental j ustice advocates" throug hout the Ar
ticle inclusivel y to mean primaril y residents of im p acted communi
ties and co mmunit y -based o rguniz;i.tions , but also includin g faith
groups , p ublic health g roups, civil ri g hts g roup s, and academics
whose works suppo rt the goals of the environment.al j ustice move
ment. In one of the EAB decisions, the pe titioner that asserted envi
ronmental j ustice claims was a com pe titor of the permi t a pp licant,
but essentiall y advanced a po sition that was cons istent with one tha1
could have been asserted by a communi ty -based org anization. In re
Ash Grove Cement Co., supra note 35.
48. In In re Ash Grove Cemen1 Co. , there was an issue that the Adminis
ll'ator cxceedw the sco pe of its authorit y in req uiring an indirect risk
assessment and im po sing additional monitoring req uirements. How
ever, the req uirement was not articulated as one made in res po nse to
environmental j ustice concerns, but was im po sed because of hi gher
than benchmark values on the hazard index and under the authority
of a g uidance document. U.S. BPA. STRATEGY FOR H /\ZAJlDOUS
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instances, the Re gi ons ultimately concluded that there was
no disproportionate adverse impact on the basis of race or
income, either due to the results of a demographic analysis
49
or an impact analysis, although in two cases additional
conditions appear to have been placed on the pennit in re
sponse to concerns of the affected communities. so Not all of
the opinions describe the methodology the regional officials
used in the envirorunental j ustice analysis, but those that are
described appear to follow a basic approach that uses 1 990
census data to detennine demographics (mean income or
ethnic minori ty) , and the use of a one� or two-mile radius to
51
determine the area of maximum impact. The methodology
for identi fyi ng a po tential environment.al j ustice communi ty
and determinin g dispari ty, which is particularly diftkult and
vulnerable to comp licating factors, is continually changing
52
and evolving. However, the petitioners obj ections to
WASTE MINIMIZATION AND COMIIUS'JlON ( 1 994). Sup ra note 35, at
•32, ADMIN, MAT. at 40733. The Petitioner challenged the authority
for the: Administrator to impose requirements that had been promul
gated by guidance rather than by rule. Id.
49. In the early Genesee cases, the Region found that there would be no
adverse impact because the emissions would not result in a NAAQS
violation. Genesee II. supra note 34, at 22, ADMIN. MAT. at 4()1)71 .
B o t the E AB also appeared to rest i ts decision o n defenses common
to civjJ rights coses, that there was no discri minatory intent, id. at
19-20, Aot.t tN. MAT. at 4097 1 . and that there was a legitimate, non
disc:riminatory �on for denying a pennit at an alternative site com
prised of a maj ori ty white population. Id. at 2 1 , ADMIN. MAT. at
4()1)71 . Su also In re Puerro Rico Elec., sup ra note 34, and In re
Chem. Wal·te Mg mt., supra note 35, at *28, ADMIN. MAT. at 40393
(no minority or low income communi ty will face a disproportionate
Impact within a one-mile radius); fn re Ash Grove Cement Co. , supra
note 35 ("low percentage" of minorities in area and per capita in·
come simillll' to income in sUITounding counties); In re Envotech, su·
p ra note 36 (impact on minority or low income populations within
two-mile radius minimum); In re En vtl. Disposal Sys. , supra note 36
(using two.mile radius, concluding that percentage of minority pop
ulation and low income population was less than the state averages).
In In re &0£/ictrica, the Region detemuned that the average me
dian household in ome of the petitioner's community was higher
than in the surrounding area, albei� lower than the commonwealth's
average, and that the facility impacts fell below NAAQS . In re
&oElectrica, sup ra note 35, at *30, ADMIN. MAT. at 40635; su also
KnaufI, sup ra note 34, at • 126, ADMIN. MAT. at 4 1 069 (the Region
concluded, without further detail, that "it was unlilccly that an Envi
ronmental Justice issue applied.''); Knauf II, supra note 34 (no ad·
verse impact because no NAAQS violation); In re AES Pueno Rico,
sup ra note 34 (looking at potential impaclS of air emissions from the
facility, the Region found that the four criteria pollutants tested fell
below NAAQS).
50. In re. En�'Otech, supra note 36, at •39, ADMIN. MAT. at 40459 (the
Region imposed particularly stringent monitoring requirements on
the pennits, including "daily sampling of the waste stream during the
firs I 90 days of operation and weekly sampling thereafter, expanded
R
monthly and annual sample constituent lists and a full RC A Ap
pcndiJl IX nnalysis prior to commending injection.''); In re AES
Pu.erto Rico, sup ra note 34 {Region required post construction ambi
ent monitoring and a multisource air quality analysis of S02).
5 1 . In the cases that describe tho methodology in greater detail, the ap
proach typically involves talting pcrcapila income from 1990 census
data, source location data from the 1 990 toxic release inventory
(TRI}, and information from the Region's pennit compliance data
base. This data is plotted in the area detennined to be the location of
the J1111JUmum impact from the source' s emissions or other facility
impaclS. Su In re A ES Puerto Rico, sup ra note 34 (Regional offi·
c:i.llls had performed an environmental j ustice analysis using the Re
gion's Geographic lnfonnation System, com parin g per capita in
come and source location and concluding that there would be no ad·
verse disproportionate health impacts); In re Chem. Wt.1Ste Mgmt. ,
sup ra note 35 (using census data); in re EcoElktrica, s upra note 34.
52. See, e.g., R.EotON 2, U.S. EPA, DRAFT INTEIUM POLICY ON lDBN·
nFYING EJ AJIBAS (1997); ReotoN 5, U.S. EPA, REVISED IN•
TfilllM GUIDELINES FOR IOENTJFYINO AND AooR.ESSING /\ PoTEN•
TIAL BJ CASE ( 1998) . The Office of Environmental Justice may
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methodology often fonned the basis for seekin g review,
thus making the EAB 's reviewing role an imponant consid
eration in fairness-oriented reform efforts.
As an initial matter, the EAB appears to view an environ
mental j ustice analysis in pennit p roceedings as a mini mum
3
requirement of the Executi ve Order "when a commenter
submits at least a superficially plausible claim that opetation
of the facili ty will have a disproportionate impact on a mi
nori t): or low•income segment of the affected commu
ni ty."54 This du� flows to delegated state and local permit
ting authorities. s Thus, when such a claim has been made,
the EAB will look to see if an environment.al j ustice analysis
was conducted and will remand when there is insufficient
detail in the administrative re�ord to support findings of th.e
56
analysis. It has also stated its view that when a matter
clearl y lies with.in th.e permitting official's authori ty as a
matter of policy that discretion should be exercised in a
manner that will better implement the Executive Order to
57
the extent practicable.
This does not mean that the EAB's willingness to view
existing authorities in l ight ofthe Executive Order automati
call y results in successful appeals. The EAB wi ll rej ect the
clai m when it views the pe t i tioner's alle g ations as
58
overbroad, vague, and not supported by detailed evidence.
Additionally, because the Executive Order by its terms does
not create rights, the failure to identi fy a s pecific source of
authori ty under the environmental statutes has apparently
soon release a draft Guide to Assessing a11.d Addressing Allegations
of Environmental Justice.

53. The one case that has remanded on these grounds is KMuf I, supra
note 34, at • 1 27-• 1 29, ADMJN. MAT. at 4 1 069. Lazarus and Tai sug.
gest that Lbe duty to provide an adequate record of an environmental
justice nalys1s might depend in part on whether the Region has de·
veloped environmental j ustice guidelines. Lazanis & Tai, Jupra note
�8. at 676+ 77. Subsequently. on appeal �ter the. environ�enr.al jus,
lice analy 1s was prepared, the EAB demed review findmg that the
petitioners did not show that the emissions would lead to an adverse
impact because NAAQS for paniculatc matter bad not been ex
ceeded and because applic able regulatory obligations concerning
public participation had been TJieC. Koouf II, sup ra note 34. at 23,
ADMIN. MAT. at 41 223.
54. In re Chem. WllSte Mgmt. , supra note 35, at • 19, AoMIN. MAT. at
40394.
SS. Kn.o,uf /, supra note 34. Although the Executive Order is directed at
federal agencies, the BAB reasoned that the state/local pennitting
authoriry stand� in the shoes of EPA for purposes of implementing
the federal program and the pemuts issued arc federal pemuts. Id. at
• 1 25, ADMIN, M1u. at 4 1 2 1 8 .
56. In In re Knauf Fiber GlCJSs, the Shasta County Air Quality Manage
ment District in ilS response to comments on the pemut, noted that
Region IX reviewed its policies and "did not find a violation of [ ilS
environmental j ustice] guidelines." id. at 1 26, AOMJN. MAT. at
412 1 8 . However, the memorandum was submitted after lhe pennit
was issued. The EAB noted that the memorandum merely stated
without adequate detail that a Region IX employee concluded that
after reviewing the proj ect location and surrounding demographics
that it was unlikely that an environmental j ustice issue applied. Id,
S1. In re Chem. Waste Mgmt., supra note 35, at 6, •23-24, ADMJN, MAT.
at 40393; In re Envotech, supra note 36, •47, ADMIN. MAT. at
40459.
58. In Pue rto Rico E/ec. Power, supra note 34, the EAB appeared to
view the petitioner' s claim as vague and lacking evidentiary support.
The EAB also took the position that the pennit applicant's alleged
poor compliance history did not bear upon the permit.conditions. See
also In re EcoE/ictrictJ, supra note 34, at •27, ADMIN. MAT. al
40635 (noting that the petitioner did not explain the basis for its con
tention that additional modeling should have been req �d). This is
likely a reflection of the limited resources available to commu
ni ty-based envirorunental j ustice organizations. Lazarus & Tai, su
pra note- 38, at 664.
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proven fatal to at least one of the claims. Environmental
j ustice petitioners have had unsuccessful appeals even in
cases where the cl aimants identified specific sources ofau
thority under environmental statutes or regulations, articu
lated their claims in detail , and provided stronger eviden
tiary support. The reason for this may lie in the consider
able deference given to the permi tting agency's view of the
limits of its authori ty, its methodology, and its environ
mental j ustice analysis. A recent case involving a PSD per
mit is illustrative.
In AES Puerto Rico,6-0 the petitioners, a community orga
nization and several individuals,6 1 opposed a major source
permit o f a 454-megawatt coal-fi red power plant in
Guayama, Puerto Rico, an area already hosting several
pharmaceutical and petrochemical plants. 62 This opinion is
rich in detail about the evidence that attended the environ
mental j ustice challenges to the pennit issuance, and in that
respect provides valuable insight into the permitting pro
ceedings. In this case petitioners tied the environmental jus
tice claims to the Administrator's discretionary authority
63
under PSD regulations and guidance documents, arguing
that because the affected communi ty was low income and
many residents were experiencing health problems, Region
II officials should have exercised their discretion in a more
protective manner. 64 In particular, the petitioners asked the
Region to require a full air quality impact analysis for sulfur
dioxide ( S02)61 and asserted that the Region should not have
relied oo what they contended to be an outdated 1 983 attain
ment demonstration for S0 2 . 66 In addition, petitioners ques
tioned the acc uracy of an impact analysis for particulate
matter and the Region's change of an emissions limit in the
pennit. This discussion will focus on the S0 2 issue, al
though the EAB took a similar approach to the particulate
matter issues.
Basically, the petitioner wanted the Region to require pre
construction multisource modeling and preconstruction am
bient monitoring for S0 2, a request that reflects the petition
ers ' concern with c umulative impacts.67 Multisource mod
eling analyzes not only the facili ty 's emissions but the com
68
bined impacts of all existing sources in the area, and it is
59. In Puerto Rico Elec. Power, the petitioner' s claim rested on the au
thority under President Clinton' s .Executive Order on environmental
justice, and not on authority under the environmental statutes. Supra
note 34, at •4, Al>MIN. MAT. at 4-0452.
60. PSD Appeal Nos. 98-29 et al, 1 999 EPA App. LEXIS 1 7. AoMIN.
MI\T. 4 1 1 32 (May 27, 1 999).
6 1 . The pelitionel'li were Dr. Jorge E. 00112.ales of the Univel'liity of
Puerto RJco Mayaguez., Sur Contra la Contaminaci6n, a local com
munity organization and Pedro J, Saade Llorens, on behalf of five in
dividuals. Id. at l, AoMJN. MAT, at 41 1 32.
62. Id. at 3, 6. ADMIN, MAT. at 4 1 132, 41 1 33.
63. Id. at 9, 3 1 , ADMJN. MAT. al 41 1 34, 4 1 1 39.
64. Id. at 1 1 , 21, AoMJN. Mu al 4 1 1 34, 4 1 1 36.
65. The Region did not exempt AES from conducting preconstruction
monitoring on particulate maner because the applicable significant
impact levels were exceeded. Id. at 27, AoMIN. MAT. at 4 1 1 38.
66. Id. at 22, AoMJN. MAT. et 4 1 1 34.
67. Id. at 9- 1 ! , ADM.IN. MAT. al 41 134 (citing 40 C,F.R. §S2.2l (i)(8)(i),
U.S. EPA, EPA Ntw SO URCE REVIEW WoRKSHOJ> MANUAL at
C.2S-.28 (Draft 1 990)) [hereinafter NSR MANUAL),
68. More specifically, a full impact multisource modeling is air quality
modeling that takes into account the "proposed source, existing
sources, and residential, commercial, 1111d industrlal growth than ac
companies the activities at the new source or modification." NSR
MANUAL, supra note 67, at C.25.
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typically required to demonstrate that the proposed source
in combination with other sources will not cause or contrib
ute to a violation of any NAAQ S or PSD increment. 69 How
ever, because this requirement is "costly and time-consum
ing," the pennitting official may allow the source to avoid
this impact analysis using a screening device that compares
the results of the source's modeled emissions to significant
impact levels (SILs) . In this case, the predicted 24-hour SO :z
impact from the vroposed facili ty (4.97 micrograms per cu
bic meter (µg/m )) was very close to exceeding the corre
sponding significant impact level ( 5 .0 µg/m3 ) . 70 The Region
went ahead and exempted the applicant from a full impact
analysis. Petitioners obj ected to this because they were con
cerned that the combination of three controls selected by the
pennit applicant would not in fact meet the corresponding
emission l imit in the permit. They asserted that the only rea
so n the applicant proposed the combination o f con
trols-which had not been previously used in prac
rice--was to avoid a preconstruction air quality analysis.7 1
Petitioners also argued that it would be difficult for the ap
plicant to control the sulfur content of the coal, which could
potentially increase the base emissions rate and conse
quently exceed the SILs.72 On appeal, the BAB denied re
view, noting that it was the applicantjs prero g,ative to accept
lower emission limits to get below the SILs 3 and that, al
though the applicant did not have much room for error in the
sulfur content, the pennit required it to avoid errors that
would result in a permit violation. 74 In fact, the BAB en
dorsed the Region's approach, indicating that its decision
"breaks new ground on potential ly available control options
. . . and may be replicated [at other facilities) ."7 5 The BAB
also gave the Region considerable deference on al l technical
challenges to the methodology used by the Region 76 and de
clined to consider one petitioner 's independently performed
multisource analysis because it had not been submitted dur
ing the applicable comment period.77 This multisoutce anal
ysis disclosed the potential for the combined sources to ex
ceed the appl icable NAAQ S. 78
The petitioners also requested preconstruction ambient
monitoring and questioned the Re gion's reliance on a 1 983
attainment demonstration based on modeling instead of
monitoring . 79 They also questioned the Region's use of data
obtained from a facili ty 1 8 kilometers from the proposed
site instead of the results of modeling performed by the
69,

In re EcoEllctrica, supra note 34, at •24, ADMIN. MAT. at 40635
(citing 4-0 C.F.R. § 52.2 l (k), (n)( 2), and NSR MANUAL, supra note
67, at C.24-.25) .
70. The Re gion exempted AES from conducting prcconstructlon moni
toring of S02 because the res ults of modeling showed fhal antici
pated air q uality impacts (4. 97 micrograms over a 24-hour avera ge)
fell below the applicable monitoring de minimis level (5.0 micro
grams over a 24-hour average ). ln re AES Puerto Rico, .rupra note
34, at 1 1 , ADMIN. MAT. at 41 1 34.
71. Id. at 1 2- 1 3. ADMIN. MAT. at 4 1 1 34-35.
72. Jd. at 1 8 - 1 9, AoMTN, MAT, al 41 1 36.
73. Jd. at 1 4, ADMIN. MAT. at 4 1 1 35.
14. Id. at 19. ADMIN. MAT. at 4 1 1 36.
75. Id. a1 14, ADMlN, MAT, a.t 4 l 13S.
76. Petitione� claim, among other thing s, that the model used was not
calibrated for tropical conditions and that the combination of BACT
controls had previously been used in practice.
77. In re AES Puerto Rico, supra note 34, at I . AOMIN. MAT. at 4 1 1 32.
78. Id. 111 1 6, Am.nN. MAT. at 4 1 1 35.
79. Id. al 23, AoMIN. MAT, at 41 1 37.
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Puerto Rico Envi ronmental Quality Board in 1 990 that pre
dicted concentrations in the Guayama area that exceeded
80
NAAQS. The EAB denied review of this claim as well.
noting that attainment is a legal designation and that even
if pe titioners' suspici ons were correct, NAAQS would be
threatened even without the emi ssions from the proposed
facility. In addition, noted the EAB , the facility would be
able to obtain a permit anyway because the impact was
below the threshold for causing or contributing to air
quality violations.
The EAB 's decision may not appear rematkab)e, espe
cially when considering the very deferential standard of re
view often applied in permit proceedings. 81 [n earlier cases,
however the EAB had stated quite boldly that as a matter of
policy, dlscretion should be exercised in a manner that wil l
better implement the Executive Order on Environmental
82
Justice. However, in this case every discretionary decision
had been exercised by the Region in favor of going forward
with the permit, often by adopting the applicant's requests.
Instead of questioning the use of discretion in this matter,
a
the BAB i nstead separted the issue of environmental jus
tice analytically. For example, when discussing the major is
sues the EAB often upheld the Region's exercise of discre
tion 'by reference to generally apflied policy and cases not
involving environmental justice. 3
The review of environmental j ustice came at the end of
the opinion. In discussing the Regio� 's enviro �ental j u�
tice analysis, the EAB focused on acnons the Region took m
response to environmental justice conc �ms, sue � as con
ducting an analysis of mean income (which estabhshed the
84
. the di s• ) , ana 1 >'.z mg
presence of a low-income commuruty
. .
tribution of toxic release inventory (TRI) fac 1hues, and en
gaging in extensive corresponden�f wi th the petitioner over
the course of the pennit process. However. the EAB did
not question whether information dissemination was re
sponsive to the community's concerns, instead noting that
"[t]be Region further analyzed . the dis �buti n o � . . . TRI . : .
?
facilities . . . • The TRI analysis pertams pnmanly to toxic
chemicals rather than criteria pollutants (which are the focus
of the PSD Program), but the Region's effort to provide
meaningful responses on these issues contributes to envi. .
' .,86
ronmental Justice tior the G uayam.a commum ty.
There was one significant condition placed on the permit
in response to environmental justice concerns. The Region
imposed post-construction ambient moni toring and a
80. Jd.
81.

82.
83.

'The- Bou.rd may grant review of a permit decision if some as
pect of the deci.5 ion was based on either a clearly erroneous
finding of fact or conclusion of law, or if lhe decision in
volves an important matter of policy or eitcrcise of discretion
lhat warrants review, . . . [P)ower of review should be only
sparingly citcrcised, and most permit conditions should be fi
nally detennined at the Regional level.
Id. at 6, AoMIN. M,n. at 4 1 1 33 (citations omitted).
Jn re Chem. Was1e Mgmt., supra note 35, at 7, Aot.m,1, MAT. at
40393 .
For example, the EAB noled that the eitempti?n from a. full impact
analysis was validly applitd based on estabhshtd policy
and the
quality of the modeling, i'I re AES Pueno Rico, supra note 34, at 22,
AoMJN. MAT. at 4 1 1 37.
Jd. at 35. AoMIN. MAt. al 41 140.
Id at 36, AoMTN, MAT. al 41 1 40.

84.
85.
86. Id.
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post-construction multisource air quality analysis for S02.
The EAB was clearly impressed by the Region's willingness
to place these conditions on the pennit, noting:
(T]his permi t contains addi tional conditions that are not
mandated by the PSD regulations but are within the Re
gion 's discretion to require. The Region incorporated the
conditions into the permit as a tangible response to lhe
community's concerns about air quality and to fulfill the
goals of lhe Executive Order [on environrnenlal justice) . 88

Curiously, however, the EAB did not seriously question
the Region's decisio n to require this costly endeavor
post-construction rather than preconstru�tion, the lat�er
time being better suited to prevent a potential NAAQS vio
lation. Thus, it appears from this case that to a certa!n de
_
gree the BAB is willing to applaud the l:'se of d1scre� on to
.
condition permits in response to environment� ! JUSt1 ce
concerns but is not incl ined to apply more probing scru
tiny to th; permitting agenc y 's methodology, use of discre
tion, or ultimate findings.
There are two primary lessons that can be taken from this
case . The case indicates the li mited role judicial review is
likel y to play in prompting faimess-o�e �ted reform, but
.
looking slightly beyond the reported decision also provides
an insight into the institutional dynamics th�t hin�� r the de�
velopment ofthis type of reform at the penrut-wntmg level.
Looking to the latter issue, it may well have been that Re
gion officials felt they were using their authority aggres
sively and protectively. Because the SIL had not been tech
nically exceeded, pennitting ofticia� s might � ve deter
mined that al though they had authonty to require precon
struction modeli ng, imposing that condition would � ve ne
gated the incentive for the permit applica�t to use a_n �ova
tive combination of controls. However, 1f the obJechon to
preconstruction modeling is cost (as .the E �B sug�ests), the
case does not explain why the pemut apph�aot did not O?·
ject to multisource modeli ng after construction of the facil
ity as part of the permit terms.
This curiosity raises the question of credibil ity. From the
community's perspective, there is likely to be a great deal of
suspicion, particularly given the history of Agency resis
89
tance to environmental justice claims. It would not be un
common, or even unreasonable, for community members to
believe that regional officials might be allowing the pennit
applicant to avoid preconstruction monitoring and mod�l
ing to avoid explaining how the Agency� ould grant a �aJ or
_
source permit ( 453 tons per year ofS02) if the anal ysis d1s·
closed that ambient concentrations al ready exceeded
NAAQS. In the case, the Region apparently argued that if
NAAQS vio�tions were later �scovered. . it woul? !1Ilder
.
_
take corrective action, mcludmg a possible rev1s1on of
Puerto Rico's state implementation plan (SIP) on an expe87. Jd.. at 35 -36, ADMJN. MAT . al 4 1 140.
88. Jd. at 36, ADMJN. MAT. at 4 1 1 40.
89. For an anecdotal description of a hostile pennit proceeding, see Lulce
W. Cole, The Struggle ofKertlemon City: Lessonsfor the �'? ve,,,enl,
S Mo. J. CoNTi:!MP. LEGAL Issuas 67 ( 1 993- 1 994) (dcscnbmg hear
ing concerning toitic waste incinerator): see also Sheila Poster, Ju:
tice Frorn t� Ground Up: Distributive lnequliies, Grassroots Rem·
ranee, t� Transforma1ive Polilics of the Environmen!af Justice
Movemefll, 86 CAL. L. REV. ns. 8 1 1 - 1 3 (1998) (descnbmg com
munity organization'� meetings wilh industry and government offi
cials in Chester, Pennsylvania).
90. In reAES Puerto Rico, supra note 34, at 9, ADMIN . MAT. at 4 1 1 34.
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dited basis. However, this is a regulatory action largely be
yond the control of the communi ty and does not require pub
lic participation. The community would be in the position of
having to take the Region at its word that this would be done.
To state the dynamic bluntly, it is difficult for a communi ty
activist-the quintessential outsider-to tell whether the of
ficial is really doing the best she can to protect the commu
nity with.in the constraints of limited authori ty or, con
versely, whether the official is only trying to make it appear
so but is actually being unduly conservative because of pres
sure from the pennit applicant or a general lack of commit
ment to environmental j ustice. Simply, there is no way to
92
tell. Undoubtedly, this is an area where leadership and
guidance from the highest levels of the Agency is crucial so
that EPNs rank and file, as well as state and local program
administrators, will be confident that they will be supported
in their efforts to use existing authorities to protect vulnera
ble conununities.
There is another lesson to be learned from this case, al
though one has to go beyond the opinion to consider it.
Benchmarks generally, and more specifically conunonly
applied significance levels, systematical ly work against en
vironmental j ustice communities. In Puerto Rico, the
asthma rates are abnormally high, particularly among chil
dren.93 In addition, because of the tropical climate and open
louvered windows common to the area, remaining indoors
does not provide protection against episodic high exposures
94
ofpollutants. This in tum is problematic because the peti
tioners had introduced evidence of noncompl iance by per
95
mitted facilities in the area. So while emissions that may
fall below a 5 .0 SIL might legitimately be considered "de
minimus" in a typical regulatory contex t , a 4. 97 SIL may
not be ben ign in the context of a community with abnor
mal health vulnerabilities and multiple impacts from di
verse sources. As commonly noted , even standards pre
mised upon conservati ve assumptions have turned out to
be inadequate . 96
Separate from the empirical issues of adequately protec
tive benchmarks and whether agency officials are attempt
ing to be as protective as they can, is the issue ofj udicial re
view. Because the Region declined to require a full impact

91. Id. at 26, ADM I N . MAT. at 4 1 1 38 .
92. The suspicion of agency capture is a part of a larger theme of distrust
resulting in what Professor Laz.aru.s describes as a "pathological cy
cle of regulatory failure, crisis and controver..y.'' Richard J. Lazarus,
The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal En viron
mental Law. 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 3 l l , 407 ( 1 99 1 ).

93. Testimony of Dr. Jose Rodriguez Santana, Program Direcior of the
Pediatric Pulmonology Program, Before the Nationnl Environmen
tal J ustice Advisory Council (NEJAC), December 12, 2000, Wash
ington, D.C. Transcript, Sixteenth Meeting of the NEJAC, vol. II,
pp. l l - 1 25 through 1 1 - 1 32 (Dec. 12, 2000) (on file with author).
94. Testimony of Rosa Hilda Ramos, resident of Puerto Rico, Before the
NEJAC Air and Water Subcommittee, October 1 8 . 2000, in New
York City, N.Y. (Discussion of noncompliance by another power
plant in Puerto Rico. Ms. Ramos additionally noted that at times
residents would sit in their automobiles with the windows rol led up
in an attempt to escape smoke from power plants) (notes on file
with author).
95. In re AES Puerto Rico, supra note 34, at 24-25, AoMIN. M AT. at
41 1 37.
96. Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice lmplicaJions of
Quantitative Ri�k Assessment, 1 996 U. ILL, L. REV. 1 03, 1 16; cf
Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth ofMeaningful Envirorimental Risk As
sessment, 1 9 HARV, ENVTL, L REv. 409 ( 1 995) (discussing perva
sive uncertainties .
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analysis before construction, the case should have raised
si gni ficant questions on appeal about the adequacy of the
Region's approach. Despite the normally deferential stan
dard of review applied by the EAB to pennit decisionS gen
erall y, the Executive Order on Environmental Justice g ives
the EAB j usti fication to more closely examine Agency dis
97
cretion once a vulnerable communi ty is identi fied. Thus,
y
g
q
the EAB could have uestioned wh the Re ion did not ex
ercise its discretion in a more protective manner in ti ght of
the troubling indicators about the ambient concentrations ,
the health problems in this communi ty (hig h asthma rates),
as well as the vulnerabi li ties of low�income communities
generall y, e. g. , more restricted access to health care.98 In
deed, there is a flavor of wishful thi nkin g to EAB 's logic in
the assump tion that violations at existing sources do not
necessaril y indicate po tential NAAQS violations and are
99
enforcement issues not gennane to pe nnit issuances. On
the con trary, the j udicial task should be to review the exer
cise of discretion with a steady eye toward realistic rather
1 00
than theoretical conditions. The level of scrutin y need not
reach inappro priate hei ghts of j udicial micromanagement,
but a much stronger message concerning the exercise o fdis
cretion ary authori ty in light of the Executive Order may be
conveyed while retaining deference to A genc y decisions.
But this has proven not to be the case thus far, either at the
administrative level or in court. The petitioners in AES
Puerto Rico sought j udicial review of the EAB's decision in
101
Among other claims , petitioners were
the First Circuit.
concerned that there would be no o pportuni ty to review and
comment on post-construction ambient monitoring and the
post-construction multisource modeling analysis. The First
Circuit rej ected petitioners' claim , notin g that although
there was no legal requirement for public comment of
post-construction pennit anal ysis , the analysis would be
1 02
conducted in accordance with EPA models and protocols.
g
p
The remainder of the etitioners' challen es were similarly
rej ected. In the end , the peti tioners were left with assurances
of protection that they had no way to veri fy, a result that is
more likely to hei ghten sus picion and skepticism about the
p rocess. The AES Puerto Rico and other EAB decisions
therefore can unwittingl y promote more conflict. Because
reviewing bodies are likel y to be considerably deferential to
pennitting authorities , 103 there is little pressure from this
97. Some may arg ue tha1, given 1he permitting age ncy 's reticence to
find a vulnerable community as a factual matter, stricter scrutiny of
the methodology em p loyed to identi fy 1lll environmental j ustice
community is also warranted. See infra notes 1 59-64 and accompa
nying teKI.
98. In Chemical Waste Managemefll, the EAB acknowled ged that par
ticularvulnerabilities may be relevant and that a "[ broad based] an11J
ysis mi ght �ave been based on assumptions thot, thoug h true for a
broad cross-section of the community, are not true for the smaller
minority or low-income seg ment of the community ." 111 re C/iem
Wastt Mgmt., supra note 35, at *20, ADMIN. MAT. at 40394.
99. In re AES Puerto Rico, supra noie 35, at 24-25 , A DMTN. MA1", al
41 1 37.
1 00. CJ. Daniel A. Farber, Taldng Slippage Seriously; Noru:ompliance
and Creative Compliance in Environmenial Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL.
L, REv, 297 ( 1999) (advocating the concept of sli ppage to inform
environmental doctrine and po lic y ) .
1 0 1 . Sur Contra la Contamlnac i6n v. EPA, 202 F.3d 443, 30 ELR 203SK
( 1 st Cir. Feb. 2000).
102. ld. at 448, 30 ELR at 20360.
103. ln EcoElicrrica, the Region ll officials also eltempled the applicant
from conducti.ng multisource modeling of impacts because the
sou.rec d id not exceed applicable significance levels. lri re
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venue to encourage EPA to more aggressively use its discre
tion to take protective measures during permit issuances.
This could be particularly problematic for communities
near heavily industrial ized areas where the aggregated risks
are more extreme while the pressures to provide relief from
104
regulatory requirements are even more demanding. This
unfortunate situation is avoidable. The generic language
commonly found in omnibus clauses have considerably
more potential than has been used thus far. While clauses
h
such as "protection of healt" may include consideration of
adverse health effects from permitted emissions, these
clauses also may be more liberally interpreted to allow at
tention to cumulative impacts, safety concerns stemming
from increased traffic, or the increased risk of facility acci
dents and resulting episodic acute exposures that are com
tos
mon occurrences in some communities.
Clauses such as
"protection of welfare" may be used to allow consideration
of quality of life impacts such as increased noise and odors
and other facility-related impacts that may not result di
rectly from the permitted releases. Such a clause may even
authorize consideration of impacts such as the potential for
increased criminal activity and decreased property values,
106
where appropriate.
note 34. at •25, ADM lN. MAT, at 40635. The
Region also perfonncd an environmental justice analysis and con
cluded that che facility did not have a disproportionate impact to
lower income communities because the modeled impacts from the
facility's expected emissions fell below the NAAQS. Id. at •28,
ADMIN. MAT. at 40635. The environmental justice analysis con
sisted of overJayiog per capi!D income data upon source Joe lion
data. The Region concluded tho! the median income of residents near
the facility was higher than the median income elsewhere in the mu
nicipality and nearby municipalities; however, the median income
was lower than the commonwealth's median income. In this case,
the EAB noted the Administrator's authority under the CAA, to take
into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and
other costs when decidi.ng upon an appropriate BACT emissions
limitation, and to determine on a case-by-case basis whether such
limi tation is achievable for such source or modification through ap
plication of production processes or available methods, systems,
and techniques. 40 C.F.R. §52.2 1 ( 8)( 1 2). However, while noting
that the Administrator had broad authority and could have required
a multisource analysis, the EAB also noted that even if such an
analysis had been performed, the exemption was proper because
it wil!l based on the source ' s own projected de minimis air quality
impacts. In re EcoElectrlca, supra note 34, at •23, ADMJN . MAT.
Ill 40634.
1 04. For it i� in these areas that well-funded industrial interests are keen to
challenge what they perceive to be oppressive and inefficient com
mand-and-control requirements. See, e.g .. infra notes 276-320 and
accompan yi ng text, d i sc us sing clustered refineries in the
nonattainment Gulf Coast region where offsets arc difficult to obtain
for major ources of criteria air pollutants.
105. For example, Professor Kuehn notes that during the period from
1 994 to 1 997, the area around Convent, Louisiana, experienced 1 4 1
reported emergency releases of toxic chemicals. This is a n average
of three per month and a 500% increase in the average number ofac
cidental releases since 1993. Robert R. Kuehn, Denying Access to
Legal Representation: The Attack on the Tulane EnvironmenJal Law
Clinic, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y (forthcoming 200 1 ) {manuscript at
n.26, on file with author) (citing May 26, 1998, letter from Tulane
Environmental Law Clinic to EPA Office of Civil Rights); see also
Ed Timms, Racial Patrerns: Economics and Segregation Left Mi·
nori/l'es Closer to Toxic Sites, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct.
3, 2000, at A l , available at 2000 WL 28 1 1 1 045 (describing how ac
cidental releases from refineries force residents in nearby public
housing to evacuati: or adopt "shelter in place" strategies, i.e., shut
ting the doors and windows and "hop[ing) fo r the best'').
106. Some regulatiollS' may specifically preclude the consideration of de
creased property valucs. ln such a case, the specific regu)ation would
override a default assumption that this factor is germane to the wel
f'ure of communities impacted hy the permit.
EcoEUctrica, supra
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Still other statutory phrases-such as those directing the
permitting authority to consider the "social costs" imposed
as a result of the facility's location or processes�an be
used to consider a wider range of factors, such as siting and
1 07
and harm to cultural or religious
exposure disparities
practices (land-based Native American beliefs). No EAB
cases, for example, have considered the nonattainment NSR
provisions of the CAA in connection with an explicit envi
108
ronmental justice chatlenge.
These provisions require
that "an analysis of alternative sites, sizes, production pro
cesses, and environmental control techniques for such pro
posed source demonstrates that benefits of the proposed
source significantly outweigh the environmental and social
costs imposed as a result of its location, construction, or
1 09
modification.'' This phrase, particularly because it is cou1 07, In particuhn, these provisions would be helpful where evidence of
risk disparity is difficult to obtain because ofscientific uncertainty or
because of the lack of resources or information 10 conduct a
risk-based analysis.
108. Two recent cases that have discussed 1he alternatives annlrsis and
social cost criteria of nonattainment NSR arc an EAB decision in In
re Campo Landfi.11 Project, Campo Bank Indian Reservation, NSR
Appeal No. 95- 1 , 6 E. A.B. 505, AoMIN. M.n. 40526 (June 1 9,
1996) (orderdenying review in part and remanding in part), and a Ti
tle V case before the Administrator in In re Operating Perm.It Form
aldehyde Plant Borden Chem., Inc. Geismar Ascension Parish, La.,
Petition 6-0 1 -J . Pennit No. 263 l-VO (order responding to peti
tioner' s request that lhe administrator object to the issuance of a state
operating permit) (on file with author). Although the Campo case in
volved a Native American tribe and Borden involved a low income
area, in neither case was the alterna tive and socio! cost criteria ex
plicirJy tied to 11h environmental justice challenge. In In re Campo,
the petitioner claimed that an alternative site should have been cho
sen because the landfill was situated over a sole-source aquifer. In re
Campo, at 520, AoMtN. MAT, at 40530. The EAB noted that there
were appropriate control measures to reduce the risk to insignificant
levels. Jd. at 524, AoMIN. MAT. at 4053 J . The EAB also noted lhat
because part of the reason for the project was to develop and diver
sify the economic base of the tribe, the use of non-tribal land was not
a viable altemotive. Id. at 523, ADMl'N. MAT. at 405 3 1 . In In re
Borden, there was an apparent environmental justice challenge in
one count that was a Title V1 claim, which the Administrator appro
priately declined to review it as it was under consideration by the
EPA Office of Civil Rights. /11 re Borckn. at 5 1 . The contention th11t
the altema1ives/social cost analysis was insufficient did not appear
to rest upon the demographics of the community but upon more gen
eral allegations that the environmental impacts outweighed lhe "so
cial an(! economic benefit'' of the facility. Id. at 35. Thus, the Admin
istrator reasoned that the process and control equipment met and al
times exceeded applicable requirements and impacts were mini
mized or avoided as much as possible. Id. at 39, More specifically,
the Administrator noted that NAAQS were met al the property line,
soil and groundwater were protected by impervious materials, the lo
cation near Borden's primary customer would reduce transporta
tion-related risk, there was low risk of off-site emissions, few resi
dences nearby, and no schools, hospitals, estuaries, or historical, cul
tural, or archeofogical sites in close proximity to the proposed plant
Id. at 40-43. In addition, six alternative shes were considered but re
jected because they had insufficient space or would cause increased
potential impacts. Id. at 43-44. The Administrator used the socioeco
nomic profile of the community to suppon the site-, noting that the
area was a desigm1ted enterprise zone and consl?Uction and opera
tion of the plant would increase employment and tax revenue. Id. at
4 1 . Althougb speculative at this poi.nt. the analysis might have dif
fered if the petitioner had argued that a disparate impact (assuming
one existed) was itself a social cost to be weighed against the grant
ing of a pennit. This would have made the existence of a racially dis
parate impact relevant to a �nnit re<j uiremcnt, but the case would
likely have resulted in denial of rev iew as the facts indicate that
off-site impacts were minimal.
109, 42 U.S.C. §7503(n)(5), BLR STA.T. CAA § 1 73(a)(S) (emphasis
added). The reference to social costs may allow the pemi.itting au
thority to consider a wider range of impacts, including nonbealth im
pacts. See, e.g. , Eileen Gauna, Major Sources of Criteria Pollutants
in Nooorrainment Areas; Balancing the Goalt ofClean Air. Environ-
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pled with a reference to consideration of alternative sites
and processes, provides am ple authority to develop a sub
stanti ve alternatives anal y sis and a more protective permit
ting framework. Without more probing review, the A g ency
is left without j udicial encoura gement or su ppo rt and,
t h e r e fo re , m an y p e r m i t t i n g o ffi c ials c o n t i n u e to
underutilize these imp ortant provisions. Testame nt to this
observation is the fact that EPA has -y et to issue g uidance on
the nonattai nment N S R alternatives anal y sis and social
0
cost criteria. 1 1
The issue of deferential review, for a di fferent reason , is
si gn ificant in considering the inte rp l ay between the environ
mental statutes and the Civil Ri g hts Act, spe ci ficall y Title
VI. State and local regul ators often forcefull y assert that al
though they have obli g ations wider Title VI, the y do not
have the authori ty to condition or den y p ermits on environ
mental j ustice grounds if the p ermit ap plicant otherwise
meets all re q uirements of the app licable environmental stat
ute. The BAB cases refute that central contention to some
degree , and this fact raises a host of other issues.

The Title VI Saga
Because of the apparent reticence of environmental ag en
cies-at the local, state, re g ional , or federal levels-to con
dition or deny permi ts on environmental j ustice g rounds ,
communi ty activists have instead turned to Title VI, a
nonenvironmental statute, as a potential redress for long
111
standing racial dis parities in environmental burden s. Title

mental Justice, and Industrial Develop ment, 3 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J.
ENYT'L, L. & PoL'Y 379 ( 1 996) , In addi1ion, 1he key p hrase u nder the
Federal Insecticide, Fun gicide, and Rodenticide Act ( FIFRA) that
grants the Administrator the authorit y to re g ister pe sticide use is that
the pesticide will not ha vc "unreasonable a dverse effects on the e nvi
ronment," which in tum is defined to re q uire the Administrator to
consider the "economic, social and environmental costs and benefits
of the use of any pes ticide." 7 U.S.C. § I 36 ( bb) , ELR STAT. FIFRA
§ 2( bb ) (em phasis added) .

1 1 0, In re Bortkn, supra note 1 08, at 36.

1 1 1 , For a discussion of le gal doctrine , see Julie H. Hurwitz & E. Q uita
Sullivan, Usin g Civil Rights Laws to Challen ge Environmental Rac
ism, Frorn Bean to Guardians to Chester to Sandoval ( un published
manuscri p t on file wilh author) ; Bradford C. Mank, ls Thue a Pri

vate Cause ofAction Under EPA 's Title VJ Reg ulmior,s?; The Need
Empo wer Envirotllrn!ntal Justice Plaintiffs, 24 Co LUM, J. ENVn...
L. 1 ( 1 999 ) ; Gilbert Paul C11m1sco, Public Wnmg .r, Private Rlg hls:
Private Attorneys General /or Ci vil Rights, 9 VILL, ENVTL. L.J. 3 2 1
( 1 998 ) ( private righl o f action under Title VI) ; Wesley D . Few , The
Wake of DlscriminiJ/ory Intent a nd the Rise of Title VJ in Environ
menial Justice Lawsuits, 6 S.C. ENVTL, L.J. 1 08 ( 1 997); Michael
Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brou g ht Under Titit VJ ofthe
Civil Rlghls Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285 ( 1995 ); James H. Colo py, Tht
Road Less Travtled; Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Title
VI ofllu! Civil Rights Act of 1 964, 1 3 STAN , ENvrL. L.J , 125 ( 1 994);
Lazarus, s up ra note 9. Ste al.ro Bradford C. Mank. The Draft Title VJ
Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidances; Too Much Dlscre
rion for EPA and a More Difficult Srandard for Complainants? 30
ELR 1 1 1 44 ( Dec. 2000) ; Bradford C. MIIJlk, Reforming Stale
Brow,lfield Prog rams to Comply With Title VI, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1 1 5 ( 2000) ; Luke Cole, " Wron g on tht Facts, Wrong on the
Law ": Civil Rig hts Advocates Excoriate EPA 's Mos1 Recent Tirle VI
Misstep , 29 ELR 1 0775 ( Dec. 1999) [ hereinafter Wrong on the
Facts]; C. S ilverman, EPA 's lnierim Guidancefor Investigating Ti
tle VI ComplainJs Cl,aflenging Permits: The Bumpy Road Toward a
Federal Environmental-Civil Rig hts Policy, 6 ENvrL. L. 35 ( 1999);
10

NATIONAL ADVlSORY COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY &
1'EClfNOLOGY 1 REPORT OF l'H£ TITLE Vl 1MPLEM£NTATION ADVI
SORY COMMITTEE! NE.Xl' STEPS FOR E p A, STATB, ANO LocA L ENVl·
RONMENTAL Jusncs PltOORAMS ( 1 999 ) [ hereinafter Tll'LE VI
FACA REPORTl ; June M. Ly le , Reactions to EPA 's Interim Guid·

ance.• Tiu! Growing Battle for Control Over Environmental Justice

i
VI, f rst enacted in 1 964 , was i nte rpreted in 1983 by the U.S.
Sup reme Col.lrt to gi ve federal a gencies the authori ty to pro
mul gate re g ulations precludin g reci pients of federal funds
from eng ag in g in activiti es that have a discriminatory "ef
"112
fect,
i .e., re gul ations that prohibit dis parate impacts
rather than re gulations prohibitin g onl y intentional discrim
ination. Following the practice of many federal ag encies. in
1 973 , E PA first p romul gated re gulations aimed at alleviat
1 13
The most recent iteration spe 
in g discriminato ry effects.
y
p
p
cificall
rovides in art that " [ a] reci p ient shall not use cri
teria or methods of administerin g its p ro g ram which have
the effect of su bj ectin2 individuals to discrimination be
cause of their race." 1 1
However, it was not until almost 20 years l ater, in Se p 
tember 1 993 , that EPA saw the be g inning of a steady stream
of administrative com plaints alle g in g Title VI violations by
1 15
state and local environmental a gencies.
Most of the com
p laints i nvolved the pe rmitting process 1 1 6 and consequently
raised the perplexing issues that are discussed later in this
Article. At that time, the EPA Office of Ci vii Rights ba,d nei
ther the resources nor the anal yti cal framework to begin the
task of investi gating and decidin g the claims. ln 1 996 , the
continuing institutional p aral y sis p romp ted acti vists to
write a letter to EPA Administrator Carol Browner about the
1 17
lack of action on the pendin g complaints.
Althoug h EPA

.r

Decisionmaking, 75 IND. L.J. 687 (2000); Bradford C. Mank, Envi
ronmental Justice and Title VJ; Makin g Recipient Agencies Justify
Tlu!ir Siting Decisions, 73 Tu1.,. L. REV. 787 ( 1 999) ; Michael D.
Mattheisen, The U.S. En vironmental Protection A gency 's New En
vironmental Civil Rig his Policy, 1 8 VA. ENYfL, L. J . 1 83 ( 1 999 ) :
Kristen L Raney, Thi! Role of Title VJ in Chester Residents v. Seif: Is
tlu! Future of Environflli!ntal Justice Really Brig hter?, 1 4 J. NAT.
RESOURCES & E111vrL. L. 1 35 ( 1998- 1 999 ); Maura Lynn Tierne y .

Environrru:ntal Justice and Title VJ Challenger to Permit Decisions:
Thi! EPA 's Interim Guidance, 48 CAn-t. U. L. R.Ev. 1 277 ( 1999);
Jimm y White, Environmental Ju.rtfce: ls Dis paratt Impact
Enough ?, 50 MERCER L. R1,v. I J 55 ( 1 999) ; Richard Monette, Envi
ronmental Justice and Indian Tribes; The Double-Edged Tomahawk
ofApplying Civil Right.r Laws in Indian Country, 76 U. DET. MERCY
L. Rev. 72 1 ( 1 999 ) ; Luke W. Cole , Civil Rights, Environmental Jus
tice, and tlu! EPA: The Brief History of Adminfstratiw Complaints
Under Title VI ofthi! Civil Rights Act of / 964, 9 J. ENvrL. L. & Lmo.

3()1) ( 1994) ,
1 1 2. Guardians Ass ' n v. Civil Serv. Comm' n of lhe City of N.Y., 463
U.S . 582 , 584, 593 ( 1 983 ) .
1 1 3. 38 Fed. Re g . 1 7968, 1 7969 ( July S , 1 973 ) : see also 46 Fed. Re g .
2306 ( Jan. 8, 1 9 8 1 ) and Nondiscrimination in Pro g rams Receivin g
Federal Assistance From lhe Environmental Protection A g enc y , 49
Fed. Re g . 1 659 ( Jan. 1 2, 1 984 ) ( codified at 40 C.F.R. p t. 7 ) .
1 14. Nondiscrimination in Pro g rams Receivin g Federal Assistance From
the Environmental Protection A genc y , 40 C.F.R. pt. 7 .3S ( b) (2000 ) .
See also 40 C.F.R, pt. 7.35 (c) (2000) ( providing that " [ al recip ient
shall not choose a site or location of a facilit y that has the p u rpo se or
effect . . . of . . . subj ecting [ individuals] lo discrimination under any
p rog ram . . . on the g rounds of race . . . . ") . However thi provision is
001 g encralJ y, a pp llcable in the pe rmittin g context as most reci p ients
( state environmental a gencies that have been deleg ated permitting
authorit y ) , do not choose the site . Generally the site has \>ten chosen
by the p roj ect s po nsor before the pe nnit a pp lication is submitte-d.

1 1 5. Wron g on the Facts, sup ra nolt 1 1 1 , at 1 0775.
1 1 6. When the lnttrim Guidance was re1eased, 14 of the 1 8 com plaints
under investi g ation involved pennitting. Enviro111tU11jla/ Justice:
Browner Defends Release of Interim Policy 011 Processing of Civil
Righls Comp/alms, 29 Env' t Rep. ( BNA) 233 ( May 22, 1 998 ) (com
ments of Administrator Browner to Title VI FACA Subcommittee ) .
In May 2000, Anne Goode, director of the EPA Office- of Civil
Rights, noted that thrce-'luarters of the complaints received involve
pe nnltting . Title VJ Guidance Offers Predictability, Community
Protection, Goode Say.r, 3 1 Souo WASTE R1,P. , 2000 WL
1 27 46 1 97 ( June 29, 2000).
1 1 7. Wrong on thi! Facts, supra note 1 1 1 . at I 0775.
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committed to actively investigate at least five of the pending
cases, the next item to come from the Office of Civil Rights
was not until February 1 998; it was not a ruling on any in
vestigation but rather an 1 1 -page docwnent ti tied Interim

Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Com
plaints Challenging Pem1its (Interim Guidance). 1 1 8 The In
terim Guidance sparked a firestorm of criticism. Environ

mental justice activists' tentative endorsement of EPA's ef
9
fort as "an important first step" 1 1 was undoubtedly wel
comed by the Agency when compared to the stinging criti
cisms coming from the indus!r)'/bus i ness sector and
120
Many of these stake
state/local regulatory agencies.
holders felt the Interim Guidance left too many unanswered
questions and complained that the ensuing uncertainty
121
destabilized ex isting permit programs.
Apparently in response to the strong criticism, in April
1 998, EPA established the multi-stakeholder Ti tle VI Imple
mentation Advisory Committee formed wider the federal
Advisory Commi ttee Act (Title VJ FACA). 1 22 The commit
tee cone! uded its mission in March 1 999, submitting its re·
port to E PA. 1 23 Al though the mission of the Title VI FACA
was to help EPA provide guidance to state agencies on how
to comply wi th Title VI, the discussions inevitably clustered
arowid the questions left unanswered by the Interim Guid
ance and, consequently, led to a variety of plausible inter·
pretations of a cognizable c lai m under Title VI. 1 24 Given the
diversity of stakeholders and their signi ficant differences on
fundamental questions, it is not surprising that the commit
tee did not achieve consensus on the majo ri ty of issues, with
possibly two important exceptions. First, the commi ttee
1 25
agreed on a set of overarching principles.
Second, the
committee menibers agreed that it was more important to
explore the complexities of the issues rather than to achieve
a series of ''i nnocuous, watered-down" recommend�
1
tions. 26 In addition to several procedural issues, the com
mittee identified eight crucial substantive issues that EPA
needed to address.
The issues identified lead to the very point where, in a
manner of speaking, the rubber meets the road. How the
Agency would address these questions would more accu
rately reveal EPA's environmental justice policy than its
public statements, and perhaps in a less direct way provide
insight as to its institutional ability to address competing
1 18. U.S. EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR lNVESl1GATING TITL6 Vl Ao.
MINISTRA� CoMPLAINTii CHALLENGING PERMrn ( 1 998) (avail
able from lhe ELR Document Service, ELR Order No. AD-3660)
[hereinafter lNTERJM GUIDANCE].
1 19. Leiter from 44 Signatories (representing a coalition of grass-roots
activists, community groups, environmental justice networks and re
source centers, church and labor leaders, attorneys, and academios)
IO Anne E. Goode, Director. commenting on the Interim Guidance,
at 2 (May 5, 1 998) (on file wilh aulhor),
1 20. TITLE VJ FACA RE PORT, supra note I 1 1 , at 3.
1 2 1 . Id. at 4-5.
1 22, The author was a member of the Title VI implemenmtion subcom
mittee appointed as a member of the academia stakeholder group.
Other stakeholder groups included industry, nongovernmental orga
niZlltions, and state/local governments. See NACEPT FEDERAL Ao
VlSORY COMMITlll,E, SUMMARY OF l1{E TITLE VJ I M PLEMENTATION
ADVISORY CoMMITTBEMEETING (MAY 18- 19, 1998) (the list of par
ticipants of this initial meeting is at the end of the summary).
1 23. TITLE VJ FACA REPORT, supra note 1 1 1 .
1 24. Id. a t 3
125, Id, at l l - 13.
l26. Id. at 10-1 1 .
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fairness claims. The Agency did respond in J une 2000,
with a 1 47-page draft revised guidance contai ning its own
internal guidance for investigating Title VI administrative
complaints as well as external guidance for EPA fund re
27
cipients (Draft Title VI Guidance). 1 By focusing on (a)
the questions posed by the Conunittee, and (b) how these
questions were answered or left unanswered under the
Draft Title VI Guidance, the reader may gain a better ap
preciation of the issues in this politically difficult and tech
nica l ly complex area.

Defining and Evaluating Adverse Effects
The first substantive issue presented by the committee was
1 28
At its
the difficulty in defining and evaluating effects.
most narrow, an adverse effect co uld be construed to mean
1
adverse health effects 29 directly caused by the permi tted re
1 30
A more expansive interpretation of adverse
leases only.
effects would i nclude not only the newly permitted releases,
but those changes to the community's well-being that are re
lated to the permit at issue, 1 3 1 in light of the aggregate
sources of pollutants and other adverse impacts existing a t
th e ti me th e permit is under consideration. This could poten
tially incl ude not only the cumulative risks posed by all per
mitted releases, but their possible synergistic effects as
well. 132 Also i ncluded would be all foreseeable adverse im·
pacts that may befall the community as a result of the per
mitted operations . These facility-related (rather than solely
emission-related) impacts could incl ude increased traffic,
odors, and noise. Often, community residents are as con
cerned with these immediate impacts on their daily lives as
they are with the potential ly latent effects of permitted re
leases. Lastly, the scope ofimpacts recognized under a more
expansive interpretation could i nclude other "environmen
tal, economic, cultural, social , or psychological harm[s],''
for example, damage to a si te that is sacred to a Native
American tribe or others with land-based bel ief systems, or
plummeting residential land val ues, or even prosti tution ac
tivities encroachi ng upon residential nei �hborhoods that
would not have occurred but for the facil ity. 33 Clearly, com1 27. U.S. EPA, Draft Tille VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients
Ad:m.in.istcring Environmental Permitting Programs ( Draft Recipi
ent Guidance) and Draft Revised Guidance for 1nves1iga1ing Title VI
Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits (Draft Revised ln
vesligation Guidance), 65 Fed. Reg. 39650 (June 27, 2000) (avail
able from the ELR Document Service, ELR Order Nos. AD-45 1 7
(Draft Recipient Guidance) and AD-45 1 6 (Draft Revised Investiga
tion Guidance)) [hereinafter Draft Thie VI Guidance].
1 28. TrrLe VJ FACA REPORT, supra note 1 1 1 , at 57-65 .
1 29. Bodily impairment. infirmity, illness, or death. Id. al 58.
1 30. Id. at 57. In !Ilf!nl oflhe d iscussions the Agency uses the t.e rm "emis
sions'' instelld o "releases." This is because many of the perm.ii dis
putes under consideration involve air perm.its. However, releases
could include rhe addition of pollulants into the water (effluent) or
releases of pollulants into lhe land by underground injection. !lfot
withst.anding the more broadly applicable ierm, because mosl of the
examples in this Article involve air permits, the iernt "emissions" is
often used interchangeably with "releases."
1 3 1 . Id.

1 32. Id. at 60.
1 33 . In Chesler, Pennsylvania, forexamplc, prostitutes began to frequent
the: area to solicit the uuckdrivers who were waiting to unload truck
loads of conraminat.ed soils. Testimony of Zulene Mayfield Before
the NEJAC Committee, Transcript. In the Matter of the Fourteenth
Meeting of lhe NEJAC, vol l , pp. 1 -7 1 , 1 ·72 (Nov. 30, 1 999); see
also Tri'LE VJ FACA REPORT, supra note 1 1 l, at 60; LOKR W.
CoLE ,I< SHEJLA R FOSTER, FROM THE GIIOUl'iD UP, ENVIRONMEN·
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munity residents see the permit as the gateway to a wide
range of undesirable impacts and. additionally, to the atten
dant risks of accidents at Ute facility and/or chronic noncom
pliance. Given the difference between a narrow view of the
meaning of "adverse effects" and the more expansive view,
it is little wonder that this issue occupied hours of vigorous
disagreement among the commi ttee members. 1 34
EPA attempted to resolve this contentious issue under the
subsequently issued Draft Tit/e VJ Guidance. Aliliough it is
somewhat unclear, the Draft Title VJ Guidance appears to
limit the types of recognized adverse effects to health im
pac ts . 1 35 First. the guidance explains that in assessing
whether an adverse impact exists, background sources of
6
stressors may be considered. 1 3 The definition of "stressor''
in the glossary oftenns includes "any substance introduced
into the environment that adverselr affects the health of hu
13
mans animals, or ecosystems."
Although noise, odors,
and increased traffic are not always "introduced into the en
vironment" by the permittee in the literal sense, the defini
tion specifically lists "noise'' as a factor that may adversely
38
affect a receptor. 1 Thus, to a limited degree EPA intends to
consider a range of cumulative impacts that affect health. To
this baseline, the facility's impacts are added. However, it is
less clear whether the Agency will consider facility-related
impacts that are not emission- related impacts. Equally sur
prising is that the guidance does not explicitly address
whether nonhealth-related impacts can be the basis of a
claim, as it focuses exclusively on health-related impacts.
The only clue lies in an oblique reference in an appendix ti
tled "Summary of Key Stakeholder Issues Concerning EPA
Ti tle VI Guidance." In that section, which appears to be a
general response to corrunents, the Agency notes that nei
ther the Interim Guidance nor the Draft Title VJ Guidance
"requi re[ ] recipients to address social and economic issues
9
that they are not authorized to address."13 As omnibus
TAL RACISM AND THE RISE 01' THE ENVIRONM ENTAL JUSTICE
MOVEMENT (2000) (describing the Chester residents' campaign)
1 34. See supra note 1 22 (the author was a member of the Title VI
FACA Com m ittee) .
1 35. Toe glossary definition of "impact" stales:
In the health and environmental context, a negative or harm·
fol effect on n receptor resulting from exposure to a stressor
(e.g., a case of disease). The likelihood of occwrence and se
verity of the impact may depend on the mngnitude and fre
quency of exposure, and other factors affecting toxicity and
receptor sensitivity.
Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 1 27, at 39666.
1 36. However, in determining whether there is a violation, only "sources
of s1ressors (e.g., facilities), stressors (e.g.• chemical or pathogens),
and/or impacts (e.g., risk of disease)" Within the recipient's authority
will be considered. Id, at 39670. This latter significant limitation on a
Tille V1 claim is related to another substantive question and will be
discussed in greater detail. See i nfra notes 1 59-64 and accompany
ing text.
1 37. The complete definition is: Any factor that may adversely affect re
ceptors, including chemical (e.g .. criteria pollutants, toxic contami
nants), physical (e.g., noise, extreme temperatures, fire) and biologi·
,cal (e.g., disease pathogens or parasites). Generally, any substance
i n troduced into the environment that adversely affects the health of
human. s , animals, or ecosystems. Airborne stressors may fall into
1wo main groups: (a) those emitted directly from identifiable sources
and (b) those produced in the air by interaction between chemicals
(e.g., most ozone). Draft Title VI Guidance, sup ra note 1 27, at 39666
138. Id.
1 39. Draft Title V I Guidance, sup ra note 1 27, at 3969 1 . Although per
haps intended lo signal EPA ' s policy position, it nevertheless begs
the question, Laz.arus and Tai have made a convincing case that there
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clauses may allow such considerations, the ambiguity re
maining in the Draft Title VJ Guidance wiili respect to defin
ing adverse impacts is surprising given the repeatedly artic
ulated importance of this issue to all stakeholders.
A question related to evaluating an adverse impact is the
type of proof that may be required to establish a violation
under complaints grounded on allegations of adverse health
effects. 140 The adverse effect might be established only by a
strict test of causation similar to tests developed in toxic tort
cases. 141 This standard would probably require epidemio
logical studies demonstrating the presence of actual harm,
and other evidence would need to be submitted to show an
exposure pathway and the causal link between the demon
strated harm and the permitted activities. An adverse impact
1 42
could also be established by evidence of differential risk.
This standard would account for the potential latent effects
of exposure to toxic chemicals but would l ikely re11:iu ire the
1
use of comparative quantitative risk assessments. Given
the number of complaints pending and the limited resources
available to investigate the complaints, such a complicated
144
and resource-intensive analysis does not seem feasible.
An alternative test would be to infer an adverse effect based
145
on elevated levels of poll utants in the impacted area. The
latter is a test essentia11y using differential exposure as an
evidentiary surrogate for differential risk.
Before EPA addressed this issue in the Draft Title VJ
Guidance, it used a differential exposure test-or what it
termed a "relative burden analysis"-in Ute Shintech case .
The S hintech case involved a controversial Title Vl admin
istrative complaint that was under investigation at the time
of the committee deliberations, but the claim based upon the
permit was mooted when the permit application was subse
146
quently withdrawn. This investigation was the Agency's
first attempt to evaluate an alleged adverse impact. After
this portion of the investigation was closed, EPA requested
that the Science Advisory Board (SAB) review the method
147
ology the Agency had used.
The SAB in its report ob-

1 40.
141.
1 42.
143.

is considerable authority within the environmental statutes to ad·
dress a potentially wide range of impacis that raise environmental
justice concerns. See Lazarus & Tai, supra note 38, at 6 1 9, 668; see
also Gauna, supra note 109, at 392-95 (social cost criterion).
Some compl a i n l s al lege d i scri m ination in public partici pa
tion opportu n i t ie s .
TITLE VI FACA REPORT, supra note 1 1 1 , a t 58.
Id. at 59 (industry stakeholders rejecting "'circumstantial" evi
dence of a causal link in favor of risk assessments an epidemio
logical evidence).
In order to prove that the risk at issue is greater than risks posed to
other communities that are predominately white or higher income,
several risk assessments may have to be prepared and compared. In
addition, risk assessments in the permit context can be unrelioble in
dicators of risk. See Ashley C. Schannauer, Science and Po l icy in
Risk Assessmenl: TIU! Need for Effective Public Participation, 24
VT. L. Rev. 3 1 ( 1 999).

1 44. See, e.g. , 0RAfT REV1SED DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMA"l10N REGARD
ING Lou1slANA DEPAR TMENT OF ENVIRONMEl'ITAL 0UALJTYIPER
M.TT FOR PROPOSED SH INTECH FACILITY, Tln.E VJ AoMJNJSTRA11VE
COMPLAINT ( 1998) (describing in vestigation findings using an rela
tive burden analysis); see also infra note 1 46 (critique of methodol·
ogy used in Shinrech case by Science Advisory Board (SAB) and
proposi ng a more complicated methodology).
145. Draft Title Vl G uidance, supra note 1 27, at 3966 1 .
146. I n addition 10 a claim of disparate impact premised upon !h e granting
of a permit, the Shintech case also alleged a paUern and practice of
racial discrimination; the pattern and practice case is stiU pending.
141. SAB, Al'! SAB REPO RT! REVIEW OF DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT
ME'l'HODOLOG IES ( 1 988) [hereinafter SAB REPORT],
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jected not only to the descriptive phrase ••relative burden"
but advised EPA that the consideration of differential expo
sure was too limited because de minim.is risk could not be
148
considered in such an analysis.
However, the SAB also
identified significant problems with a risk-based analysis as
well, noting that both methodologies would tend to underes
1 49
timate risks;
Ultimately, the Draft Title VI Guidance reveals that the
Agency has endorsed a differential risk standard by its intent
to use risk values as benchmarks for adverse i mpacts, adopt·
ing an acceptable cancer risk of less than one in one million
and an acceptable non-cancer risk of less than one on the
150
These ri sks are considered "not ad
hazard index .
verse,"although risks above these levels are not necessari ly
1 51
presumed to be adverse.
However, in also indicating i ts
148. Id. at 2.
1 49. In discussing both an enhanced relative burden analysis (ERBA)
that takes into account dispersion of pollutants, and a risk-based
analysis tenned Cumulative Outdoor Air Toxics Concentration
Exposure Methodology (COATCEM) (dispersion model analyz
ing ou1door concentrations of hazardous air pollutants), id. at 7, the
SAB noted that:
[t]hey do not take into account short- term excursions from
steady state levels. As a result there could be acute exposures
that may be significandy higher than the calculated steady
state levels. Neither ERBA nor COATCEM evaluate deposi
tion transfers to otherenvironmental media of emitted chemi
cals or subsequent reemission of these chemicals. In addition,
both methodologies assume that all emitted chemicals dis
perse in the same manner. They do not take into account that
some emitted chemicals are stable while others are reactive.
In addition, they do not address the fact that cenain chemicals
are released in the vapor phase, while others arc associa1ed
with particles.

Jd. al 1 7 . The SAB also noted serious limitations where the method

ologies did not consideror evaluate acute intermittent exposures, the
length of residence: of persons with 1he census blocks, and their activ
ity patterns, as well as limitations due to the fact that input data from
the TR1 was self-reported and based upon estimates. Id. Neither take
into account exposures from drinking water, soil, or food chain path·
ways due to air emissions. Id. at 1 6.
In order to address the limitations of the methodology, the SAB
recommended that EPA conduct a sequenced analysl5 that would be
gin with a site-specific analysis of exposure using the Basic Relative
Burden Analysis (annualized emissions from TRI data) to identify
the chemicals upon which to focus, or more optimally an Enhanced
Relative Burden Analysis (including dispersion modeling) to iden
tify toxicity-weighted exposures. After this basic toxicity-weighted
exposure analy.sis, EPA could supplement it With the use of risk as
sessments of the chemicals or c lasses of chemicals of concern . The
COATCEM methodology had promise in this regard, bl.It the SAB
cautioned that an uncenainty and sensitivity analysis had to be pcr
fonned for each methodology. 1ben an impa.c l would be considered
''significant" if the calculated risks were both above the de minimis
level and the toxicity weighted exposure ratios were larger then the
uncertainty factors. Finally, the findings should be validated with
site-specific ambient monitoring data.
Two things stand In marked contrast in lhe SAB report. First is that
the methodologies used and proposed by EPA have significant limi·
tations that would be expected to underestimate risk. Id. at 25. 29. ln
addlt.ion, the SAB appears lo suggest that the exposure ratios have to
be larger than the uncertainty factors, thus making uncertainty pre
clude a finding of significant risk. This would mean that use of the
methodology proposed by the SAB would systematically work
against impacted communities, even though the SAB specifically
noted that whether an identified disparity is substantial and whether
the impact is at or above a level of concern are policy issues. Id. at 6.

150. Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 127, at 39680.
ISi.

OC R may m m a finding i n instances where cumulative risk
Jewels fall in the rang� of 1 in I mllliop ( I 0 -6) to l in 1 0,000

intent to consider "toxic i ty-weighted emi ssions"m and
1 53
"concentration levels,"
the Agency does appear to retain
the option to rely solely upon differential exposure to deter
mine whether an impact is adveIBe in some instances.
In decl ining to adopt the common-law causation standard
and in failing to adopt or reject the more expansive defini
tion of "adverse impact," EPA appears to be a.dhering to a
version of risk-based analytical methodology that supports
most rulemaking proceedings and other regulatory func
tions. It remains to be seen. however, how practical this evi
dentiary standard may be in case-by-case adj udications of
Title VI claims, which are likely to increase number given
the continuing perception that federal and state initiatives
-promote measures that are industry friendly at the expense
154
a
of the hevily impacted communities.
The Agency's re·
fusal to take an explicit stand on other faci lity-related im·
pacts, in particular nonhealth-related impacts, is telling. In
stitutionally, EPA has long been hesitant to venture too
55
deeply into the realm of the social sciences, 1 preferring in
stead the more precise world of engineering and the hard
1 56
This hesitancy has come at a price, as the
sciences.
Agency has been criticized for not tackling the more diffi
cult socioeconomic questions and turning a blind-eye to the
1
real world in which environmental laws are enforced. 57 The
guidance did little to dispel this criticism. Although expand
ing the stakeholder process to include environmental justice
activists and residents from impacted communities, the
Agency 's co rresponding retreat from an analysis that
would require consideration of their social, cultural, po
litical , and economic realities has l e ft participants feeling
158
that they have wasted their time .
This unfortunate re
sul t might impair the Agency 's abili ty to engage in o u t
reach i n subsequent issues where stakeholder participa
tion is indispensable .

in

( l O°i. OCR would be more likely to issue an adversity find
ing for Title VI purposes where the cumulative cancer risk in
o
the affected area was abve I in 1 0,000 (values above l can·
not be represented as a probability of developing disease or
,.
other effect 0 ) . . . .

Id.

152. Id, at 39679.
1 5 3. Id.

1 54. See generally CBE et al. Tier 2 Comments, infra note 304.
1 5 5. When lhe issue of environmental racism first surfaced nationally,
then- Administrator William K. Reilly cook the position that a gov
ernmental agency is limited in its capacity to affect larger cultural
and social trends, and that the failure to achieve equitable environ
mental protection was a symptom of a larger pattern of industrial
growth and the legacy of inherited poverty and discrimination. See
William K. Reilly, Environmental Equity: EPA 'r Position, EPA J .•
MarJApr. 1 992, at 1 9-22. In the 1992 Workgroup Report, Agency
staff noted that the existence of injustices and socioe.conomic factors
was beyond the sco� of the re port as EPA could act upon inequities
based only on scientific data. Sul'PORTING Docm.rnNT, s11pra note 9,
at 2-3.
156. Id.
157. See The Draft Civil Rights Guidance: The Comrover.y ConJinues,
ENvn., F., Sept./Oct. 2000, at 46. 5 1 (interview with Thomas J.
Henderson, Deputy Director of Litigation, Lawyer.i' Committee for
Civil Rights, who criticizes "EPA's continuing reticence to accept
its responsibilities beyond the comfort of scientific and technical
considerations"); see als o Gauna. supra note 1 5 , at 3 1 .
158. See L etter to Carol Browner and Anne Goode, fro m Center for Race,
Poverty and the Environ ment and Other Environmental Justice Or
ganizations and Individuals (Aug, 26, 2000) (on file with author)
(concerning the Draft Title VI Guidance) [hereinafter EJ Activists
Title VI Comments).
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Identifying the Community of Concern
Another question posed by the committee and answered by

the Draft Title VI Guidance concerned the method ofidenti

fying the affected community. This of course is dependent to
a large degree on the types ofimpacts that will be considered
in the first instance. Although the committee assumed that
the baseline or comparison population would likely be com
prised of the jurisdiction of the recipient (typically the
state), H 9 the Draft Title VJ Guidance was more detailed.
EPA affirmed in the guidance that the reference area would
be the recipient's jurisdiction under the relevant environ
60
mental statute. 1 However, the comparison population
would apparently depend on the allegations of the case and
could include either the general population of the reference
area or only the non-affected portion of the reference
161
area. I n other words, one can compare th e affected popu
lation w ith the general popul ation ( defined by the
Agency's jurisdiction). Alternatively, one can compare the
affected population with the unaffected population within
the general population of the recipient agency's j uri sdic
tion, or the most likely affected with the least likely af
fected (by percentage), or even the statistical prob a bi Ii ty of
certain demogra8hic groups within an affected population
1
being affected.
Determining the "affected" population rather than the
comparison population was more problematic to some com
mittee members. Some favored the use of monitoring data
and computer modeling to determine the communities
within the facility's exposure pathway. Environmental jus
tice advocates were more skeptical of this method because
of their view that monitor placement is generally Inade
quate or nonexistent in many environmental j ustice com
163
munities. In the Draft Title VJ Guidance, EPA endorsed
and preferred the use of monito ring data and modeled anal
ysis, but it recognized that the more simple proximity ap
proach may be used where more detailed estimates cannot
1
be developed. 64

Determining the Degree ofDisparity
The third substantive issue concerns how to determine the
degree of disparity that is required to establish a violation.
The conunittee discussed alternative descriptive measure
ments, such as "significant disparity," "substantial disparity,"
"above generally accepted nonns," "appreciably exceeding
the risk to (or the rate in) the general population," or "any
16
measurable disparity." A statistical approach using two
166
standard deviations or higher was discussed.
Some ob
jected because of a perceived lack of connection between the
statistical correlation and the actions of the facility at issue,
others because the approach fai led to account for communi
ties that may be particularly vulnerable, for example, a com
167
munity experiencing abnormally high rates of asthma.
159.
1 60.
161.
162,
163 ,
1 64.
J 65.
1 66.
167.

TITLE VJ FACA REPORT, supra note 1 1 1 , at 67-68.
Draft Title Vl Gl,jdance, supra note 127, at 39666.
Id. at 3968 l .
Id.

TrrLE YI FACA REPORT, supra note 1 1 1 , at 65-66,
Draft Title V1 Guidance, supra note 1 27, at 39679.
TrrLE YI FACA REPORT, supra note 1 1 1 , at 7 1 .
Id. at 69.
id. at 70.
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U l ti mately, EPA adopted a hybrid approach. First,
'[m]easures of the demographic disparity between an af
fected population and a comparison population would nor
mally be statistically evaluated to determine whether the
differences achieved statistical significance to at least 2 to 3
168
standard deviations." The Agency will then i n some man
ner account for uncertainties such as population shifts, accu
racy of predicted risk levels, population size, demographic
composition of a general comparison population, and the
proportion of the affected area within the recipient agency's
iurisdiction. 169 After a "dernogra-phic dis-parity" is exam
ined, the Agency will tum to examine the disparity in im
pact, considering other factors such as the level of adverse
1 70
impact, its severity, and the frequency of occurrence. In
one final balancing act, EPA will weigh the demographic
disparity against the disparity of impact and make a final de
termination whether the overall degree of disparity is
1
enough to support a claim. 1 7 The Draft ntle VJ Guidance
cautions that there is no fixed formula or analysis to be ap
plied and no single factor is applicable in all cases. 1 72
This convoluted approach is apparently designed to give
the Agency wide latitude to address complicated situations,
such as where the disparity of impact is large but tbe dispar
173
ity in demographics is relatively slight or vice versa. 174
Other demographic complications may arise, for example,
where one ethnic minority is disparately impacted within
the context of a general population having a relatively high
percentage of a combination of ethnic mi norities, such as
where an African-American community is disparately im
pacted within an air shed that has a 90% ethnic minority
population overa11 (African American, Hispanic, Native
American, and Asian combined). rn
Al though it is understandable why the Agency would
want to retain this flexibility, it provides little guidance and,
therefore, little predictability as to how the various factors
1 68. Draft Title VJ Guidance, supra note 1 2 7, at 39682 (emphasis
in origina l ) .
1 69. Id.
1 70. Id.
1 7 1 . Id.
1 72. Id.
1 73. Providing this very scenario, the Draft Title VI Guidance states: "For
jnstance where a large disparity (e.g., a factor of JO times higher) ex
is ts with regard to a significant adverse impact, OCR might find dis
parate impact even though the demographic disparity is relatively
slight (e.g. , under 20%)." Id,
174. The Agency did not address this situation, which may present a more
difficult case. This would typically occur in a situation where the ad
verse impact is slightly above a cognizable threshold of adversity,
but the white population is affected just below that threshold, the dis
parity in impact would be slight.
1 7 5.
For example, state populations may .be U5ed as a basis for
comparison with the affected population. Recent data show
that the proportion of total 'minority' populations (defined as
other than white races together with white Hispanics) range
from about 4% to 50% of various state populations. In light of
that variance,, the adoption of a single level of disparity, such
as a factor of 2, as the only indicator of significance, would
lead 10 highly inconsistent results. If a complaint alleged dis
crimination against minorities, as defined above. in some
states, a significant disparity would be presumed to exist if
less than 1 0% of an affected population were minority,
whereas in other states, the percentage would have to tcach
100%.
Jd.
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wi ll be weighted. For example, if the demographic disparity
is relatively low but the community is experiencing elevated
blood lead levels (and therefore a larger disparity in impact) ,
would this constitute a disparately impacted community?
Conversely, if a communi ty in an air shed is experiencing a
hot spot due in part because of the permitted releases, but
other communities are similarly exposed to hi gher than nor
mal levels of pollutants because of their proximi ty to traffic
1 76
corridors , is the first communi ty disparately impacted?
To determine whether the first, second, or both disparities
count necessari ly involves an examination as to the cause of
the disparities. This in tum may potentially involve EPA in
an examination of environmental protection not in isolation,
but in the context of a range of considerations common to
the social sciences-such as exclusionary zoning practices,
white flight in residential patterns, or inadequate access to
public services-as well as the recipient agency's role in ex
acerbating these existing conditions by continuing to issue
permits in overburdened communities.

The Role of Existing Environmental Standards
Industry representati ves and some state regulators are
strong adherents of the view that if a pennit applicant com
plies with all applicable requirements under the relevant en
vironmental standards, there can be no violation of Title
1
VI. n The logic supporting th.is position is that environmen
tal laws are designed to--and in fact do-accomplish an ad
equate level of protection for all members of society ; thus,
j ust because environmental burdens and benefits are not dis
tributed even1y does not constitute illegal discrimination.
During the committee deliberations , EPA ruled on a Title VI
administrative case that appeared to support this view. In
what came to be called the Select Stee/17 case, the EPA Of
fice ofCivi l Rights dismissed a Title VI complaint involving
a PSD pennit on the rationale that there was no adverse im
pact because the air shed was in compliance with NAAQS .
Apparently a bit wary that too much might be read into the
Select Steel decision, EPA was quick to point out i n the
guidance that compliance with environmental laws did not
constitute per se compliance with Title VI . 1 79 Instead, com
pliance with a health-based standard would raise a presump 
tion that the impact, however disparate was not adverse, a
preswnption that could be overcome. 1 ll0
Environmental j ustice representatives were adamantly
opposed to using health-based standards in this manner and
criticized the rationale during the committee deliberations
and also in response to the Draft 1itle VJ Guidance. Such
standards, they argued, were often insufficiently protective
to begin with, had not been fully implemented, and did not
take into account the particular vulnerabilities of a commu
181
nity.
Moreover, the health-based ambient standards
1 76. The problem may be panicularly difficult where there arc several
disparately impacted communities within the recipient agency's j u
risdiction, but the problem is not severe enough to establish a claim
based on a paltem and practice of discrimination.
1 77. Tm.E VJ FACA REPORT, supra note 1 1 1, at 72.
l 78. St. Francis Prayer Cir. v. Michigan Dep' t ofEnvtl. Quality, EPA File
No. SR-98-R5 (Select Steel).
1 79. Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 1 27, at 39680.
1 80. l<L
1 8 1 . TITLE VI FACA REPOXT, supra note 1 1 1 , at 72� see also EJ Activ
ist.� Title VI Comments, supra note 158, at 50-SS ; Letter to Carol

tended to cover large geographical regions (like an air shed) ;
thus, while the geographical area might comply with the
standards overall, toxic bot spots could well occur within
182
those areas. The fact that such a presumption is rebuttable
would be oflittle benefit to communities within the hot spot,
as inadequate monitor placement (perhaps itself the result of
discriminatory practices, unintentional or otherwise ) would
prevent the complainant or EPA from obtaining the data
183
necessary to rebut the presumption. Rebutting such a pre
sumption would also conceivably require additional empiri
cal data such as information about home and workplace
risks, exposures from other media, and information about
atypical health problems the communi ty may be experienc
ing, data that the Agency is unlikely to gather on its own.
In addi tion to these cri ticisms, there may be other more
nuanced consequences of creating such a presumption. Al
though the Office of Civil Rights committed i tself to "work
closely with recipients'' and "provide the recipient with sev
1 84
eral opportunities to respond," the claimants role is much
more circumscribed. The Office of Civil Rights may request
interviews of the claimant or relevant documents in its pos
session. However, the guidance was clear on the Agency's
position that "EPA does not represent the complainants" and
the investigation .. does not involve an adversarial process
1 85
between the complainant and the recipient. "
The only
time the claimant is expressly given an opportuni ty to re
spond is very late in the administrative appeal process if the
recipient requests a hearing before an administrative law
j udge ( ALJ) and subsequently files an exception to the
ALJ's determination and the EPA Administrator elects to re
view the determination. In contrast, there are "no appeal
rights for the complainant built into EPA's Title VI regula
tory process." In practice, the experience of claimants is that
after submi tting a claim they hear little if an ything from the
1 86
Office of Civil Rights.
This raises an important procedural issue. Since the recip
ient is not going to rebut a presumption that a health.based
standard is protective and the claimant does not have an ac
tive role in the administrative investigation, EPA is in the
position of having to rebut its own sel f-imposed presump
tion. There is little to support a prediction that the Agency
wi ll attempt to do so. And even if such a successful rebuttal
were to occur, the absence of adequate monitoring in some
impacted communities may make the rebuttal finding diffi.

1 82.
1 83.

l84,
l 8S.
1 86.

Browner and Anne Goode, from Golden Gate UniveJSily School of
Law' s Environmental Law and Justice Clinic Regarding Draft Tille
VJ Guidance, 9 - 1 1 (Aug. 28, 2000) (on file with author); Letter lo
Carol Browner and Anne Goode, from Professor Alice Kaswan, 6
{Aug. 28, 2000) (on file with author); Lett.er to Carol Browner and
Anne Goode, from Professor Eileen Gauna, 7 (July 27, 2000) (on file
with author).
TITLE V1 FACA REPORT, supra note I l l , at 72.
Id. Inadequate monitor placement was also a concern of I.he NEJAC
Air and Water Subcommittee in submitting comments to the Office
of Air and Rw:liadon on EPA' s Draft Urban Air Toxics Strategy. See
NEJAC AIR AN D WATER SUBCOMMllTEE'S U1U3AN AIR TOXICS
WORJC ING G ROUP, COMMENTS TO TH£ OFFICE OP AIR AND R AOIA•
110N ON rnE EPA's DRAFT UR.BAN AIR ToXJcs STRATEGY 9- 1 3
(1999) (recommending the public have an opportunity to petition the
state and EPA for air monitoring changes). The corrunents are listed
as Appendix C lO the 1999 NEJAC REPORT ON PERMITTING, infra
note 356.
Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 127, at 3967 1 .
Id. a t 39672.
See EJ Activists Title VJ Commcnis. supra note I 58, al 2-4 (stories
of frustration).
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cult to sustain on appeal. The more troubling scenario,
however, is that the presumption will provide the Office of
Ci vil Rights a tempting alternative to the difficulty and ex
pense of conducting a comparative risk-based disparate
impact analysis . And the vi gor by which the Agency will
interrogate its own presumption will be vulnerable to the
shifting philosophies and pol itical will that occur from ad
ministration to administration.

Agency Jurisdiction
Regulatory officials appear to have a range of views as to the
appropriateness of addressing environmental j ustice issues
in the course of issuing permits. However, even those that
are open to the idea have expressed two concerns. First, that
they may not have authori ty to condition or deny a permit on
187
environmental j ustice grounds. After all , none of the fed
eral environmental statutes mention environmental j ustice
or grant explicit authority to go beyond typical requirements
to protect heavi ly impacted conununities. Moreover, the as
sociated siting decisions are made in corporate boardrooms
long before the recipient regulatory agency is invol ved and
depend in large part on local land use and zonip.g decisions,
also outside the purview of these agencies. 1 88 The second
concern squarely presents a powerful competing fairness
claim by the agency: it would be Wlfair to hold recipient reg
ulatory agencies accountable for impacts over which they
have no control .
Responding to the second concern , EPA clearly agreed
with the states. This agreement came, apparently, well be
fore the issuance of the Draft Title VI Guidance, during a
meeting between Administrator Browner and state officials
1 89
in late 1 998. Thus, it was no surprise when the guidance,
in unequivocal terms, stated that ''in determining whether a
recipient is in violation of Title VI or EPA's implementing
regulations, [EPA ] expects to account for the disparate im
pacts resul ting from source of stressors (e.g., facilities),
stressors (e.g. , chemicals or pathogens), and/or impacts
(e.g. , risk of disease ) within the recipient's authority.'' 190
Unfortunately, this unequivocal position taken by the guid
ance only begged the more central questions. Exactly what
impacts are within the recipient agency's j urisdiction? If, as
the recent EAB decisions suggest, there exists wide author
i ty under the environmental statutes to undertake an envi
ronmental j ustice analysis during pennit proceedings, pre
sumably there must be authori ty to do something about
some of the associated impacts. lt would be a curious read
ing of a statute to presume that Congress granted authority to
consider excessive impacts while at the same time preclud
ing the abili ty to address those very impacts by granting au
thority to issue only typical permit conditions. Assuming
there exists such authority, what is the scope of impacts that
may be considered under the environmental statutes? Do
agencies have authority to condition permits in order to mi t
i g ate o r av o i d n o n e m i s s i o n - re l ated i mp ac t s and
nonhealth-related impacts? To take it one step further, do
agenc ies have authori ty to deny a permit on similar
grounds? If the answer is yes, then a related and critical
1 87.
1 88.
1 89.
1 90.

TITLE VI FACA R.l!PORT, supra note 1 1 1 , at 72.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 78.
Draft Title Vl Guidance, supra note 127, at 39670.
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question emerges under Title VI law: if a recipient agency
fails to exercise this discretionary authority in response to a
known significant racial dispari ty, has it violated its duty Wl
der Title VI by using methods of administering its program
that has the effect of subj ecting individuals to discrimina
tion because of their race?
The Draft Tille VI Guidance did not answer the scope of
authority question, which would have taken EPA down the
legal slippery slope and head first into these difficult ques
tions. The Agency may have decided, wisely perhaps, to
await the development of case law by the EAB and ulti
mately the courts. Curiously, however, EPA did take a stand
on the issue of permit denial The Guidance explains that
"denial or revocation of a permit is not necessarily an appTO
191
priate solution" to a disparate impact, and that EPA will
"likely recommend that the recipient focus on other permit
ted entities and other sources within their authority to elimi
1 92
nate or reduce . . . disparate impacts." Thus, by refusing to
explicitly address the scope of authori ty question while at
the same time essentiaJly requiring recipient agencies to
spread the required mitigation among the regulated commu
ni ty, it leaves its own Office of Civil Rights in an Wltenable
position. It is possible that this o ffice-underfunded for the
task and c h roni c a l l y s ubj e c t e d to c o ngress i on a l
1 93
interference -will o n its own i n case-by-case investiga
tions venture to advise recipient agencies of their Jegal au
thority under environmental statutes. Alternatively, the Of
fice of Civil Rights would Wlderstandably prefer to avoid
the untested legal issues. The investigatory framework out
i
lined in the guidance g ves it ample opportunity to do so; at
that point it may become tempting to use the presumptions
created by the guidance or the flexible criteria for determin
ing disparity in a marmer that wil l allow the Office of Civil
Rights to dismiss the complai nt.

New Versus Renewal Permits
Just as the agency j urisdiction question presented the fair
ness issue for state regulators, the issue of permit renewal i l
lustrates the potential W1fairness to some indus try stake
holders. When a p roj ect sponsor initially commits substan
tial capital to build a facility, it likely anticipates a usefu1 life
of the facility of at least 30 years. But a permit typically ex
pires in five years. So there is a common understanding that
these permits will be serially renewed as long as the facility
complies with pollution control pennit conditions that typi
cally apply. Title VI destabilizes that compact. Consider, for
example, a faci lity built in 1 990., before the advent of per
mit-related Title VI complaints. It would be unfair to tell this
facility owner, who expected routine permit renewals, that
her multimillion dollar facility can no longer operate be1 9 1 . ld. at 39653, 39683,
192. Id. at 39683 .
1 93. See Jennifer Silverman & Cheryl Hogue, Budget: Limits to Civi(
Rights Guidance Included in Bill Approved by House Funding
Panel, 29 Env' t Rep. (BNA) 5 1 6 (July 3. 1998) ( noting rider on 1 999
appropriations biU precluding the use ofappropriated funds to inves
tigate civil rights complaints under the inJerim Guidance); Environ
ml!ntal Justice: EPA Should Follow Rulemaking ProcedJAresfor Ti
tle VI Guidance. House Report Says, 30 Env' t Rep. (BNA) 880
(Sept. 3. 1 999) (noting house report on EPA fiscal year 2000 appro
priations prohibiting the use of funds to investigate pending com
plaints under the lnJerlm Guidance and criticizing EPA for issuing
guidance instead of using formal rulemaking procedures).
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cause a permit renewal would violate the regulator's Title
VI duty by continuing to subj ect the host communi ty to a
racially disparate impact. This unfairness could be exac
erbated by the fact that closing the facility would not ap
preciably redress the community 's problems because of
multiple contributors to the o verall impact, incl uding ex
empt, grandfathered, and nonpermitted sources . And it is
simply unfai r, argue some, to "hold a facility hostage to
1
changing demographi cs. " 94
At the other end of the spectrum is the perspective of envi
ronmental j ustice advocates. They point out that the civil
rights laws have been in effect for decades (prior to the
building ofmany of the oldest existing facilities ) and facili ty
owners do not have an absolute right to a permit renewal.
Moreover, they point out that most renewal situations do not
involve changed demographics and that many facil ities up
for permit renewal have a poor history of compliance or
19
have operated in a discriminatory fashion for years. s In
fact, permit applicants expect new requirements upon re
newal as standards often change over time. Presenting their
own fairness claims, they point out that a ton of pollution re
sulting from a pennit renewal is j ust as harmful as a ton of
196
pollution resulting from an initially granted pennit.
In responding to this difficul t issue, EPA appears to have
studiously steered a middle course. The Draft Tille VJ Guid
ance rej ects the industry position that renewals should be
treated differently categorically, affinning that new permits ,
renewals, and modifications can all support a Title Vl
1 97
claim.
However, a potentially important and controver•
sial exception was created in an apparent attempt to mitigate
the harshness to some industry constituents. EPA has taken
the position that a civil rights investigation will likely be
closed if the permit action at issue involves a significant de
crease in overall emissions or a decrease in the pollutants of
1 98
Since newly permitted facilities cannot "de
concern.
crease'' emissions and since by definition modified facilities
199
generally involve emission increases, this exception per
tains only to permit renewals. In other words, if an applicant
for a renewal agrees to decrease emissions, the applicant
may avoid a potential Title VI challenge to the agency based
on its permit.
Environmental j ustice advocates criticized this position,
reasoning that a comparatively small decrease in emissions
will not help the overburdened community, given the mag
nitude of the facility emissions overa11 200 and the cumulative
194. Comments of Greg Adams, on behalf of a consortium of wastewater
agencies in southern California, made at a Title VI Liston ing Session
sponsored by the EPA in Los Angeles, California, on August 2, 2000
(on file wilh author).
1 95. TrrLE VI FACA REPORT, supra no1e 1 1 1 , at 8 1 .
196. Jd.
197. Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 1 27, at 39677.
198. Id.
199. See. e.g., 40 C.F.R. §� l . 1654(a)( l)(x) (2000) (s-ignificant net in·
creases to major sources of criteria air pollutants).
200. The glossary defines significant as "[a] detenninatlon that an ob
serve� value is sufficiently large and meaningful to warrant some ac·
tion. (See statistical significance)." Draft Title VI Guidance, supra
oote 127, at 39655. Significant for purposes of regulating criteri11 air
emi�sions, for e,;ample, is LYJ>ically 40 Lons per year of volatile or·
game compounds (VOCs), 40 C.F,R. §5 1.1654(aX l )(x). To place
this number in context of some of the more intensive indW1trial activ
ities, one might compare that amount with the 3 million pounds per
year of expected emissions-including 692,200 pounds per year of
tox.ic air pollutants-from lhe facilit y al issue in .the Sbintech invesd-
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effect of multiple-source impacts in the area. In addition,
this provision disadvantages facilities with better control
teclmology while benefitting older facilities with poor pol
lution control, as the latter can more easily reduce emis
sions. Notwithstanding these criticisms, it remains to be
seen whether facili ty operators will respond to this incentive
to reduce emissions. In large part, that will depend on
whether they perceive Title VI as posing a credible threat to
their operations under the new Draft Title VI Guidance.

Mitigation
If an investigation should reveal the presence of an "adverse
disparate impact," the issue of whether, bow much, and how
to mitigate raises another set of questions. As an initial pro
cedural matter, industry representatives argue that state offi
cials should be allowed to j usti fy impacts before mitigation
is required, and environmental j ustice advocates maintain
that mitigation possibilities should be explored before the
issue of legal j ustification is addressed in the investig�
201
tion. In other words, environmental j ustice advocates be
lieve that an agency should always attempt to mitigate ad
verse effects, even if the disparate impact is otherwise le·
gally j ustified. In terms of how much mitigation should be
required, the possibilities include mitigation sufficient to
( a) eliminate the disparity, (b) reduce risk to acceptable
levels, or (c ) make reasonable progress in eliminating the
disparity. The committee also focused on acceptable miti
gation strategies, with the committee deliberating p rimar
il y on the relationshi p between the adverse impact and the
miti gation undertaken.
At its most narrow inte rpretation, mitig ation could mean
onl y those actions that reduce or eliminate the adverse im
pact at issue. A more moderate approach would allow mi ti
g ation measures that do not reduce the dispari ty, but ad
dress its etTects , 202 such as medical monitoring, research
into cwnulative risks and s ynerg istic effects , or enhanced
emergency response systems. The most expansive view of
miti gation , termed b y the committee "loose nexus" mitig a
tion, would include benefits to the host communi ty that do
not otherwise reduce the dis pari ty or miti gate i ts effects ,203
such as a day care center, for example. Loose nexus miti g a·
tion may close?' resemble p rop osals for compe nsated sit
20
ing schemes.
A committee workgroup on miti gation achieved a con.
sensus that a moderate to narrow nexus miti g ation approach
would be best, an approach that essentially requires the miti
gation to be as narrowl y tailored to the adverse impact as
possible but allows some substitute fonns of mitigation

20 1 .
202.
203 ,
204,

gation. See Kuehn, DeTTJing Acee.rs, supra note I 05, at 3. Excluding
the pro posed Shin!cch facility , there were 127 facilities emitting a
total of _approximately 44.7 19.609 pounds per year of air reJcases
within a 3-mile radius of the proposed facility . U.S. EPA, Drnft Re
vised Demogra phic Information to TitJe VI Adminislrative Com
plaint Re: Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality/Pennit
for Proposed Shintech Facilii ty ( Apr. 1998) ( Attachment I-TRI Fa
cility Counts excluding Shntech ) (on file with author) .
TrrLE VJ FACA REPORT, supra note l l l , at 83.
Id at 86.
The committee acknowledged that what is "loose nexus mitigation"
depends on bow one defines the scope of an adverse effect. Id at 87.
Compare Raebel D. Oodsil, Remedying En11/ro11171enraJ Racism, 90
Mica. L. REv. 394 ( 199 1) (examining the reform of siting proce
dures), with Vicki Been, Compensared Siring Proposals: ls It Time
to Pay �trenrion?, 21 FOIDHAM Uu. L.J. 787 ( t 994).
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when reducing or eliminting the facility impacts is not pos
205
sible. Although reasonable and logical from a health stand
point. the workgroup acknowledged that this recommenda
tion, if adopted, would raise its own set of issues about pro
206 What i f, for example, most members of the host
cess.
comm.unity preferted compensatory or loose nexus mi tiga
tion? I f that were the case and an agreement was negotiated
along those lines, should the EPA Office of Civil !tights de
cline to investigate a claim brought by a communi ty mem
ber who was not a party to the mitigation agreement?
L ast l y, there were questi ons about the e ffe c t of
agency-sponsored or facilitated mitigation measures taken
in advance of any particular perm.it proceedim;, termed by
the Title VI FACA a "Track 1" approach.
This latter
pro-active approach was strongly recommended by the
collllruttee overall as possibly the best means to address
long-standi ng disparities caused by diverse and multiple
208
sources, as well as addressing the entire range of commu
nity concerns, including nonhealth impacts and impacts be
yond the jurisdiction of the environmental agency. The
Trac k 1 approach was developed by a subcommittee
workgroup charged with developing a template for state
agencies to consider, a model approach that would ideally
help recipient agencies administer their programs to avoid
Ti tle VI claims in the first instance. 209 It was originally envi
sioned by the work.group as a preventative approach that
would lie outside the confi nes of any particular permit pro
ceedi ng or Title VI investigation. 2 1 0 However, before the Ti·
tie Vl FACA had been formed, some state regulators had
taken the position that similar state environmental justice
11
programs should be an alternative to Title VI compliance. 2
These state agencies were adamant that th e states who com
mitted resources to devising such environmental j ustice pro
grams should be afforded deference in a subsequent Ti tle VI
investigation. 212 The issue of deference then itself became
vigorously debated.213
EPA, under the Draft ntle VI Guidance, seized upon the
Track 1 approach and assigned to it an extraordinary role in a
Title VI investigation. Metamorphosed as an ''Area Specific
Agreement," this approach essentially became the center
piece of the new Draft Title VI Guidance, as weJI as the
means for the Agency to resolve all of the conflicting claims
of fairness in one tidy package . The central idea is for the re
cipient agency to identify overburdened areas and enter into
agreements among the residents and other stakeholders to
el iminate or reduce adverse impacts "to the extent required
214
by Title VI. " The agreement might, for example, establish
a ceiling on pollutant releases, with a steady reduction over
215
time, i.e., a declining cap. Ideally, the process of arri ving
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
2 1 0.
211.

TnLE VI FACA REPoRT, upra note l I J , at 86-87.
Id. at 88-90.
Id. at 25-3 1 .
Id. ai J O.
Id. al 9- 10.
fd. a, 25-26.
See Environmental Justice: Home-Grown Programs Good Alrerna·
rives to EPA Civil Rights Guidance, States Say, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA)

1 83 (May 15, 1 998).
2 1 2. TITLE VI FACA R£PO.RT, supra note I 1 1 , at 26-29.
2 1 3. fd.
2 1 4. Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 127, at 39675.
2 1 5 . Id..
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at such an agreement will include state and local govern
mental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and other
stakeholders with the ability to help solve the identified
216
problems. The guidance explains that if the analysis un
derlying the agreement supports the conclusions that there
217
will occur "actual reductions over a reasonable time," the
agreement will merit "due weight" in the course of a Title V1
inves�ation and EPA will close the pending investiga
1
tion. 2 This may occur even if the claimant was not in
cluded in thef.rocess and was not party to the area-specific
21
agreement. In addition, later-filed complaints concerning
other pennitting actions in the geographical area covered by
the agreement will be similarly dismissed unless the agree
ment is ' 1 no longer adequate" or is "not being properly im
plemented."220 In substance, the area-specific agreement
categorically constitutes adequate mitigation.
A few observations can be made about this provision.
First, it allowed the Agency to avoid directly addressing the
issue of whether "loose'' or "moderate'' nexus mitigation
was sufficient by stating that the impacts should be reduced
"to the extent required by Title VI." It therefore remains un
resolved how closely the mitigation has to be tailored to ad
dress the impacts at issue in any pennit proceeding. The
vagueness of this provision in tum has allowed the Agency
to retain the vagueness in its provisions defi ning the scope
of impacts that will support a claim. However, the use of
area-specific agreements to dismiss pending actions clearl y
answered the "how much" question, adopting a reasonable
progress standard to suffice instead of requiring a degree of
mitigation that will eliminate the disparity or reduce risk to
acceptable levels. The provision also excuses the Tecipient
agency from having to consider mitigation strategies in the
permit proceeding at issue and, therefore, excuses EPA from
having to decide the agency j urisdiction issue, i.e., whether
under the environmental statutes there is authority to condi
tion permits beyond nonnally imposed conditions.
The due weight provision also appears to have a more ex
ceptional role from an evidentiary and a procedural stand
point. Once the due weight threshold is met, due weight ef
fectively operates as a conclusive presumption of compli
ance with Title VI in the proc eeding at issue, thus excusing
the Office of Civil Rights from having to determine whether
there is a disparate impact to begin wi th or whether the im
pact, if it exists, is otherwise legally justi fied. This is pecu
liar considering that the strategies in the area-specific agree
ment may have little connectio n to the permit conditions at
issue and the types of i mpacts in the Ti tle VI complaint un
der consideration. Accordingly, there seems to be little justi
fication for such a presumption as an evidentiary matter.
Equally remarkable is that the provision also functions as
res judicata or collateral estoppel in subsequent Title VI ad
ministrative proceedings. Given the exceptional power that
this provision has, the strategies that might suffice to sup
port a finding that actual reductions will occur over a rea
sonable time are critically important components of the
2 1 6.
21 7,
2 1 8.
2 1 9.

Id,

Id.
Id.

While noting that infonnal resolutions may be more successful if re
cipients work with complainants, EPA notes that reduction plans
may be developed without consulting complainants or others. fd. at
39674.
220. Id. at 39664.
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agreement. However, other than a statement that the under
l ying analysis should have "sufficient depth , breadth, com
"221 the guidance does little to elab
pleteness and accuracy,
orate on the reduction strategies that are contemplated or
the criteria that will be applied to determine their antici
pated efficacy.
ln addition to the vagueness concerning the criteria to
j udge the agreements' reduction plans, the Draft ntle VJ
Guidance did not discuss with any specificity EPA's over
sight role in ensuring that the area-specific agreements do in
fact yield actual reductions in disparate impacts over a rea
sonable time. Nor did the guidance discuss to what extent
emission increases from newly pennitted facilities would be
allowed to consume the gains made by the proposed reduc
tion strategies. Equating Title VI compliance with the exis
tence ofa pollution reduction plan in an area-specific agree
ment would logically require that a baseline will be estab
lished and that strong oversight by EPA will be undertaken,
particularly gi ven the problems with measurement, predict
ability, and enforceabili ty that such agreements present. It
remains to be seen, however, how rigorous this oversight
will be in practice.

Justification
As noted earlier, the sequence of considering j ustification
was important to conunittee members. Some believed that
legal j ustification should only be considered after alterna
tive sites and processes had been analyzed and all feasible
mitigation efforts had been made. 222 As a practical matter,
this approach requires recipient agencies to test the bounds
of their legal authority in imposing additional permit condi
tions. Others on the committee took the position that this
step was unnecessary ifthere was a legally recognized j usti
fication for the disparate impact. Other than this important
procedural point. there remained the issue of what circum
stances j usti fy a racially disparate impact. Proposed justifi
cation tests ranged from strict necessi ty with benefits flow
ing directly-and perhaps exclusively-to the impacted
community, to less stringent tests j ustifyi ng disparate im
pacts that would be too costly to mitigate or involve facili
ties that provide some public benefit.
The Draft 7ille VJ Guidance first stated the Agency's
seemingly strict position that the recipient would have to
demonstrate that the challenged activity was "reasonably
necessary to meet a goal that is legitimate, important and in
tegral to the recipient's institutional mission."223 This ap
pears to include only permitted operations that are designed
primarily to provide environmental benefits, such as a waste
water treatment plant. Anything else, such as a manufactur
ing facility, is not integral to the mission of an environmen
tal protection agency. Moreover, even if the challenged ac
tivity is integral to the recipient's mission and, therefore,
justifie d, such a justification may be rebutted if EPA deter
224
mines that a less discriminatory alternative exists.
22 l .
222.
223..
224.

Id. at 39675.

Id. at 39683.
let at 39685 (emphasis 11dded).
1be presence of I.his "'rebuu.able presumption" in an investigation
where the complainant is not considered an "advetse" party and
whose role is limited raises the now familiar question-who will re
but the preswnplion? See infra notes 1 77-86 and accompanying te!lt.
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Immediately following this conceptual ly straightforward
test are provisions that call this interpretation into doubt.
The guidance states that the Office of Civil Rights will
"likely consider broader interests, such as economic devel
opment . . . if the benefits are delivered directly to the af
fected population and if the broader interest is le91timate1
important and integral to the recipient's mission.'
Thus,
the key to deciphering the twin provisions will lie in whether
the Agency really meant to use the word "and" or whether it
possibly meant to use a disj unctive for the three qualifiers. It
seems odd that a broader interest like "economic develop
ment" would ever be an interest that is integral to the mis
sion of an environmental protection agency. The grammati
cal ambiguity is important; if the Draft Title VI Guidance is
ultimately implemented to allow goals or broader interests
that are legi timate, important or integral to the recipient
agency's institutional mission, that will j ustify virtual ly all
disparate impacts. Anything less, however, makes the refer
ence to economic development il logical .
There are several observations to make at this point about
EPA, fairness, and the Title VI saga. First is that institution
ally the Agency did not confront the competing fairness
claims explicitly, calling the shots on who wins and who
loses. Nor did EPA explicitly address its own difficult posi
tion. lf EPA were to actually impose a Title VI administra
tive remedy, the withdrawal of ftmds is likely to result in the
Agency re-acquiring previously delegated state permitting
226
programs. This will present resource difficulties and have
severe political consequences. Whether the investigation
framework was intentionally designed to avoid these hard
questions is pure speculation. Similarly, it is anyone's guess
to what extent the Agency might have been influenced by
the fairness claims presented by the different stakeholders.
But assuming for a moment that such claims had bearing on
the ultimate resolution, which fairness claims prevailed?
The claims by state regulators that they should not have
their funding revoked for effects over which they have no
control was squarely addressed. They should not. However,
there are still no safe harbors because EPA did not take an
explicit position on the recipients' scope of authority or
whether addressing nonemission and nonhealth impacts
was within that scope. The fairness claims of the regulated
community Were twofold: first, individual perm.it applicants
should not be penalized for the existence of racial disparities
caused by a multitude of sources, and second, pennit re
newal applications should be afforded special consideration
because of the swtlc costs involved. Both claims gained
some ground in terms of remedy. Perm.it denial was taken
off of the table as a potential solution to addressing dispari
ties, but more stringent pennit conditions remain a possibil
ity. In the case oftenewals, an attractive safe harbor has been
created for facility operators who can reduce overall emis
sions. More importantly, however, the uncertainties created
by the still-open questions (scope of adverse impacts and
scope of the recipient's legal authority to condition permi ts
225. Draft Tille VI Guidance, supra note 1 27, at 39683.
226. Recent experience of EPA' s oversight of state enfo.rcernent of fed
eral environmental statutes illustrateS the Agency's willingness lO
go lO great lengths to avoid withdrawal of delegation for failure to
follow EPA's enforcement policies. Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution
and the Public Health. 24 HARV. BNvn.. L. REV. 352, 359 (2000)
(noting that although EPA bas initiated withdrawal proceedings
against states, it has never actually withdrawn a staie's delegation)
(hereinafter Devolution and the Public Health].
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beyond typical requirements) may not be of great practical
significance given the alternative compliance route possible
by devising area-specific agreements. Overall, recipient
agencies and industry stakeholders have made significant
gains and have expressed greater satisfaction with the Draft

Title VI Guidance. 227

The resolution of the fairness claims ofimpacted commu
nities presents a more complicated picture. The essential
thrust of many claims is that it is unfair for commm1ities of
color to disproportionately suffer the insults of permi tted in
dustrial activity. EPA did respond to that claim by creating
an incentive for the development and implementation of
pollution reduction strategies. Because these agreements
are voluntary and provide for reasonable progress over time,
however, it appears that Title VI, as i nterpreted by EPA, pro
vides no immediate relief for these communities in the near
future. In addition, the guidance's suggestion that the recipi
ent agency focus on all permitted entities to reduce the dis
parate impact may prompt state regulatory officials to test
the bounds of their legal authority more aggressively under
existing environmental laws. Unfortunately, these potential
benefits are dependent upon the commitment by state regu
latory agencies to begin with, a commitment that varies
from state to state. This bodes badly for the very cases that
Ti tle VI was designed to redress, in this context, cases where
state and local regulatory agencies neglect ever-increasing
environmental degradation in communities of color. In a fi
nal ironic twist, the Draft ntle VI Guidance may have re
moved the one unintended benefit to such communities that
resulted from the earlier Interim· Guidance: the uncertainty
created by the much-mal igned Interim Guidance made state
regulators and industry stakeholders more inclined to bring
affected residents into the process earlier and more willing
to be flexible and to work out solutions. 228
In many respects, the competing claims of fairness pre
sented EPA with a zero-sum choice. To the extent that cumu
lative impacts are attributable to nonpennitted sources,
making the regulatory agencies and by extension the
pennittees somehow accountable for those impacts necessi
tates winners and losers. In that respect, impacted communi
ties were clearly the losers because these impacts will not be
redressed under Title VI. With respect to penniHelated i m
pacts, there is a more subtle zero-sum choice presented. To
the ex.tent that regulatory agencies have to press legal au
thority to impose atypical permi t conditions or deny per
mits, agencies stand to lose due to greater pressure from reg
ulated stakeholders and the risk of litigation, and the im
pacted communities stand to gain. To the extent that pennit
applicants get their permits denied or conditioned based
227. Environmental Justice: Draft Revised Civil Rights Guidance Clar
ifies Definitions, Addresses State Issues, 3 1 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1 33 1
(June 23, 2000) (no1ing indusu-y source ' s praise o f the guidance);

Environmenlal Justice: Expanded Verswn of Civil Rights Guidance
Enjoys Broad Support, EPA Official Reports, 3 1 Env' t Rep. (BNA)

1 58 1 (July 28, 2000) (EPA Office of Civil Rights Director Anne
Goode noting support from recipients, bul some concerns from in
dustry and environmental groups). But see Sieve Cook, Environmen
la/Justice: Stales Faull EPA Civil Righls Guidance as Vague, lock
ing Defini1ions, Nonbinding, 3 1 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1773 (Aug. 25
2000); see also Environmental Council of States (ECOS), Com
ments on Revised Title VJ Guidance (as approved by the Cross-Me
dia Committee on Aug. 1 4, 2000) (on file with author).

228. See Catherine Bridge, Digging Up )us/ice, TAE RECORDER, Nov.
24, l 999, at I (interviewing several attorneys working on environ
mental justice cases).
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upon environmental justice considerations, facility spon
sors stand to lose and impacted communities stand to gain.
EPA attempted mightily to avoid this choice by utilizing an
area-specific agreement. If EPA succeeds in this effort, it
will accomplish a win-win-win scenario. The regulatory
agencies may remain comfortably within the express scope
of their authorities under the existing statutes, the facility
operators will not have additional enforceable limits and
other conditions incorporated into their pennits, and im
pacted communities eventually will gain some measure of
relief from adverse impacts . It remains to be seen whether
such an alternative com�liance strategy, known and criti
230 Unfortu
cized in other contexts, 29 wi ll be effective.
nately, the strategy carries a remarkably high risk of regula�
tory failure, with overburdened communities standing alone
to absorb the losses.
If EPA bad not devised a way to avoid the win-lose sce
nario, other interesting approaches to addressing competing
fairness claims might have emerged. The Agency might
have explored policy-oriented common-Jaw approaches to
1
allocating risk and loss. 23 For example, the Agency could
have compared the m1derlying interests, it could have al lo
cated the potential losses to the class better positioned to ab
sorb the loss, or it could have allocated the potential losses to
the least innocent parties. Under an interest-balancing ap
proach, the impacted communities would win because their
interests (freedom from racial discrimination and freedom
from bodily harm) would likely have outweighed the mone
tary interests of the recipient agencies (fundi ng) or the mon
etary interests of the regulated community (costs of mitiga
tion) . Indeed, Title VI itself evidences a preexisting con
gressional detennination that these very interests surpass
232
economic considerations in most instances.
Allocating
the potential loss to the party best positioned to absorb the
loss would li kely lead to a framework that would require a
much higher degree of mitigation, probably to the level of
advanced technical capability using individual control strat
egies . At the point where narrowly tai lored mitigation
would not be sufficient to reduce the risks to an acceptable
level or appreciably reduce the impacts, the resulting loss,
e. g., facility shutdowns in the case of permit reneWals, may
tip the scales in favor of the recipient agency. 233 This is con229. See generally Clifford Rechtschaffen, Competing Visions: EPA and
11,e States Battle for the Future of EnvironmenraJ Enforcement. 30
ELR I 0803 (Oct, 2000); Rena I. St.einwr, Reinventing E11vironmen
tal Regulation: The Dangtrous Journey From Command to
Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENvrL. L. Rev. 1 03 ( 1 998) [heroinafter
Dangerous Journey].

230 . .Russell Harding, director of the Michigan Department of Environ
mental Quality, told reporters that the Draft Title VJ Guidance wa.�
"a liger without teeth" and tha1 he was "not going lo pay particular at
tention to it." Environmental Justice: Draft Revised Civil Righi$, su
pra note 227, at 1 33 1 .
23 1 . The use of common-law approaches 10 fill in the gaps in statutes is
not unconunon, particularly in environmental law. For example,
strict liability for abnonnally dangerous activitie was used to rel.ax
causation standards under the Comprehensive Environmental Re
sponse, Compensation, and Liabi l i ty Act ( CERCLA) . See
P.El!CIVAL, infra note 377.
232. Certain justifications, uch as business necessity, cues the point
where economic considerations cease to be subordinate. 42 U.S.C.
§2000c-2(k)( I )(A)(i) (2000).
233. Although under this approach it could still be argued that the recipi·
ent agency and regulated community is �till bettor able to absorb the
loss, that argumenl would necessarily lead to an interest balancing
approach in order to account for nonmonetary losses sustained by the
impacted community.
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sistent with the more protecti ve environmental standards
that retain sensitivity to costs, but the approach would not go
as far as some cost-blind or technology forcing standards
known to environmental law.
Under a least innocent approach common to tort law, a
tn0re generalized analysis would likely lead to the conclu
sion that the regulatory agency and by extension the regu
lated communi ty are less innocent than the affected commu
nities. The regulatory agencies are less innocent because
they contractually undertake to avoid disparate impacts in
exchange for federal funding. The regulated community is
less innocent because of its practice of externalizing costs
by releasing harmful agents into the environment. In con
trast, the affected communities neither undertake any spe
cific obligations to perform, nor do they inj ect harmful
agents into the environment nor as a class do they profit
from the activity causing the i mpacts.
A case-by-case inquiry involving interest comparison,
loss allocation, and relative innocence might not be as clear.
It could be argued, for example, that if the community of
color became established after the facili ty was sited, the im
pacted communi ty is less innocent than the pennit applicant
and by extension, the regulatory agency. Yet, even this rela
ti vely straightforward "coming to the nuisance" scenario
does not end the inquiry. If anything, such a case pulls EPA
into an interdisciplinary exploration of circumstances limit
ing residential options, a phenomenon best explained by the
social sciences. Additionally. this approach would allow
consideration of a range of equitable factors, such as the fa.
cili ty 's compliance history in the case of renewals and the
availability of alternative sites in the case of new permi ts .
The method i s comparable to a court's us e of i ts equitable
powers and might be more responsive to the factual context
presenti ng competing fairness claims. For example, if
there is a disparate impact but construction of the facility
predated the establ ishment o f the affected community and
the facility has a good compliance record, a permit might
be renewed on similar terms with off-site mitigation as the
primary solution. However, if there is a disparate impact
and the host community preexisted the facility and the fa.
cili ty had compliance problems in the past, that would ap
pear to be a good case for more stringent monitoring and
control requirements and, in extreme cases, possibly a per
mit denial . In these cases, the Office of Civil Ri ghts could
examine how aggressively the recipient agency used its
i
discretionary author ty to protect the impacted commu
ni ty. This approach has the potential to couple the ingenu
i ty of common-law equi ty and incremental rule refinement
with the advantages of agency expertise, while reaping the
benefit of newly developed data about localized environ
mental and health conditions. Such an approach might be
better suited to the diversity and complexity of environ
mental j ustice scenarios.
Although perhaps speculative at this point, it is never
theless important to consider the interplay between the
guidance and other high-priority initiatives wi thin the
Agency, as well as the effect that a more protective inter
pretation of Title VJ might have had on those programs.
This might provide an indication of how more protective
fairness-ori ented approaches can coexist w i th effi
c iency-oriented reform.
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Environmental Justice and "Reinvention"
In recent years EPA has been experimenting with ways to
niake enviroIUI1ental regulation more efficient. The senti
ment expressed by some in the environmental field is that
command•and-control regulation has outlived its useful
ness, primarily in addressing the easy environmental prob
lems such as poflution caused by relatively large facili ties.
However, the second generation of environmental prob
lems, degradation caused by much smaller diverse sources,
cannot be solved by this outdated strategy. Proponents of
this view adopt a philosophy that rests upon a belief in the
superior efficiency of the market and devolution of author
ity to the local Level. 234 In :response to thjs sentiment, the
Cl inton Administration through EPA pledged to "reinvent"
environmental regulation, primarily by affording regulatory
relief to heavily regulated sources by promoting a variety of
innovations, including performance-based standards, trad
ing regimes, and incentive-based compliance. 235 In the per
mit context in particular, streamlined permit proceedings
and operational flexibi lity were proposed as a way to de
crease complexity and delay. The addition ofenhanced pub
lic partici pation and substantive environmental j ustice crite
ria in permit proceedings appear to confl ict with these par
ticular reinvention strategies. It is this apparent conflict that
has to be examined closely and addressed or there is sure to
be continued resistance to environmental justice proposals.
In order to assess how a more protective Title VJ interpre
tation or how permitting reforms may potentially conflict
with these high-priority initiatives, three discrete programs
are examined: brownfields, the Tier 2 refinery proposal, and
White Paper Number 3 . These discrete initiatives are used
primarily because they involve pennits as well as illustrate
EPA's application of its current reinvention philosophy,
which is likely to continue under the Bush Administration,
albeit perhaps under different terminology. The brownfield
initiative promotes re-use ofindustrial sites, the Tier 2 refin.
ery proposal involves an aggressive market-based strategy,
and White Paper Number 3 invol ves a "flexible" approach
to CAA permitting using the concepts of bubbles and ad·
vance approvals. All are designed to respond to the perceived
inefficiencies of a command-and-control pennitting system.
The following discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive
236
treatment of reiovention generally, or a critique of the mer
its of the three approaches in particular. Rather, the goal is to
examine the potential conflict between these programs and
environ.mental justice goals in the permitting context.
234.

See, e.g .. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Refomung En
vironmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 333 ( 1 985}; Richard L. Revez,
Rehabilitating lnterstau Competition: Rethinldng the. "'Race to the
Bottom " Ration.ale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67

N.Y.U. L. Rsv. 1 2 1 0 ( 1 992).
See U.S. EPA Office of Policy, Economics & lnnovation, lnnovalive
Programs Across EPA , at http://www.epa.gov/opeilbyepa.btm (last
visited Feb. 27, 2001).
236. Professor S teinzor bas written se veral articles q uestioning
reinvention initiatives and devolution. See Devolutkm and r!,e Pub
lic Health, supra note 226; Rena L Stcinzor, Tiu! Corruption ofCivic
Environmentalism, 30 ELR 10909 (Oct 2000}; Dangerous Jourru!y,
supra note 229; Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Pro-
ject XL: Does tlu! Emperor Have Any Clothes? 26 ELR 10527
( 1996); see also William Funk. Bargaining Towards rhe New Mil
235.

lennium; Regula tory Negolian·on and tlu! Subversion of tlu! Public
Interest, 46 DuKE L.J, 1 35 1 ( 1 977); bur see Jody Freeman, Collabo
rative Governance in the AdministraJive Stale, 45 U .C.L.A. L. Rsv.

1 (1997).
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Brownflelds
EPA-sponsored brownfield redevelopment was designed to
respond to a �rceived disincentive resulting from environ
mental laws. 37 It was widely believed that developers and
industrial manufacturers declined to purchase and develop
unused industrial sites because of a concern about potential
contamination and resulting liability under the Comprehen
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA). The irony is that many of these sites do not
qualify for Superfund action because of more highly con
taminated sites on the national priorities list. However, be
cause of the fear of potential liability these sites remain
idle, often abandoned by their former owners, thus pre
cJuding cleanup and reindustrialization in areas needing
economic revitalization. Meanwhile, project sponsors of
ten choose greenfields (nonindustrial sites) to build new
industrial faci lities, thus promoting urban sprawl. In order
to encourage the recycling of these idle industrial sites,
EPA de vised a bro wnfield action agenda 2 3 8 in the
mid- l 990s to facilitate redevelopment using a mix of regu
latory incenti ves , including grants to local governments to
facilitate brownfield redevelopment and the use of EPA
discretion to clarify and limit the CERCLA liability of pro
spective purchasers. 23 9 EPA also considers imposing less
stringent cleanup standards if the site will be used for in·
dustrial instead of residential purposes. State brownfield
programs address similar sites that are potentially subject
to state cleanup laws.
Given the obvious connection between environmental
justice and brownfield development, there has been sub237. See U.S. EPA, THE 8kOWNFI£LDS ACTION AoENDA ( 1 996): see
also U.S. EPA, Brownjie/ds Assessment Demonstrarion Pilots, at
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/pllotlst.htm (last updated May 26,
2000). For a history of this administrative initiative, see Paul
SkanLOTI Kibel, The Urban Nexus: Open Space, Brownfields, and
Justice, 25 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV. 589 ( 1 998) lhereinafterKibel,
The Urban Nexus); see also Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, One. Piece of
the Puule; Why State Brown/ields Programs Can 't Lure Busine.sses
to the Urban Cores Without Finding the Missing Pieces, 5 1

Rurous L. REV, 1 075, 1 1 24 ( J 999) (questioning the accuracy of
the assumption that liability is a significant disincentive).
238. See U.S. EPA, THE BkOWNFIELOS EcONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT
IN ITIATIVE APPLICATION GUIDELINES FOR DEMONSTRATIONS
( 1995) (EPA 540- R-994-068).
239. Paul Kibel summarizes the regulatory incentives nicely:
In terms of CERCLA implementation, the EPA Agenda
called for several changes in agency policy and operating
procedures. These changes included, among other things ( I )
CERCLIS delisting, in which EPA removed over 25,000
properties from the national track.log list of contaminated
sites; (2) prospective purchaser agreements, in which EPA
agreed nol to sue new owners for environmental remediation
costs for contamination that occurted prior to purchase: (3)
comfort letters, in which EPA set forth its remediation goals
regarding formerly federally owned property; (4) land-use
restrictions, in which new owners agreed to limit future use to
commercial and industrial purposes in exchange for EPA' s
release of remediation liability; (5) national and regional
brownfields pilots, in which EPA provided grants to states
and local governments lo help promote enviro nmental
cleanup and .redevelopment of contaminated properties; and
(6) Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) credits, in which
federal guidelines were changed to permit banks to fulfill
CRA' s local-lending obligations by providing loans for envi
ronmental remediation and brownfields redevelopment.
Kibel, The Urba11 Nexus, supra note 237, at 604 (citations omitted).
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stantial agency240 and scholarly attention 1 to the environ
mental justice implications of brownfield redevelopment.
However, it may come as a surprise that EPA has noted that
there are no pending Title Vl challenges in the brownfield
context. 242 Nonetheless, the attention is not misplaced. The
environmental justice perspective on brown field redevel
opment is perhaps best described as the good, the bad, and
the ambivalent.
On the positive side, brownfield development may result
in more clean urban environments and economic develop
ment. The idle and often abandoned sites contribute to urban
blighiJt times become a magnet for drug and criminal ac
tivity, 3 may contain unremediated contamination, and
generally become a source ofcommunity demoralization. 244
From that grim baseline, a project that involves any degree
of cleanup and added employment opportunities is attrac
tive, especially if the redevelopment project involves light
industrial use or a nonpol luting business. On the negative
side, because brownfield sites are often located near com
munities of color and the poor, the less stringent use-based
cleanup standards are problematic when considering the ex
isting pol lutant-loadings impacting many host communi
ties. To add to the environmental problems, some develop
ers specifically purchase these sites with plans to return the
site to heavy industrial use. In this respec t, brownfield rede
velopment has the effect of locking in the legacy of past in
5
dustrial development. 24 Thus, as the project sponsor subse
quently applies for the necessary environmental pennits to
begin operations, developers and local officials worry that
240. NEJAC WASTE ANO FACILITY SmNG SUBCOMM., ENV1RONMEN·
TAL JUSTICE, URBAN °REVITALIZATION, AND BROWNFIUOS: THE
S E A R C H FOR A UT H E N T I C StGNS O P HOPE ( 1 996) ( E PA
500-R-96-002) [hereinafrer NEJ AC, AuTHENTIC StGNS OP HoPE).
24 1 , Gabriel A. Espinosa, Building on Brownfields: A Catalysrfor Neigh
borhood Revita/iwtlon, 1 1 VJLL. ENVTL. L.J. I (2000): Mank, Re
forming State Brownjit'ld Programs, supra note 1 1 1 ; Lincoln L.
Davies, Working Toward a Common Goal? Three Case Studies of
Brownjields Redevelopmenl in Environmental Justice Commu
nities, 18 STAN, L.J. 285 ( 1 999); Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields Policies
for Sustalnablt' Cities, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y F. 187 ( 1 999);
Kirsten H. Engel, Brownfield Initiatives and Environmental Justice:
Second-Class Cleanups or Market-Based Equity?, 1 3 J. NAT. Re.•

SOURCES "' ENVTL. L. 3 1 7 (1 998) (describing brownfield redevelop
ment from three perspectives: a righL�-based approach, a mar
ket-based approach, and a pragmatic approach); E. Lynn Grayson,
An Alliance ofNecessiry: Enviro)ustice and Brown.fields, 1 4 ENVTL.
CoMPLIANCE & LJTIG. STRATEGY 4 ( 1 998); Kibel, The Urban Nexus,
supra note 237 (discussing the brownfield agenda within the context
of urban sprawl and failed urban renewal policies); John S.
Applegate, Risk Assessment, Redevelopment, and Environmental
Justice: Evaluating the Brownjields Bargain, 1 3 J. NAT. RE·
SOURCES & ENvrL, L. 243 ( 1 997-1998); Stephen M. Johnson, The

Brownfields Action Agerula: A Model for Future Federal/State Co
operarion in the Quest for Environmental Justice?, 37 SANTA
CLARA L REV, 85 ( 1 996); Georgette C. Poindexter, Separate a11d
Unequal; A Comment on the Urban Development Aspect of
Brownfie/ds Programs, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. I ( 1996); Douglas
A. McWilliams, Environmenlal Justke and Industrial Redevelop·
ment: Ecorwmics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 2 1 EcoL

OGY L.Q. 705 ( 1 994).
242. Paul Connolly, Environrnen1al Justice: Mayors Rap EPA al Meeting
With Brownerfor Failure to Consult on Interim Guidance, 29 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 658 (July 24, 1 998) (Administrator Browner notes that
there are no brownfield redevelopment projects delayed because of
an environmental justice complaint).
243. NEJAC, A UTHENTIC SIGNS Ol' HOPE. supra note 240. at 33.
244. Id
245. Engel, Brownfield Initiatives and Environmental Justice, supra note
24 1 , at 3 1 8.
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the potential for disparate impacts (from less stringent
cleanup standards and/or new emissions) and a resulting Ti
tle VI claim could either derail a proj ect or result in a chal 
lenge at the end of the proj ect after the expenditure of sub
stantial time and capital. EPA, environmental agencies, and
local governments are understandably concerned that Title
VI would be a strong disincentive for the purchase and de
velopment of these sites. Given the potential for good and
bad consequences, some environmental j ustice advocates
are arnbivalent about brownfield redevelopment. Part ofthe
skepticism maY. be based on a history of failed urban re
newal pol icies /46 negative experiences with government
24 7
environmental regulators, and a concern that the profit
motives of the lendinls and investment stakeholders will
dominate the process.
When the brownfield agenda first surfaced, environmen
tal j ustice advocates quickly recognized that the public pol
icy dialogue was too narrowly focused on removing barriers
to real estate and investment transactions. In response, the
Waste and Fac ility Siting Subcommittee of the National En
vironmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC) maintained
that "EPA's Brownfields locomoti ve left the station without
249
a maj or group of passengers," and it began a series of pub
lic dialogues to allow residents of impacted corrununities
and environmental j ustice advocates to s>;:stematically con
0
tribute input into the public policy debate.25 The public dia
logue first served to broaden the issue by placing brownfield
redevelopment in the context of an urban ecosystem with
four environments that had to be addressed: natural, built,
251
Environmental j ustice adsocial, and cultural/spiritual.
246. Kibel, The Urbari Nexus, supra note 237, at 608.
247. The public dialogues disclosed much evidence of lack of conununi
catlons and distrust between government.al organizations and com
munities concerned with brownfield programs and
that the distrust is
a continuing barrier 10 effective implementation. NEJAC, Au
TB£NTIC SJONS OF HOPE, supra note 240, at 5 1 .
248. Kibel, The Urban Nexus, supra note 237, at 612. Lenny Siegel of Pacific Studies in Oakland. Cal., explains:
One of the fint times I heard the notion of Brownfields was
from the environmental attorney for one of the nation' s larg
est corporations. She told me that she liked the idea of
Brownfields because thal meant that they could build facto
ries in communities that were already contaminated rather
than going out and threatening the Greenfields, which were
pristine . . . . I think there are a lot of people in government
who have basically the same attitude. We pollute cenain ar
eas of the country; th.e re are certain kinds of people that live
there. Let's keep on polluting the same areas. lf Brownfields
get misused as a concept, it could lead to more of that.
NEJAC, AUTHENTIC SIONS OF A'.oPE, supra nore 240, at 33.
249. NEJAC. AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HoP1;, supra note 240, al 67.
250. Id. at I .
25 1 . Id. at IO. The subcommittee formulated a more useful characterization of the urban environment as comprising:
( I ) an oversaturation of communities with multiple sources
of environmental pollution in highly congested spaces, (2) the
c�xistence of residential and industrial sites as a result of
imprudent land use decisions, (3) a lack of documentation of
mos! envirorunental health risks in urban commwiities, (4) the
ellistence of as yet nor understood effects of multiple, cumu
lative, and synergistic risks, (5) the absence of a comprehen·
sive environmeni.al enforcement and compliance activity
which results, for some communities, in a virtual non-exis
tence of such activity; (6) the lack of health services and ade
quate information on environmental risks, (7) the severe de-
cay in the institutional infrasl.rUCture, and (8) a high degree of
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vacates also argued that potential liabili ty was a relatively
minor impediment to brownfield redevelopment. Redlining
by investment and insurance companies, lack of training,
and the poor quality of education, public safety, housing,
and transportation all led to the deindustrialization of urban
252
areas, along with the contribution ofindirect subsidies for
3
greenfield development.25 Activists promoted the concept
of "urban revitalization"-a corrununity-based approach
focused on building capaci ty, partnerships, and mobilizing
resources-as opposed to ''urban redevelopment''-a gen
trification-driven policy that displaces existing corumuni
ties. 254 In a report to then-EPA Administrator Browner, the
NEJAC offered specific recommendations designed to in·
c o rporate env i ronmenta l j ustice co ncern s into the
brownfield redevelopment process. ln response to the con
cerns raised during the public dialogues, EPA reportedly re
vised its criteria for appl yi ng for brownfields pilots, for ex
ample, by emphasizing communi� involvement and requir
55
ing that participation be verified.
One might think that heavy involvement by the commu
nity in a formerly narrow transaction might disrupt the deli
cate system of incentives designed to entice prospective
purchasers to consider brownfields. This involvement is
particularly risky when community residents approach the
proj ect with skepticism about cleanup remedies, a determi
nation to bring a broader range of concerns to the table, and
an insistence that they maintain a direct involvement in land
use decisions that affect their communities. As noted in the
NEJAC report, however:
Those who claim that the community wi ll alway s require
the maximum level of cleanup . . . i gnore the fact that far
better than an yone else, the communi ty recogn izes the
dangers of losing any cleanup by demanding a full
cleanup . Urban revitalization may demand compro
mises, but these compromises must be suppo rted by
those who bear the burdens of incomplete cleanup . 256

Thus, in a process where both stand to gain and lose si gnifi
cantly. EPA in its pilot program may have set up a different
system of incentives that allowed a more nuanced reneg otia
tion to take place."'
As enlightening and informative as the 1 995 public dia
log ues were , the report did little to assuage the fears of state
and local agencies that environmental j ustice claims would
stifle redevelopment in inner-city areas, particularl y in li ght
social alienation and decay caused by livin g in deg raded
physical environments.
Id.

252. Id. 36·39 ; see also Robertson, One Pfece of the Puu.Je. supra note
237 (concluding that the failure to address nonenvironmental chal
le n g es w i ll co ntinue to hinder brownfield develo p me nt.
Nonenvironmental challenges include infrastructure, site and
building confi guration, utility cos-u., crime rates, education issues,
and racism) ,
253. NEJAC, AuniENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE, supra note 240, at 44
(mentioning governmen t-built infrastructure such as roads, water,
and sewera ge) .
254. Id. at 13.
255. Id. at es-ii. The NEJAC subcommittee cautioned, however, that
meaning ful public partici pa�ion is different in many wa ys from sim
ply holding meetings and getting letters of support. ll involves ongo
ing slAkeholder involvement and a recognition that the communi ty
brings a wealth of site-s pecific knowledge to the table. Id. at 22.
256. Id. at 43.
257. See generally Lazarus, supra note 37.

5-200 1

NEWS & ANALYSlS

of the subsequent Title VI claims and the 1 998 Interim
Guidance. Therefore, in July 1 998, then-EPA Administrator
Browner promised participants at a mayors' forum held in
Detroit that her office would undertake a study to ascertain
258
whether the guidance in fact hindered redevelopment.
Thus, a case study of seven EPA Assessment Pilot Proj ects
was undertaken in early 1 999 . The pi lots were chosen based
on an obj ectively high risk of Title VI c laims using criteria
such as a relatively high affected minori ty population and
involving proj ects with tentative redevelopmentzilans for
reuse that would require environmental permits. In four
of the pilot cities, there was significant environmental j us
tice activism and protests that were anticipated to cause
260
some concern to stakeholders. However, the interviews
subsequently disclosed that developers and investors did not
perceive Title VI complaints to be a maj or barrier but were
more concerned with other issues such as financing, con
struction season, and c leanup costs. 261 These concerns
turned out to be more prescient. as activities of several sites
were delayed by unresolved liability, ownership, and j uris
262
dictional issues.
None were delayed by environmental
justice disputes .
Other important con.siderations from the communi ty 's
perspective were that the redevelopment was an improve
ment over the existing blight and that the proj ect sponsor
was willing to promote j ob creation for local residents. 263
For example, a stamping press manufacturer in Chicago cre
ated 100 new jobs for local residents and a plastic rack man
ufacturer in Detroit created 30 new j obs with a potential for
264
70 more. As important as these considerations were, how
ever. they did not override the communi ty's concerns about
n
the cleaup and potential reuse of the property. A more sur
prising finding of the case study i s that des pi te the selection
criteria, typical redevelopment activities of the chosen pi
lots did not ultimately include pollution-heavy or permi t-in
tensive proj ects, a finding that may beJeneralized to a fair
2
number of the EPA-sponsored pilots. Of the three pilots
66
that did involve heavy industrial use , 2 an important com258. U .S. EPA, BRoWNFIELDs Trn.E VI CASE Sruores: Sm,tMAJtY RE
PORT{ 1999) (EPA 500-R-99-003) [hereinafter BIIOWN PIELOS TITLE
Vl c....se STUDIES].
259. Id. at 2.
260. Id. at 7.
26 1 . Id. at 7.
262. Id. at 9.
263. Id. at 8.
264. Id. at 1 0.
265, Id. at 8. Three sites included a stamping press operation, a plastic
rack manufacturer, and a construction company , Of20 sites targeted
for possible inclusion in the case studies, reuse plans included con
crete manufacturi ng. co1Jtainer-ma.king, parking, residential, retail
and office build ings, flex space, and road and bridge improvements.
Id. at 5. As noted in the report;
[Wlhile in-depth infonnation was only gathered at seven of
more than 200 active Pilots, these Pilots were chosen for their
high potential for Title VI complain1s (e.g., double digit mi
noriiy rat.es, active redevelopmenr and relatively high rate of
existing perm.its). It is logical to assume thal if Title VI com
plaints were nol negatively impacting progress at sit.es cho
sen for their high likelihood of conflict, remaining sites are
not likely to be impacted (sic] than those in this study.

Id. al 6-7.
266. A container manufacturer in Chicago, and cement plants in Miami
and Camden. Id. at 1 2 .
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ponent ofreducing conflict w as "involving the communi ty[ ,
which] allowed potential problems to be identified and
solved from the beginning when stakes were lower and de>
7
sign changes could more easily be made.":26 For example,
in a Miami project involving a proposed cement processing
operation, a neutral toxicologist was hired to explain the
emissions. 268 In Camden, the developer described the new1
cleaner process and agreed to the communi ty's request that
an independent engi neering firm conduct on-site monitor
ing. 269 In Charlotte , the developer lowered the height of
planned buildings in re �nse to communi ty concerns about
7
li ght and tree health. 2
gh
Althou there are undoubtedly many factors that con
tributed to the ultimate support of the brownfield pilot pro
j ects by the affected communities, what is striking is that the
"communi ty define [db the problem from the vantage point
1
of their aspirations,"
thus inj ecting more positive ele
ments into an economic transaction formerl y devoid of so
cial responsibili ty or civic possibili ty. In the Chicago pilo t.
for example, stakeholders built on the brownfield-ins pired
relationshi p between fhe ci ty and local communities to sub
sequentl y institute a coo perative enforcement program that
included brochures in several languages , a hotline for citi
zens to report illegal dumpin� in their communities, and
heavier penalties for violators . 72 Equal ly import.ant i s the
steadfast insistence by the communi ty-and the subsequent
cooperation by p ermitti ng officials and proj ect s pon
sors-to expand public partici pation oppo rtunities and also
to attemp t in some substantive fashion to miti gate the facil
ity's adverse impacts on heal th, safety, and q uali ty of life in
the host communi ty. These proj ects reflect a more comp re
hensive strategy-apparent in the p ublic dialogues of envi
ronmental j ustice activists-of addressin g brownfields in
its comp lex social context This may wel l be an example of
the product of a process of reframing issues and restructur
ing po wer relations that Sheila Foster describes as the
273
"transformative po litics'' of the movement.
y
Unfortunatel , however, the Draft ntle VI Guidance may
unwittingl y undennine this transfonnative process, reg ard
less of the assumptions concerning the connection between
brownfields and Title VI, To the extent project sponsors
may be concerned about potential Title VI claims, the Draft
Title VI Guidance eliminated leverage that might have been
hel pful to these communities to broaden the issues and pro
mote a more responsive negotiation process. In these in
stances, p roj ect sponsors seem more willing to negotiate
and accommodate rather than forego the proj ect altogether.
Thus, the percep,tion that the Drqfl Title VJ Guidance evis
74
cerates Title VI may make brownfield s ponsors less will
g
in to solicit communi ty support by undertaking voluntary
on-site miti g ati on measures ( this holds true for non
brownfield facili ty p rojects as well ) .
267. Id. at 8. For another stud y confinning the same advantage of early
p ublic partic i pation, see Davies supra note 241 , at 28 5 .
268. BROWNFIELDS 'l'm..E VI CA.SE Sruou;s, sup ra note 258, at 1 0, 1 8 .
269. Id. a t 1 2.
270. Id.
2 7 1 . NEJAC, A UTHENTIC S1GNS OP HOPE, sJJ.pra note 240. at 25.
272. Id. at 1 9 .
273. Poster, .mpra note 89.
274. See s14pra note 230 (director of a stace environmental agency d�
scribing the guidance as a "tiger without teeth.")
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To the extent that brownfield proj ect sponsors are uncon
cerned with Title VI liability in the first instance, the Title VI
investigatory framework is at best irrelevant. If it is the case,
as some believe, that Title VI was weakened to respond to
the perception that Title VI would act as a barrier to in
ner-city redevelopment, that perception is inaccurate in
those instances.27 At worst, the publicity surrounding the
Draft l' itle VJ Guidance may prompt prospective project
sponsors to believe that negotiating with the host commu
nity will yield little benefit. Such a powerful misconception
is indeed unfortunate because a more protective interpreta
tion of Title VI-one requiring close or moderate nexus mit
igation, for example-may not have a chilling effect on
brownfield redevelopment as participants seem to volun
tarily opt for mitigation measures closely tailored to respond
to community concerns.

The Proposed Tier 2 Refinery Proposal
In May 1 999, EPA proposed a major program that was de
signed to reduce emissions from cars and light trucks, pri
marily nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds. 276
Termed the "Tier 2" program, the central idea was to achieve
emission reductions by tailpipe controls and low sulfur
fuel. 277 Although the program is certain to achieve major re
ductions overall, it has the potential to increase pollutant
levels in areas near refineries. This is because the refineries,
in removing sulfur from fuel, must make changes to their fa.
cilities that are anticipated to increase significantly emis
sions in five criteria po llutants278 unless the facility owner
can find a way to contemporaneously reduce emissions in
other units within the same facility, thus "netting" out of
NSR 279 When a source nets out of review, overall opera
tions may still result in an emissions increase, but the in
crease is considered "de minimis" for regulatory p�ses.
Although an occasional small increase in isolation28 is not
problematic generally, the Tier 2 initiative presents a differ
ent scenario. Many of the refineries are clustered in the
nonatta irunent GulfCoast area of Region VI,28 1 the changes
have to occur during the same time frame (meeting the new
sulfur standard by 2004),282 and EPA anticipated that many
sources in nonattainment areas will not be able to net out of
review. 283 Thus, the residents in communities near Gulf
Coast refineries-who tend to be predominantly African
American and low-income-could be disproportionately
affected by the aggre g ate of both the si gnificant and the de
minimis emission increases from several refmeries all oc275. See U.S GAO, REPORT ro THE CHAIRMAN, COMMllTEE ON CoM
MBRCE, HOUSE OP REPRE.SENTAT1V£S, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC
TION: AGENCIES HAVB MADE PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING TH E
FEDERAL 8ROWNFU!LO PARTNERSHIP INmATIVE (1999).
276. 64 Fod, Reg. 26004 (M�y 13, 1999) [hereinafter Proposed Tier 2
Rule]. See also 65 Fed. Reg. 6698 (Feb. 10, 2000) (hereinafter Final
Tier 2 Ruic].
277. Proposed Tier 2 Rule, !iUpra note 276, at 26004.
278. The l.echnologies typically requm; lhc use of a fwnace and therefore
have. 1he potential to increase nitrogen oxide (NOJ, VOCs, panicu
late ltllllter, carbon monoit.ide, and S02• Id. at 26065 ,
279. Id at 26064.
280. Twenty-five tons per ye11r of NO, and VOCs in a severe ozone
nonattainment area. Id. at 26065.
28 1 . Id.
282. Id. at 26008,
283. Id. at 2606S.
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curring within the same time frame. 284 Such a scenario is an
unfortunate but classic case of distributional inequity.
In the initially proposed Tier 2 rule, EPA did not acknowl
edge the distributional implications but instead proposed a
suite of regulatocy relief measures for the refineries, includ
ing the use of "plantwide applicability limits" (PALs) to
avoid triggering NSR285 ; streamlining approaches to speed
up the permit process1 including a preswnptive uniform
technology requirement for lowest achievable emission rate
(LAER) and best available control technology (BACT)
rather than the typical case-by-case determinations; mobile
source offsets; model pem:ut and permit applications; prior
ity processing of permit applications; EPA permitting teams
to help permit applicants troubleshoot individual permitting
issues; separately issued advance Title V permits for the
desulfurization project only; a single emission limit or con
trol requirement to comply with multiple applicable re
quirements; advance-approved changes in operation; the
use of pollution prevention approaches; and less stringent
hardship requirements for small refineries during the early
years of the program.286
From an environmental justice perspective, expedited
permits in general tend to disadvantage vulnerable com
munities because these communities often lack the re
sources to evaluate technical permit terms and use public
participation opportunities effectively, and a shorter time
frame magnifies this difficulty. In addition. one approach
proved to be particularly problematic: the use of expected
reductions from mobile source emissions to "offset" the
emission increases at the refineries. 287 This is a significant
departure from normal regulatory standards as o ffsets are
typically reductions from other stationary sources ( facili
ties) that are measured and obtained from processes and
po llution contro l technol ogies rather than di ffuse re 
ductions from the tailpipes of an indefinite number of
motor vehicles .
EPA received several comments on the proposed rule,
and in particular on its proposal to assist the refineries in ob
taining the necessary pennits. 288 In responding to the com
ments of various stakeholders, EPA disagreed w i th
commenters who opposed the use of mobile source off:
sets. 2 89 In response to stakeholder concerns about potential
Title VI claims, the Agency specifically noted that a Title VI
284. Su NATIONAL Ass'N OP MANUPAcnJKERS, REGrON 6 EXECUTIVE
SUMMA!I.Y: SHOULP EJ BE A TTB1t 2 PERJ,ffmNG fssUE1 ( 1 999),
available at http://www. nam.org/rer/BNEJ/bnej-tier2.h1ml (last
visited Sept. 19, 2000). According to this summary, 25 of the refiner
ies bad a high score on the "po tential environmental justice index."
The method averaged data over a four-mile radius and would miss
smaller environmental justice neighborhoods in lhe study area. Id. at
2. The repo11 concluded that based on the demographic information,
EPA should consider environmental justice issues as a potential fac
tor in the sulfur role penn.ltting.
285. Proposed Tier 2 Rule, supra note 276, at 26065-66. This would al
low the facility operator to make changes without having to evaluate
a baseline for each modification and calculate a netting equation. Id.
at 26066.
286. id. at 26066-69.
287. Id. at 26066-67.
288. See generally U.S. EPA, Tl.ER 2 MOTOR VEtllCLE EMISSION STAN
DARDS AND GASOLIN E SULPUR CoNTR.OL Rl!QUIJIBMENTS: RE
SPONSE ro CoM'M ENTS ( 1 999) (EPA 420-R-99-024) [hereinafter
'fIER 2 RESPONSE TO COMMENTS].
289. Some automobile manufacturer.; objected to the use of these offsets,
notit\g that the refiner.; should not be allowed to benefit from the in
vestmen ts being made by the automotive industry. Id. al 20- IO.
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claim should not delay issuance of the permit. 290 To address
the environmental justice issues more generally, EPA
agreed to institute a stakeholder outreach process and iden
tify areas that may experience local emissions increases as a
291
result of refinery modification. Although the Agency as
serted that at the county leve1 benefits were anticipated to
outweigh expected emission increases, the Agency con
ceded that it could not determine the precise local environ
menta1 impacts with certainty W1til the types of modifica
tions and control requirements were determined. 292 EPA
agreed to address the environmental justice issue on a
case-by-case basis, 293 and it would use the permit teams to
address community concerns and conduct edu. c ational
meetings with affected communities. 294
The subsequent stakeholder interviews revealed common
impediments to the stakeholder process when dealing with
environmental justice issues, such as the- need for independ
ent technical assistance for affected communities 295 and the
fact that the environmental justice activists would not pur
port to represent the views and speak for the residents of all
ofthe impacted Gulf Coast communities. 296 More generally,
environmental j ustice advocates were concerned about the
overwhelming pollutant burdens, streaml ined permitting
processes, the lack of enforcement at the refineries, and
were distrustful of state environmental agencies. 297 All en
vironmental j ustice organizations noted their lack of input
prior to the proposed rule in contrast to EPA's extensive con
sultation with industry representatives. 298 The refini ng in
dustry was concerned about the time it would take to process
applications, particularly if there was community opposi
tion to the pennits. 299 Some state environmental agencies
were concerned about their capacity to process the multiple
permit applications that were expected, especially in light of
existing backlogs. 300 Conventional environmental organi
zations were particularly concerned that environmental jus
tice communities would press their position and attempt to
"scuttle the rules," thereby putting "the national groups in
the difficult position of either continuing to support the
rules despite local communities' objections or opposinJi
3
the implementation of rules they have fought bard for. "
Ulti mately, however, they appeared to believe that this po
tential impasse could be avoided since Tier 2 implementa
tion could be achieved without emission increases, they
290. Id. at 20- 1 3. Ironically, this was six months before EPA issued the
Draft Tir/e VI Guida11Ce io June 2000. Draft Title VI Guidance, su
pra not.e 1 27. The Interim Guidance did not explicitly address the is
sue of whether a Title: VT claim could stay a permit.
29 1 . TIER 2 RESPONSE. TO COM M ENTS, supra note 288, at 20- 15.
292. Jd. 3 1 20-20.
293. Id.
294. Id. a1 20-23.
295. See PROPOSED TIER 2 GASOLIN E RULE, SUMMARY OF TH E PHAsll l
STAKEHOLDER CONVENING ON REl'INERY PERMJITINQ 1SS1)ES 5
( 1 999) {hereinafter PHASE I STAKEJiOLDER REPORT] ; see also Pao
POSED TIER 2 GASOLINE RULE, SU M MARY OF THE PR ASE TI STAKE·
HOLDER CONVENING ON REFINERY PERMl'lTlNG ISSU ES (2000)
[hereinafter PHASE n STAKEHOLDER REPORT).
296. PHASE I STAKEHOLDER REPORT, supra note 295, at J O.
297. PHASE II STAKEHOLDER REPORT, supra note 295. at 1 -3 .
298. Id.
299. Id. at 5 ,,
300. Id.
301 . Id. lt 4.
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maintained, because "no refinery is operating with BACT
on all equipment." 302
These concerns notwithstanding, the Agency decided to
proceed with a proposal to allow mobile source offsets by
guidance,303 a decision that sparked vehement opposition
from the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC),
Communities for a Better Envirownent (CBE), and other
environmental justice organizations. 304 In addition to dis•
cussing the potential impact to vulnerable communities, the
comments of these organizations were revealing for another
reason. They laid out the extreme degree to which EPA was
using its interpretive authority. For example, they pointed
out that existing statutes and regulations only allowed the
use of stationary source offsets under nonattainment
305
NSR. They particularly questioned the rationale support
ing the Agency's positions. For example, offsets must be
"surplus," i.e., not otherwise required by the CAA. 306 The
proposed guidance stated that because the Tier 2 rule was
based upon findings that involved the Administrator's dis
cretion, the mobile source reductions were not "otherwise
required" by the CAA. 307 This logic is particularly puzzling
because, as noted by the NRDC, "[o]nce the Agency bas
made this positive finding, and determined that there is a
'need for further reduc tions in emissions, ' the Administra·
tor is required to promulgate emission standards.''308 Thus,
the Tier 2 tailpipe reductions are required under the CAA
notwithstanding a degree of discretion that the Administra·
tor has in making the finding that triggers the requirement.
That being so, the reductions are not surplus and are ineligi
ble for offset purposes. The commenters also pointed out
that the mobile source offsets were not quanti fiable by usual
309
qualitative criteria and could not be considered "in effect"
by the time the refineries commenced operation because the
fuel was yet to be produced and sold. 3 1 0 The NRDC was par
ticularly concerned that the proposed Tier 2 guidance, if
adopted, would be harmful precedent that would lead other
302. Id. at 3. As one stakeholder no1ed: "It' s a matter of using technolo
gies that may cost more. but will reduce the pollutants." Id. (quoting
a stakeholder).
303, Notice of Availability; Memorandum, Use of Emissions Reductions
From Motor Vehicles Operated on Low-S ulfur Gasoline as New
Source Review (NSR) Offsets for Tier 2/Gasoline Sulfur Refinery
Projects in Nonattainment Areas, 65 Fed. Reg. 43009 (July 12,
2000) [hereinafter Tier 2 Offset Memo].
304. See Comment letter by Natural Resources De fense Council dated
August 1 1 , 2000 (on file with author) [hereinafter NRDC Tier 2
Comments] , and Comme nl Letter by Communities for a Better Envi
ronmen t et al., dated August J I, 2000 (this letter, endorsed by ap
proximately 67 organizations and individuals. is on file wilh the au
thor) [ hereinafter CBE et al. Tier 2 Comments).
:ms. NRDC Tier 2 Comments, supra note 304, al 9; CBE cc al. Tier 2
Comments, supra note 304, at 6. A related criticism was that the
Agency, assuming it had aulhority to allow mobile source offset
should have proceeded by notice-and-<mmment rulemaklng because
the guidance contradicted established regulations. NROC Tier 2
Conunents. supra note 304, at 3.
306. 42 U.S.C. §7503(c)(2), ELR STAT, CAA § 1 73(c)(,2).
307. Tier 2 Offset Memo, supra note 303 , attach . at 5.
308. Id. at 10 (emphasis in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. §752 l (i)(2)(A),
( i)(3)(A)(i ) , & (i)(3)(C)(i), ELR ST AT . CAA §202(i)(2)(A),
(i)(3)(A)(i), & (i)(3)(C)(i) (emphasis added)).
309. Id. at 7-8 (noting that the crude emission estimates used ror SIP plan
ning purposes is insufficient); CBE et al. Tier 2 Comments, supra
note 304, at 5-6.
3 1 0. CBE el al. Tier 2 Comments, supra note 304. at 5: NRDC Tier 2
Comments, supra note 305, at 4-7.
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source categories to demand similar treatment and further
asserted that the Agency's logic supporting the mobile
source reduc tion could be applied to almost any manufac
turing activity tbat would result in an environmentally bene
ficia1 product-bicycle manufacturers, for example, would
be in a positio n to request mobile source offsets and expe
di1ed permit processing. 3 12
The comment letter from CBE and other environmental
justice organizations noted that a similar issue had previ
ously arisen in California, with the refineries advancing
similar arguments for an exemption from full review wider
313
the California Environmenta1 Quality Act. The California
state legislature decided to subject the projects to full re
view, which resulted in feasible yet protective technologies
314
and control measures. They maintain that feasible tech
nologies exist that will enable refineries to produce the Tier
2 fuel without an i ncrease in emissions, especially consider
ing that the "majority of U.S. refineries are decades old, with
315
ample opportunities to achieve such reductions ."
Even
the national organization of air poll ution control officials
noted that "such a proposal could discourage refi neri es from
seeking on-site offsets, resul ting in emission increases at re
fineries that will have a diswoportionate, negative impact
36
on refinery communities."
It remains to be seen whether the Agency ultimately
adopts and allows the use of mobile source offsets for refin
eries as agency pol icy or, more broadly, whether the refinery
permitting aspect of the Tier 2 rule can be implemented
w i th out the d i re conseq uences p redi cted by these
commenters, in particular the harm to populations near re
fineries. One thing appears certain: should the states in the
Gulf Coast region opt to devise area-specific agreements to
reduce pollutants in the affected communities, any subse
quent Title VI claim based on the aggregated increases at the
refineries will likely be dismissed. This would save the
Agency from the obvious embarrassment of having to even
consider a disparate impact claim based upon a state 's com
pliance with EPA's own guidance.
Title VI aside, other observations can be made about
EPA's approach to resolving this distributional issue. First,
in its understandable zeal to implement a program that wiJl
yield an immense environmental benefit, the Agency first
opted to ignore apparent environmental justice conse
quences. In the initially proposed rule, the Agenc.x did not
7
address the environmental justice implications.
When

comment letters subsequently forced the issue. the Agency
responded, but not by developing a programmatic response
by rule or guidance. In the subsequent Tier 2 final rule, the
Agency addressed environmental justice only in a general
fashion. partly by assuming the issue would not arise at the
local level and partly by a commibnent to address the issue
3 18
by guidance at a later date. The second observation is that
EPA opted for procedural remedies in this case by belatedly
319
instituting a separate stakeholder process. This process
was insufficient for a variety of reasons, the most obvious of
which was that the inevitable trade offs that occur in rule de
velopment had already been made. 320 What followed in fact
was the guidance on mobile source offsets, an action that d i d
not alleviate, but intensified, environmental justice coninto the overall estimated net economic effec t of the pro
posed standards.
Proposed Tier 2 Rule, supra no te 276, at 26078.
3 1 8. The rule states:
['IJhe Tier 2/gasoline sulfur rule will achieve environmental
benefits in the local areas where refineries are located, due to
reductions in tail pipe emissions from vehicles driven in
those are.as. Although we expect residual emissions increases
ar some refineries even after iJ1stalling the stringent level of
emissions controls required under the Act, for the vast major
ity of areas, we believe that these potential refinery emission.
increases will be very small compared to the Tier 2 benefits in
those same local areas.
We believe it i important to understand and address con·
cems relating to potential localized emissions increases
from refineries that make significant process changes to
meet the requirements of t he Tier 2 rule. We believe that.
among other things, the keys to addressing any potential
concerns are as follows:
- Providing meaningful community involvement early
and throughout the process;
- Determining what information and actions would elimi·
nate concerns; and
- Detennining what EPA , States, and indu try can do to
make the permitting prooess smoother by ensuring ongoing
community involvement in the dedsion making process
and by building trust among stakeholders . . . . [W]e plan to
undertake additional actions in the future, including pro
viding education and outreach about the rule and its im
pacts in local communities, developing pennitting guid·
ance through a publ ic process and addressing Title VI peti
tions if they arise.
Final Tier 2 Rule, supra note 276, at 6774.
3 1 9. The rule states:
BPA's Office of Air and Radiation and the Alternative Dis
pute Resolution Team within EPA' s Office of the Adminis
trator implemented a national convening process which was
designed to bring together a broad spectrum of stak.eholdern
to exp Ion: with !hem their perceptions and v iews of issues as
sociated wilh Tier 2 pennitting and to assess the potential for
a collaborative process lo address specific implementation is
sues at some time in the future. The convening was carried
out by an outside neutral party who conducted interviews
with representatives from selected EPA offices, States, in
dustry, environmental groups, and environmental justice or
ganizations. Second, EPA held infonnalional briefings and
provided background materials to the National Environmen
tal Justice Advisory Council's (NFJAC) Air and Water S ub
committee and Enforcement Subcommittee to provide an op
portunity for them to provide feedback and recommendations
IO the Agency. Finally, in October 1 999, we met with both na
tional environmental groups and environmental justice advo
cacy representatives, IO discuss their views on the pennitting
aspects of the p{oposed rule.

3 1 1 . NRDC Tier 2 Comments, supra J1ote 304, at 2.
3 1 2. Id. at 7.
3 1 3 . CBE et al. Tier 2 Comme nts. supra note 304, at 3.
3 1 4. Id.
3 1 5. Id. at 2.
3 1 6. Co�nJs of Stale and Territorial Air Pollution Program Adminis

trators (STAPPA ) and the Association of local Air Pollution Con
tro l Offi c i a l s ( A LA PC O ) , 2 ( A u g . 1 7 , 2000) , a t

hrtp : //www.4cleanair.org/members/comml t1ee/penni1.html (las1
visited Oct. 25, 2000).

3 1 7. The only reference to environmental jus1ice was a passing refer
ence in the cost-benefit section of the proposed rule, where the
Agency concluded:
Finally, when considered along wilh other important eco
nomic dimensions-including environmental justice, smaU
business financial effects, and other outcomes related to the
distri b u tion of be nefits and costs a mong partic ular
groups-the direct comparison of q uantified economic
benefils and economic costs can provide useful insights
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cems. The third observation is that the Agency ultimately
opted to address environ men tal j us tice issues on a
case-by-case basis, in th.is case without providing a frame
work for addressing potential impacts that are fairly predict
able. In this respect, the Agency lost an opportunity to test a
framework within a discrete and manageable context. The
last observation about the Tier 2 refinery proposal is that i t
il lustrates the Agency's expansive interpretation of i ts au
thority in providing regulatory relief to refineries in stark
contrast to the conservative use of its authority to condition
or deny pemtits on environmental justice gro unds. The same
liberal approach can be seen in reinvention initiatives with
much broader applicability.

Another Draft Guidance- " White Paper Number 3 "
One recent agency initiative is i llustrative. Perhaps more
than any other venue, the reinvention enterprise is at its most
aggressive in the area of pennitting emissions of criteria air
pollutan ts-usually by large industrial facilities-via a pre
construction permitting program termed NSR. If the EAB
decisions, Title VI complaints, and the Tier 2 refinery com
ments are any indication, this is also an area that routinely
32 1
raises signi ficant environmental justice concems .
To
magnify the difficulty of this conflict, the preconstruction
air permitting profraDl under the federal CAA is extraordi
32
with separate statutory requirements for
narily complex,
permitting major sources of crite ria pollutants in attainment
323
areas (tenned PSD review)
and nonattainment areas
324
(termed nonattainment NSR).
Joining these preconstruc
tion permitting programs is the umbrella operating permit
program under Title V of the 1 990 Amendments. 325 Although
a general discussion could not do justice to the breadth and
326
depth of these air permitting programs,
this Article hopes
32 1 . S ix out of l O appeals board decisions concern major source air per
mitting. and 2 1 of 6 1 Title VJ administrative complaints presently
accepted for investigation or under rev iew similarly involve air per
mits. See infra notes 32 1 -73 and accompanying tex1; see also Title VJ
ComplainJs Fifed With the EPA as of No vember 30, 2000, at
bttp://www.epa.gov/civilrigbts/docs/t6csnov2000.pdf (last visited
Jan. 9, 200 1 ) (on file with author).

322. See generally Theodore L. Garrett & Sonya D. Winner, A Clean Air
Act Primer: Part I, 22 ELR 1 0159 (May 1 992).
323. 42 U.S.C. § §7470-7492, ELR STAT. CAA § § 1 60- 1 69B. For a dis
cussion of the mechanics of the PSD program, see Craig N. Oren,
Prevention of SignificanJ Deterioration: Control Compelling Versus
Site-Shifting, 74 IOWA L. REV. I ( 1 988).

324. 42 U.S.C. §§750 1 -75 1 5 , ELR STAT. CAA §§ 1 7 1 - 1 93. For a discus
sion of the mecbanios of nonaltainment NSR, see Gauna, supra note
1 09.

325. 42 U.S.C. §766 1 , ELR STAT, CAA §50 1 . Title V Is procedural and
not int.coded to create new substantive requirements. 57 Fed. Reg.
32250, 32284 (July 2 1 , 1 992). However, the reg11lations for Title V
opomling permits programs envision the integration of PS D review.
nonauainmenl NSR, the pennitting of hazardous air pol lutants, and
existing EPA-approved state NSR requirements. The existing regu
lations can be found at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70 (2000); see also Proposed Re
visions to Part 70, 59 Fed. Reg. 44460 (Aug . 29, 1 994 ); Proposed Re
visions to Part 5 1 and Pa11 70, 60 Fed. Reg. 45530 (Aug. 3 1 , 1 995);
Notice of Avai lability of Draft Rules and Accompanying Informa
tion, 62 Fed. . Reg . 30289 (June 3, l 997) (draft final rule to Part 5 1 and
Part 70). This Arti cle will focus primllrily on major NSR.
326. The current regulations can be found at 40 C.F.R. pl. .5 1 . See also
NSR MANU AL, supra note 67, at 2-3. The NSR Manual does not es
tablish binding regulatory requirements nor is it an official statement
of policy. Id. at I . The NSR Manual is used to generally prescribe the
mechanics of the NSR program, but is subject to NSR regulations
and vatiation by state pennitting authorities !hat have been autho
rii.ed by EPA.
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to highlight some of the potential difficulties that rein
vention in this area may pose to impacted communities.
Since 1 993, EPA has been engaged in o�oing dialogues
7
with various stakeholders to reform NSR.
The most re
cent product of this effort is a Draft Guidance on Design of
Flexible Air Permits (Draft Flexibility Guidance), also
',32 8
known as "White Paper Number 3 ,
which partly draws
on al ternative permitting approachi;:s proposed but never
formally adopted by final rule. White Paper N umber 3 is in·
teresting in several respects. First, although not finalized,
the proposed guidance reveals current Agency thinking on
potential alternative permi tting strategies under consider
ation, at least in some quarters of the Agency. However, the
proposal contains flexibilities that may be problematic to
m
com unities impacted by these large facil ities. The guid
ance is a procedural curiosity that i tself illustrates the con
tradictory institutional messages that tend to confound
stakeholders. Shortly before its issuance as proposed
Agency guidance, White Paper Number 3-then termed an
internal memo- had been leaked to the press. 329 In re327. The reform effort concerns mainly the permitting of crile. ri a pollut
ants by large industrial sources. On March 1 6- 1 7, 1 993, and Juoe 4,
1 993, EPA held an NSR simplification workshop, See U.S . EPA, New
Source &view Simplification Workshop Tran$cript (Mill. 1 7- 1 8,
1993), al http://www.epa.gov/ltn/nsr/rule_dev.htrnl (last modified
June 29, 2000); U.S. EPA, New Source Review Simplification Work
slwp Transcript (June 4, 1 993). at h ttp://w w w.cpa.go v/ttn/nsr/
rule_dev.htmJ (last modified June 29, 2000). On July 7, 1 993, an NSR
subcommittee was subsequently established a part of the existing
CAA Federal Advisory Commit I.Ce. 58 Fed. Reg, 36407 (July 7.
1 993). The subcommiuee bas met on several occasions JO discuss re·
form ofNSR, See, e.g., U.S. EPA, New Sourr:e Revil!W Subcommit
tee Meeting TrMscript (July 2 1 -22, 1.993); U.S . EPA, New Source
Review Subcommittee Meeting Transcript (Nov. 8-9, 1 993); U.S.
EPA, New Source Review Subcomminee Meeting Transcript (Jan.
20-2 1 , 1 994): U.S. EPA, New Source Review Subcommittee Meeting
Transcript (Mar. 1 6· 17, 1 994); U.S. EPA, New Source Review Re·

form Subcommittee Mee/ing as to New Source Review Reform
Rulemaldng Transcript (SepL l 7, J 996) (all transcripts on file with

author and available at h ttp://www.epa.gov/ttn/nsr/rule_dev. html
(last modified June 29, 2000)). The goal of this ongoing effort.
termed NSR reform, is to reduce complexity, speed up review, and,
where possible, afford flexibility to regulated entities without sacri
ficing environmental protection. The deliberations of the workshop
and subcommittee contributed 10 a major refonn proposal on July
23 , 1 996. See Prevention of Sig_nificant Deterioration (PSD) and
Nonat111inmenl New Source Review (NSR) EPA Notice of
Rlllemaking, 6 1 Fed. Reg. 38250-38344 (July 23, 1 996); Notice of
Availability of Draft Rules and Accompanying lnfonnalion, 62 Fed.
Reg. 30289 (June 3, 1 997) (draft final rule on Part 5 1 and Part 70);
Noiice of Availability; Altema1jves for New Source Review (NSR)
ApplicabiUty for Major Modifications· Solicitation of Comment, 63
Fed. Reg. 39857 (July 24, 1 998). The rule has yet to be final ized, but
White Paper Number J appears to draw upon several proposals out
lined in the 1 996 proposed rule and subsequent refinements. The re·
form effor1 in its entirety is beyond the scope of this Article.

328. See Notice of Availabilhy for Draft Guidance on Design of flexible
Air Pennits (White Paper Number 3). 65 Fed , Reg. 49803-01 (Aug.
1 5, 2000) (available al EPA ' s NS R website, http://w ww .epa.gov/
ttn/nsr/whatsnew.html). The tenn "White Paper Number 3" indi
cates that this proposed guidance is part of an ongoing effort to
streamline permits as it is the third in a series of white papers. See
Proposed Tier 2 Rule, supra note 276, at 26068 (referring to White
Paper for Streamlined Development of Patt 70 Permit Applications,
Lyd ie N. Wegman. Deputy Director, Office of Ai( Quality Planning
and Standards, U.S. EPA, July J O, 1 995, and White Paper Number 2
for Improved Implementation of the Part 70 Operating Permits Pro
gram, Lydia N Wegman, Deputy Director. Office of Air Quality
Planning and Standards, U.S. EPA, Mar. 5, 1 996).

329. The int ernal memo was roponedly given to 1he press by Public Em
ployees for Environmental Responsibility, a Washington-based ad
vocacy group. H . Josef Hebert, EPA Considers Relaxing Pollution
Rules on Industrial Plants, ASSOCIATED PRE.SS NEWSW1R£S, June 5 ,
2000. available at APWIR£S 1 7:59:00.
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sponding to j ournalists' inquiries, Agency officials charac
terized the internal memo as "an idea sheet" by mid-level
staff members that was "embryonic'' and did "not represent
much of anything/' least of all Agency policy. 330 Approxi •
mately two months later, Whi te Paper Number 3 was issued
as proposed guidance 1 a move that departed from the
Agency's seven-year effort to accomplish reform of NSR
and its eight-year effort to revise the operating permit pro
gram regulations by rule. Indeed, the expressed mid-stream
change of position-that the changes contemplated by the
proposed guidance were authorized by the current regula
13 1
tions all along -provoked a particularly sharp conunent
by the NRDC an environmental organi zation that had sig
nificantly and consistently participated in the ongoing
rulemaking process . 332 Although the scope of the Draft
Flexibi/ity Guidance does not encompass the numerous pro
posals undertaken in the NSR or Title V rulemaking pack
ages, the focus of this guidance is on two concepts that are
central to the reform project generally-operational flexi
bility and permit streamlining. Under the Draft Flexibility
Guidance, these ideas will be applied in a regulatory context
more expansive than the relatively narrow confines of pi lot
projects, e.g.• brownfield redevelopment and facility XLs,
and the Tier 2 refinery proposal. 33 And once again, in the
proposal we see that EPA is willing to push its interpretive
authority to the limits.
One of the central strategies to provide flexibility is the
use of a bubble (plantwide or partial) to avoid applicability
of new permit proceedings when changes are made subse
quent to the initial permit. A PAL allows wiits to be added
and modified, and e.mi ssions increased within the PAL level
without triggering NSR or without the type of state agency
review and approval that is usually required in connection
with the change. 334 Although PALs have been allowed, typi330. Id. See also John J. Fialka, EPA Is Considering Increased Fle.xibility
In lssuing Industry Air-Pollution Permits, WALl. ST. J., June 5,
2000, at A-3, available al 2000 WL-WSJ 303 1 786; Jwie 5. 2000,
Dow Jones Business News 00:43 :00.
33 1 . See, e.g .. advance approvals are really a fonn or reasonably antici
pated operating scenarios, White Paper Number3, supra note 328, at
1 1 , 1 6 , and PALs are permissible under existing regulations, Id.
at 3 1 .
332. A comment letter signed by approximately 56 organizations, including the NRDC, stated:
Adoption of the document ' s "flexibilities" through guidance
rather than rulemaking would circumvent and short circuit
pending Agency iulemakings thal are addressing many of
these same issues. These rulemakings under part 70 and the
NSR program are ones in which some of our organizations
have been involved p.s �takeholders for ovor eighl yefilS, and
we con. s ider it deplorable that EPA would treat our sustained
participation as stakeholders so cavalierly.
Conunent letter from NRDC and other organizations addressed ro
Michael Trutna, U.S. EPA (Sept. 1 4, 2000) (on file with author)
[hereinafter NRDC et al. White Paper Number 3 Comments] . NROC
Senior Attorney David Hawkins consistently had been Involved
with the ongoing refonn efforts. See U.S. EPA, New Source Review
Simplification Workshop Transcript, supra note 327. at 1 8 ; see also
NSR Reform Stakeholder Members, at http://w ww.epa.gov/ttn/nsr/
rule_dcv.html (updated Jan. 20, 1 999) (on file with author).
333. For example, the fleltibilities provided by guidance not only apply to
PSD and nonanainment NSR (new and modified major sources of
criteria pollutants), but also to sources of hazardous air pollutams.
new source perfonnance standards and SlP requirements, and
nonfederal requirements (ststc/local/tribaJ) as well. White Paper
Number 3, s11pra note 328, at 2 1 -27.
334. Id. at 30. Under curren1 regulations, sources can avoid major NSR by
a netting transaction, bu! prior review and approval by the ,s tate
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cally they rn1ve been granted in connection with a permit pi
lot project. with the Agency promising to evaluate claims of
superior environmental performance and the practical
enforceabilit;; of the experimental approach before adop
tion by rule. s The NRDC and others noted that the most
common permit pilot projects, Project XL, have site-spe
cific rulemakings and opportWlities for public flarticip ation
3 6
that have yet to be concluded and evaluated. Yet, in the
Draft Flexibility Guidance, the Agency has taken the posi
tion that PALs are permissible under the current regulations
and that previously proposed regulatory language in the
pending NSR rulemaking proceeding was intended merely
to clarify the PAL approach.337 Thus, the extent to which a
PAL may be approved in practice now depends on a state 's
current SIP and not on finali zati on of the pending
rulemak.ing proceedings.
Although PALs may eliminate major NSR/PSD applica
bility, the addition of new equipment wider the PAL might
trigger minor source review and Title V requirements.
Therefore, the Draft Flexibility Guidance contains another
strategy that will allow the source to avoid these subsequent
permit proceedings as well. This flexibility tool-also as
serted to exi st under current law-is the advance at>
pro val. 338 Under this provision, if the permit applicant antic
ipates a need to add or modify processing equipment or pol
lution control devices in the future, the applicant can request
advance approval of those changes in the application for the
39
initial flexibility permit. 3 Advance approval can even be
obtained when the precise changes are not s�cifically
known at the time of the initial pennit application. 340 Under
the Draft Flexibility Guidance, the family of advance approv
als can apply to "a potentially wide spectrum of changes, in
cluding the addition of specific new process units, modifica
tions to existing units, or even for the addition ot modification
ofunits which are not known but which are within a described
category of changes. "341 Advance approvals niay also be used
in connection with PALs and other strategies that are de
signed to allow the source to avoid triggering NSR.342 Con
ceding that the number of different operating scenarios could
be extensive, EPA advised that where it was impractical to de
scribe the operating sceruµios in detail, they could be de
scribed as a category of advance approved changes. 341
agency is necessary and Title V permit terms are generated because
decreases used to generate netting credit must be made enforceable.
!d. A use of a PAL avoids this requirement. Id. at 3 1 .
335. NRDC et al. White Paper Number3 Comments, supra note 332, at 1 7.
336. Id. at 1 8.

337. White Paper Number 3, supra note 328, at 3 1 .
338. Id. at J I .
339. Id. a t I 0- 1 1 .
340. Id.

34 l . Id. at IO.
342. These include potential-to-emit limits and minor ongoing modifica
tions (MOMs) or "cap and track" strategics. Id. at 30-35. MO Ms ap
pear to be partial caps that pertain to groups or interrelated changes
within the facility, while "cap and track" is a cap that falls just below
lhe applicable significance level that would trigger NS R. Id.
343. Id. at 1 9:
Where the possibilities of lhese changes are so great that it is
practical only to describe the conditions that assure compli·
ance and not each of the scenarios in detail In the permit, these
different operating scenarios may, in some instances still be
included in title V permits as a described category of changes
. . . in a menu fonnaL
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To assure permit authorities that the future changes will
comply with legal requirements, the facil ity operator may
state in advance a menu of "replicable operating proce
dures, "344 mechanical procedures that do not require j udg
ment and would yield identical results regardless of the op
345
erator. Anticipating that compliance requirements would
necessarily change with a change in operations and equip
ment, the Draft Flexibility Guidance provides for streamlin
ing compliance requirements as well. The source operator
can approve si gn ificant changes in advance by inserting into
the initial flexible permit a menu of compliance require
ments (such as monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting)
with a protocol for choosing the appropriate compliance ap
proach. 346 When minor compliance details are missing, it is
possible for the source to add the detai ls later through the
Title V minor permit modi fication process, a process that
does not require advance notice to the public or public
hearing opportwlities.w
Toe aggressive use of bubbles, a menu approach (of ad
vance approved changes and compliance requirements),
and the Title V minor permit modification process results in
significant obstacles to effective public participation. As the
Agency acknowledged, advance approved changes can be
incorporated into the Title V permit without public review
unless the proposed advanced change itselfwould constitute
48
a major modification.3 However, since advance approved
changes are generally designed specifically to keep the
source from subsequently undergoing the type of modifica�
tions that trigger Title V proceedings, as a practical matter,
all that EPA can do is encourage (but not require) the permit
ting authority to rrovide notification to the public at the time
of the change . 34 Even for advance approvals of "non-Title
V requirements/' EPA announced its intent to grant defer
ence to the states in interpr e ting their own rules and SIPs,
thus �ig n aling its endorsement of creative interpretation by
the states to allow sources to avo id applicability of
NSR/PSD proceedings.
The upshot is that new facilities acquiring a flexible per
mit can avoid the potential appl icability of major NSR or
PSD and minor NSR and Title V, and can make any subse
quent changes through the minor Title V modification pro
cess and avoid public participation. To be sure, there is pub
lic review of the initial fl exible permi t. At that point, how
ever, any concerned member of the public can expect to en�
counter a dizzying menu of operating procedures, materials,
equipment, and compliance protocols designed to cover an
array of choices the facili ty operator may or may not make
during the term of the pennit, Citizens or conununity-based
344. Id. at I 2.
345. "All replicable operating procedures must be scientifically credible
and 1heir use must not req uire judgement [sic]. Thal is, the
'replicability' requirement means the procedure for che same inputs
must be capable of yield ing the identical result whether applied by
you, the source, a member or the public, or us." Id. at 20.
346. For significant chang�s to monitoring, record.keeping, or reporting
requirements, the Agency proposed several "streamlining tech·
niques'' of using a menu of monitoring approaches and protocols for
selecting the appropriate monitoring approach. Id. at 35·36.
347. Id. at 28. 35. This anomaly, which the NRDC contends is illegal, was
reponedly due to former Presiden1 George Bush's intervention on
the jndustry' s behalf. See NRDC et al. White Paper Number } Com·
ments, supra note 332, at 1 3 (citing a news article in the WASH.
POST, May 1 7. 1 992, al A l ).
348. Whjte Paper Number J, supra noie 328, at 28.
349. Id. at 29.
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organizations on a limited budget might want to forego tech
nical review of all of the proposed advance approvals and
tum instead to the compliance provisions, reasoning per
haps that they may obtain adequate assurances if they can
effectively monitor compliance of emission limits during
the term of the permit (regardless of the operations em
ployed under the PAL or partial cap). In this respect. reports
obtained from instrumental continuous emissions monitor
ing equipment (CEMs) may be the best inforniation avail
able. Unfortwlatelyi however, the Draft Flexibility Guid
ance. allows non-instrumental ..CEMs•equivalent' monitor
ing methods, such as "equations for mass balance or
stoichiometric calculations or records of fuel or raw mate
rial purchases or usage,"350 an llf.Proach that can be con
35
founded by technical problems. · Thus, technical review of
a menu of these types of propc,sed compliance methods is
likely to be beyond the resource capabilities of ordinary citi
zen groups. Another potential problem is that, due to strong
industry pressUI'e, the use of CEMs-equivalent monitoring
may be applied in practice so liberal ly so as to yield little, if
any, verification of compliance.352 In short, CAA permits
are notoriously complex to begin with, and the Draft Flexi
bility Guidance promises to increase that complexity by or
ders of magnitude without assurances that compliance can
be adequately verified.
The flexibilities advanced by this Draft Flexibility Guid
ance pose additional impediments to environmental justice
communities that host the facility. First, to the extent that
E PA s u pp o r t s a n d e nc o u rages s o u rc e s to a v o i d
nonattainment NSR, the alternatives analysis an d social
cost criterion cannot be used to protect vulnerable conunu
nities or aid in the development of substantive fairness-ori
ented permit criteria. In addition, the community is now in
the position of having to raise money to obtain the technical
expertise to independently evaluate a permit application
that has an assemblage of advance approvals and compli
ance protocols instead of one set of requirements.353 As
noted by the NRDC and others, EPA is "condensing all of
the public 's opportunities to participate in permitting
through minor NSR, PSD, major NSR, and Title V into one
34
fleeting 30-day period every five years." s Even an associa
tion of air pollution control officials-who strongly s upport
the concept of operational flexibility-expressed concern
about the increased complexity and resource burdens that
355
would be required to process flexible pennits .
350. Id. al 38.
35 l. For example, the choioe of emissions factors, correlating emissions
with operating range parameters, and missing emissions data, or
choice of averaging times may cause emissions to be under or over
estimated. Id. at 384 1 .
352. Professor Steinzor 9uestions t he prac1ice, i n t he name of flexibility,
of granting exemptions from precise monitoring requirements that
bear no relationship to producing su perior performance. Dangerous
Journey, supra note 229, at 1 94.
353. See Leiter from Eileen Gauna, 10 U.S. EPA (Sept. 1 3, 2000) (on file
with author) (containing comments on White Paper Number 3).
354. See NRDC et al. -white Paper Number 3 Comments, supra note 332,
at 2.
355 . See Letttr from STAPl'A and ALAPCO, to EPA (Sepl 2 1 , 2000) at
http://www.4cleanair.org/Wl-IlTEPAPER3COMMENT-9I00.PDF
(last visited Dec. 30, 2000) (commenting on White Paper Number 3
and requesting that EPA provide guidance on rejecting sources and
noting that Title V fees may be insufficient to meet increased re
source demands).
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Asswning that these obstacles are overcome, however,
others remain. An advance approved change may subse
quently occur without anyone consideri ng socioeconomic
factors and health indicators at the time of the change. For
example, if recent studies document an abnormally high rate
of respiratory illnesses or elevated blood lead levels, an
emissions increase can occur without noti fying the commu
nity about the increase, much less giving the community an
opportunity to bring the heal th-related information before
the permitting authority. Even though the increases may be
considered under the cap (or partial cap) or de minimis for
regulatory purposes, the emission increases still may pres
ent problems to a vulnerable community when combined
with other sources of pollutants. At a time when environ
mental justice advocates and others are encouraging the
Agency to bring the public into the permitting and pre-per
mitting process as early as possible in order to resolve po
56
tential problems,3 the Draft Flexibility Guidance substan
357
tially weakens public participation opportunities. This is
yet another example of the contradictory messages from the
Janus, as EPA has repeatedly endorsed increasing opportu
nities for public particwation, particularly in the environ
mental justice context. 3 In addi ti.on, the use of flexible per
mits may be at odds with a community's request for mitiga
tion measures that are narrowly tailored to reduce or elimi
nate facility-related impacts.
Another problem is that the ability of the faci lity owner to
change processes, equipment. and compliance protocols at
any time without public notice will impede the ability of the
community to monitor operations and use private citizen
359
suit enforcement rights to keep the facility in compliance.
The community is in the difficult position of having to dis
cern which set of processes, equipment, materials, and com
pliance protocols pertai n within any given time frame to de
termine if suspected violations have in fact occurred or are
occurring. In particular, correlating and interpreting data to
evaluate whether a violation has occurred when non•instru
mental compliance protocols are allowed may again lie be
yond the resource capabilities of a community·based group.
Additionally, as noted by the NRDC and others, the Draft
Flexibility Guidance raises uncertainty about potential ap
plication of the permi t shie l d, a provision that precludes citi
360
zen suits in some instances. All of this contradicts EPA's
expressed desire to promote private enforcement capacity
361
within environmental justice com.munities.
Indeed, for
356. See Tm.E VI FACA REPORT, sup ra note l l l , at 30 ; NEJAC, EN
VTRONMENTAI. JUSTICE IN TI[£ PERMITTING PRocl!ss ; A REPORT
FROM THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JusncE ADVISORY COUN
CIL ' S PUBLIC M E ETING ON E N V I RO N M ENTAL PERM J TI I N G ,
AfLINGlON, Vtll.OfNIA, NOVEMBER 30..0ECEMBl!R 2, 1999, at 1 7
(2000) (EPA 300-R-00-004) , available at htt p://e pa . gov/ooca/mai.n/
ej/nej acpl1b.htmi ( hereina fter 1 999 NEJ AC REPORT ON PER·
MTITING J (containing detailed reco1JUJ1endatioos, largely from envi
ronmen!al j ustice advocates. aimed at identifying both deficiencies
in lhe c11mlnl pe nnir p rocess and remedies or alternative a pproaches
to penni tting ),
357. NRDC et Ill. White Pa per Number 3 Comments, supra note 332, a t 4.
358. See U.S. EPA , EPA's ENVIRON MENTAL JUSTICE STRATEGY, 6-8
( 1 995 ) , available at http ://w w w .e p a. gov/docs/oej p ubs/strate gy /
stra<o gy .nt.html ( last visited Jan. 9, 2001 ) .
359. For a discussion of the technical difficulties e nforcing blanket emis
sions limits, see NRDC et al. Comments on White Pa pe r Number 3,
supra note 332, at 2 1 - 2 7 .
360. Id. a t 1 0-. 1 2.
36 1 . See EPA 's ENVIRONMENTAL JusncE STRATEOY, supra note 358, at
1 5· 16.

many of these communities, public enforcement even under
a more prescriptive and� therefore, more enforceable regime
has proven inadequate. 62 Thus t the Draft Flexibility Guid
ance may well promote an unintended perverse incentive; it
appears to benefit well-resourced industries that anticipate
compliance problems by allowing them to obtain a flexible
permit and to locate in a community that is lacking private
enforcement capacity due to the community's inability to
obtam
. expensive
. teehnicaI advice.
' 363
In addition to the impediments to public participation and
to the development of substantive environm.ental justice cri
teria, mitigation measures, and enforcement, the Draft Flex
ibility Guidance once again illustrates the expansive use of
EPA's interpretive authority. The NRDC and others derided
the Agency's endorsement of untested "replicable operating
364
procedures" and persuasively posit that the Agency's au
thority to grant the specified flexibilities could not possibly
365
For example, the
be deri ved from current regulations.
commenters noted that an advance approval is not autho
rized wider the current regulations ' provision for ·'reason·
ably anticipated operating scenarios," which only allows the
source owner to accommodate different operational states
of existing emission units, not future emission units or
modification to existing units . 366 They further asserted that
it was irresponsible for the Agency to authorize the whole
sale use of strategies that had not been proven even in l im
ited pilot projects (such as facility XLs, which often em
ploy PALs), and were particularl y concerned that the Draft
Flexibility Guidance would subvert EPA's prior promises
to test and q uan tify the asserted superior environmental
performance of these reinvention strategies before consid
367
ering their adoption.
As in the proposed Tier 2 rule, the Draft Fleribility Guid
ance similarly neglects to mention environmental justice
and the procedural and distributional issues are not ad
dressed. This may not be surprising, considering that the
seven-year intensive stakeholder process through the NSR
FACA subcommittee did not have an environmental justice
368
representative. Instead, the Agency gave an information
briefing session on this complicated guidance to the NEJAC
Air and Water Subcommittee during a monthly telephone
362. See Unequal Protection, supra note 1 5.
363. This could even extend to lhe establishment of the- tle,uble pe nnit a�
well as enforcement. The- flexibili ty g uidance s pec ifically notes thal
" [ w] here a concern arises as to whether this g uidance is consistent
with your EPA-a pproved rules, we will work: with you to make this
detennination. Source.� should be aware, however, that our exercise
of discretion does not shield them from a citizen suit." See White Pa
per Number 3 , supra note 328. at 1 4.
364. The commenters ex plain:
Althoug h the Draft Guidance is telling l y vag ue as to what
q ualified as a ROP . . . . BPA appears to be suggesting that the
a pplication of com p lex re g ulaUons and the interpretation of
reg ulato ry lenns can be distilled to the eq uivalent of a mathe·
matical fonnula. This is an absurd p roposition . . . because en
vironmental re g ulations arc not al g orithms and a pplicabilit y
derenninations ( with their embedded le gal in terpretations)
do not p roceed according IO the "rules" of mathematics.
NROC et al. White Pa p er Number 3 Comments, supra note 33 2,
at 9.

365.
366.
367.
368.

ld. at 27-42.
Id. at 3.+35.
Id. at 1 6- 1 7 .
See supra note 327 (transcripts containing membership list),
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conference shortly before publication of the document. 369
Subseq uently, many environmental j ustice organizations
were apparently unable to prepare their own comment letter
but opted to co-sign the comments by the NRDC and others
that opposed the adoption of the Draft Flexibility Guidance
0
on a variety of grounds .37 Ultimately, this may be a case
where, because ofthe daunting complexity of the penni tting
program coupled with the relative lack of stakeholder in
volvement by environmental j ustice advocates, the full en
vironmental j ustice implications of this proposal and similar
broad-based reinvention initiatives may never be anal yzed
and voiced prior to ultimate adoption and i mplementation,
This is a serious obstacle considering that these initiatives
represent a fundamental shi ft from a permitting regime
founded on public participation and contemporaneous re
view to one that, while affording flexibility, also reduces
public participation and is heavil:>.:: dependent on source-con
37 1
ducted, after-the-fact verification. This effectivel y negates
the one l i mited remedy that the Ageocy has indicated its
willingness to adopt in response to environmental justice
claims, i .e., enhanced public partici pation opportunities.
When j uxtap osing community c-oncems about permitted
activities with the Draft Title VI Guidance and these pro
posed reinvention initiatives, several con trasting themes be
come apparent. Community residents in overburdened com
munities see the permit process as the frontline defense
against continuing environmental disparities. Yet permit
ting officials at the local, state, and federal levels generally
resist imposing additional conditions or denying pe rmits on
environmental j ustice grounds, although the lack of support
from the upper management levels may make this hesitanc y
understandable. When environmental j ustice concerns sur
face and become unavoidable, the primary response instead
has been to enhance public participation opportunities and
negC'tiate voluntary mitigation measures. While this is de·
sirable, it is not Likely to app reciably reduce the scope and
intensity of impacts that heavily impacted communities ex
perience. And as illustrated, the enhanced public participa
tion that the Agency promises w i th one band may be taken
away with the other. The only substantive pro grammatic re
sponse to environmental j ustice permi tting concerns bas been
the relatively crude, unquantifiable, and voluntary off-si te
mitigation measures propo sed by the Draft Title Vi Guidance,
which sit in stark contrast to the more sophisticated and
mandated offsets, pollution control requirements, and com
pliance measures required by traditional regulatory standards.
At the rulemaking or guidance-making level, the regula
tory dynamics that impede fairness-oriented reform are
even more troubling. 1n a manner disturbingly reminiscent
of historical race relations, environmental j ustice is ren�
dered invisible by its absence in maj or rules and guidance
documents. 372 During the cri tical stakeholder-intensive pro369. Aug. 8, 2000, Air and Water Subcommittee monthly telephone con
ference. The author was invited to participate in the telephone con
ference- as a prospective member of the subcommlttee, but could not
participate due to prior commitments. The author was subsequentJy
appointed to 1he NEJAC Air and Water Subcommittee on Aug. 2 1 ,
2000.
::.70. N RDC et al. White Paper Number 3 Comments, supra note 332, nt
2-3 (Overview of Comments).
37 I. Telephone I nterview with John Walke, NRDC (Nov. 27, 2000).
372. A literary version of "invisibility" as a racia1 phenomenon is elo
quently ex.pressed in Ralph Ellison's 1952 classic novel "The Invisi
ble Man."
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cesses that informed attempts to develop efficiency-ori
ented reform of air permitting programs, envirom;nentaJ jus
tice representatives were absent. In contrast, industty stake
holders , conventional environmental groups, state and loca1
regulatory agencies, and even federal land managers for
years engaged in extensive discussions about the technical i
ties of air permitting in an attempt to understand the con
straints of each group and to work out acceptable trade offs.
This put environmental j ustice advocates in the unfortu
nately reactive posi tion of attempting to understand the
daW1tingly complex proposals and address the environmen
tal j ustice i mplications within a hopelessly short time
frame. m When environmental j ustice concerns became un
avoidable at the rulemaking level, the Agency responded
not by integrating more protective strategies within the
framework of the pennitting pmcess, but by a combination
of assuming away the problem, further study, separate af
ter-the-fact stakeholder processes, or when pressed by
agreeing to address the problem on a case-by-case basis.
Most disappointing of all is the contrast between the
Agency's aggressive use of its interpretive authori ty-in
some instances beyond the constraints oflogic-to propose
and promote strea.oilined permits and operational flexibility
to help permi t applicants, while at the same time declining
to explore the potential of existing omnibus clauses to pro
mote on-site mitigation or alternative-site analyses, even in
the most heavily impacted areas.
Although these criticisms may seem harsh, it is important
to remember that the political pressures on EPA are enor
mous. Once noted to be a perpetual victim of ''battered
agency syndrome," the Agency is working against unrelent
ing pressure from state and local regulators to provide guid
ance, certainty, and safe harbors in this difficult area, while
the industty stakeholders want regulatory relief in the foon
of streamlined permit proceedings and enhanced opera
tional flexibility. From the perspectives of these powerful
stakeholder groups, the typ es of safeguards and mitigation
requested by impacted communities would destabili ze and
worsen an already cumbersome permit process. As difficult
as this conflict is , however, it is also obvious that at present
the regulatory strategies to address environmental justice
are wholly inadequate. This is unfortunate because even
aggress ive fairness-oriented reforms in perm i tt i ng can
be designed to co-exist w ith efficiency-oriented mea
sures and may ulti m,ately provide more certainty by pro
viding a framework within w h i c h to address the funda
mental concerns of overburdened and disparately im
pacted communities .

Protective Permitting
While one might conclude that EPA either lacks the desire or
is too politically constrained to seriously address environ
mental j ustice by reforming the permitting process, the
more optimistic, perhaps aspirational, approach would be to
view fairness-oriented reform as an inevitable aspect of reg 
ulatory evo lution. l n any event, the continuing conflicts that
arise during permit proceedings ultimatel y may make pro373. This is a serious deficiency considering I.bat the President's 1 994 Ex
ecutl ve Order on Environmental Justice mandated federal agencies
to identify and address dispro po rtfonate effects of its programs.
Exec. Order No. 12898, supra note 41, § 1 - 10 1 ; see also EPA's EN
VI RON MENTAL J USTICE STRAT£GY. supra note 358.
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grammatic reform the best option from a practical stand
point Ad hoc resolutions provide no predictabil i ty for the
regulated community. Because of the differences in re
4
sources and pol itical wi l l among the states,37 this type of
programmatic refonn is best developed nationally. Should
EPA embark on such an endeavor, it should be able to de
velop and provide a protecti ve permi tting framework under
the authority of statutory omnibus clauses either by guid
ance or pending rulemaking proceedings. 375 At present, the
Agency already has a suite of recommendations for address
ing environmental justice in permit proceedings. At a recent
NE.lAC meeting, an assortment of stakeholder groups came
forward with ideas and suggestions that ran the gambit from
376
broad principles to numerous specific reconunendations.
EPA, however, lacks a basic framework within which to ex
periment with, develop, and apply more protective criteria
in a systematic or consistent manner. This Article concludes
with a few exploratory suggestions on a framework the
Agency might consider.
To begin with, two procedural refonns are necessary to
promote negotiated solutions in advance of more formal
permit proceedings: early public participation opportunities
and mechanisms to provide the conununity independent
technical review of the pennittee 's proposals. When the
community is brought into the pre-permitting process and
provided the means to independently exami oe the proposal,
the commW1ity is able to participate on a more level playing
field and the comfort level is likely to increase. As such, the
dynamics are more likely to change from an encounter
marked by hostility and suspicion to one with greater coop
eration and trust, thus providjng optimal conditions for col
laboration and creative problem solving. The permitting
agency can use additional methods to enhance thi s process,
for example by cultivating preexisting relationships with
community-based groups.
As important as procedural and capacity-bui lding mea
sures are, however, there will be instances where they do not
resolve all conflicts. If pre-pemritting negotiations do not
yield voluntary commitments acceptable to all, then the
Agency needs to have in place a more protecti ve and certain
process to address the environmental justice complications.
S ignificantly, the Agency is not only dealing with technical
issues-which it is undoubtedly qualified to address-but
fairness clai ms as well . Thus, the conunon-Jaw tradition of
equity is the logical place to look, as a measured use of equi
table principles might be particularly well-suited to resolve
confl icts over mitigation. It is not unheard of in environ
mental law and regulation for an agency to use common-law
concepts to implement statutory requirements. 377 In addi
tion, the Agency could look beyond the poll ution control re
gime to permit programs that address the pre servation of
374. Devolution and the Public Health, supra note 226.
375. To date EPA has not developed environmental justice guidance on
the parameter.i oftbe valuable sources of omnibus authority. Su su·
pra notes 14- 1 10 and accompanying text.
376. 1999 NEJAC REPORT ON PERM11T1NG, supra note 356.
377. See ROBERT v. PERCIVAL E.T AL. , ENvtRONMENTAL REGULATION
LAW, SCI ENC E , /IND Poucy 280 (2d ed. 1 996) (noting thal
"CERCLA is a direct extension of common law principals ofslrict li
ability for abnormally dangerous activides."): cf United States v.
Price, 688 F.2d 204, 2 1 2, 1 2 ELR 2 1 020, 2 1 023-24 (3d Cir. 1 982)
(noting lhat by e!lllcting the endangerment provisions of RCRA and
the Safe Drinking Water Act. Congress "sought to invoke the broad
and flexible equity powers of the federal courts in instances where
haz.a.rdous waste threaten human health.").
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highly protected resources, such as wetland preservation,
endan�ered species protection, and historic building preser
78
vation. These permit schemes have potential because the
primary otzjecti ve is not to issue the pennit, but to protect the
3
resource.
Although these pennitting frameworks carry
their own brand of conflict, it is important to remember that
adopting similar approaches in the environmental justice
context wi ll not result in a moratorium on all development
activity. To put the matter rhetorically and. admittedly, pro
vocatively, i f we can take extraordinary measures to protect
wetlands and endangered species, shouldn' t we be similarly
aggressi ve in protecting vulnerable communities?
Any framework selected, however, must begin with the
difficult issue of assessment, i.e., determining whether the
conununity is an "environmental j ustice community." Be
cause of the disparate condi tions that present these concerns
throughout the country, from sparsely populated Native
American reservations to congested inner city enclaves 1 this
may be an area best suited for precise definition by the com
mon law's incremental approach, i.e. , using a general princi
pal that is refined by case-by-case adj udication. Using Rich
ard Lazarus' fonnulation, the permitting official could
make·this determination based on the presence of risk aggre
gation or risk dispro� ortionality, perhaps directed by
3
EPA-issued guiclance. In order to make a realistic assess
ment of the historic, socioeconomic, political, and cultural
context of the host community, a range of factors other than
38 1
emission-related impacts should be considered. This de378. Many of these ideas were presented in a letter to the NFJAC follow.
ing the author's presentation on a panel, See L:t1er 10 NEJAC by
Eileen Gauna (Apr. 1 8, 2000) (copy on file with author): see also
THE LAW OF ENVIRONM ENTAL JUSTICE 473-76 (Michael B.
Gerrard ed., 1999) (discussing site-based pennit requirements under
several statutes).
3 79. Dredge and fiU operations (of wetlands) are regulated under §404 of
the Clean Wat.er Act (CWA). 33 U.S.C. § 1 344, ELR STAT. FWPCA
§404. Congress stated that the purpose of the CWA was to "restore
and maintain the chemical, physical and biologkal integrity of the
nation 's wate�." 33 U.S.C. § 125 1 (a), ELR SrAT. FWPCA § 10 /(a),
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) states that it is the '"po licy of
Congress that all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to con
serve endangered species and threatened species . . . ." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1 5 3 l(c)( l), ELR STAT. ESA §2(c)( l ). Specifically, the ESA bars
federal government agencies from performing, funding, or permit·
ting any activity that will jeopardize the critical habitat of a listed or
endangered species. 16 U.S.C. § 1 536, ELR STAT, ESA §7. See also
Shi-Ling Hsu, The Potential and the Pitfalls of Habitat Conserva
tion Planning Under the Endangered Species Act, 29 ELR 10592,
10593 (Oct 1 999) (discussing how the ESA' s powerful prohibition�
against the "rake" of species listed as endangered or threatened ex
tend to private property and even prohibit private l.andowners from
engaging in actions on their property that adversely modify habitats
of listed species). The poncipal federal legislation in the field of
historic preservation is the National Historic Preservation Act. 1 6
U.S.C. § §470-470w-6, originally enacted in I 966. The Act estab
lished the National Register of Historic Places. See ulso D ANIEL
P. S!!L!,(I & JAM ES A. K U S H. N Eil, LAND USE REGU I../ITION :
CASES AND M I\TERIALS 800 ( 1 999) (noting that societal benefits,
both of a monetary and a psychological kind, accrue from preser
vation of historic sites, and tbat these benefits appear to have a so
cietal consensus).
380. Lazarus & Tai, supra note 9.
38 1 . In addition to the expected impacts from the new, modified, or ex
panded facility (including emission-related impacts, adwtional
safety risks or risks of accidents. the compliance record of the
permittee at other locations. nonemissio11-relatcd impaclli such os
noise, tnffic. odor, and foreseeable injury to nontraditional cultural
prac tices) • other relevant factors might include the existing pollution
.
load (nonpennittcd
contributors, pennined contributors, and point
and nonpoint sources), the compliance histozy of the existing permit
ted sources. thc risk of accidcntaJ releases. expected. foreseeable de·
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termination may be less complicated than in a Title VI in
vesti gati o n because a part i c ular degree of d ispro
portionality is not absolutely required . Risk aggregation
alone would justify protecti ve measures, and since regula
tion is preventative in nature, toxicity weighted exposures
should be an adequate indicator. Once a vulnerable com
munity is identi fied, that should suffice to trigger a range of
protective mechanisms.
One mechanism employed could be a substantive alterna
382
tives analysis similar to one the U.S . Anny Corps of Engi
neers uses in protecti ng wetlands. Under the Clean Water
Act, the permitting authority determines if there is a rracti
3 1
cable altemati ve to placing fill material in a wetland . If an
alternati ve site is available, the permit is denied without fur
384
ther inquiry into the suitability of the proposed site. Un
like the National Envi ronmental Policy Act, which only di
rects that alternatives be described in the environmental im
385
pact statement and considered by the federal agency, the
alternatives analysis in wetland permitting contains a stan
dard and a substantive mandate, a point at which it becomes
improper to proceed in light of the alternative offered.
In the environmental justice context, for example, the
permitting agency could engage in an analysis of whether a

practicable alternative exists to permitting the emissions in
or near a heavily impacted comm�nity. A practicable alter

native could exist if the permi t involves a new facility and
there are alternative locations to site the facility in areas that
are not highly impacted. In such a case, the permit would be
denied for that site because of the avai lability of alternative,
more suitable sites. Conversely, if the permit involves a sim
ple renewal of a permit at an existing facility that is rela
tively new and bas updated controJ teclmology, then there
might not exist a practicable alternative to the permi tting at
the proposed site because of the capital already invested in
the existing site. this is not to suggest that a findi ng of "no
practicable alternative" should be applied categorically to
all existing facilities. There might be practicable altema•
rives to renewing permits at existing facilities where, for ex
ample, the facility has a poor compl iance record, is near the
ve\opmenls, demographics, nontraditional cullural practices, the
history of land use practices in 1he area (e.g .. expulsive zoning), and
health issues currently ex.isling in the community (relatively high
cancer races, asthma, and othe r particular vulnerabilities).
382. The mos! obvious candidate omnibus clause would be CAA
§ l 73(a)(5) (nonatcai nment NSR). 42 0.S .C. §7503(a)(5), ELR
STAT. CAA § 1 73(a)(5). However, other broadly worded clauses
might provide adequate legal grounding as well, such as permit
terms ''necessary to protect human health and the environment'' un
der RCRA §3005(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. §6925(c)(3), El.R STAT. RCRA
§3005(c)(3), The justification would necessarily differ. however,
given the scope of omnibus authority. See supra notes 14- 1 1 0 and
accompilllying text,
383 . 40 C.F.R. §230. I O(a) (2000).
384. Practical alternatives are presumed if the activity is not water de
pendant. 40 C.P.R. §230. I O(a)(.3). The agency looks to whether there
were non-wetland sites available at the time the developer entered
the market and began looking for suitable locations.
385. This is not to say that the National Envirnnmencal Policy Act
(NEPA) and its implementing regulations are unhelpful in this ef
fort. The Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ's) regulations
and EPA ' s own NEPA compliance concerning an agency's consid
eration of alternatives in an environmental justice context could be
used in connection with a substantive standard. Su U.S. EPA, Final

Guidance for Incorporating Environmental Ju.sti'ce Concerns in
EPA 's NEPA Compliance Analysis ( 1 998), QI http://es.epa.gov/oeca/

ofa/ejepa, html (i-a$t visited Jan, 9, 2001 ) (available from the ELR
Document Service, ELR Order No. AD-3856).
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end of its useful life, has pollution control processes and
technology that are obsolete, or the facili ty has been af
forded favorable regulatory treatment in the past that has
substantially contributed to risk aggregation or dispro
portionali ty, e.g., exemptions, variances, grandfathering, or
long-expired permits. The practicable alternative standard
may offer a greater degree of predictability than currently
exists while at the same time removing the counterproduc
tive tendency of older facilities with outmoded technology
6
to remain onli ne longer. 38
If there is no suitable alternative site, then the penni tting
officials should adopt the wetland permitting approach,
which is to consider whether the impacts can be otheiwise
avoided, minimized, or compensated, 387 in that order. 388 For
example, the official would not consider compensation of
impacts that can be minimized or avoided ; likewise, the of
ficial would not consider minimizing impacts that can be
avoided altogether. The sequencing approach affords more
protection to the nearby community by ensuring that the
most protective measures are in fact taken. This is an ap
proach similar to the closely tai lored mitigation approach
re c o m m ended b y t h e T i t l e VI FA C A M i tigat i o n
Workgroup. I n the environmental justice context, for exam
ple, it might be appropriate to consider whether the emis
sions-related impacts might be avoided by substitutions of
materials, alternative production processes, or more strin
gent control technology. For nonemissions-rel ated impacts,
e.g. , noise, odors, traffic, damage to cultural sites, etc., the
knowledge and creativity of community residents can be
helpful. Because community residents are more intimatel y
aware of the precise effects of the facil ity, they are in a better
position to advise as to appropriate buffer zones, alternative
traffic routes, or the like.
3 89
Only if it is not possible
to completely avoid the im
pacts should the pennitting agency proceed to consider
other means to minimize their effects, such as enhanced
emergency response systems and ambient monitoring.
Again, this prese nts an opportunity to use the expertise
of the community residents, for example, in determining
the most advantageous l ocations of the monitors. The
386. See, e. g., comments of David Hawk.ins regarding the use of"routine
maintenance. repair and replace ment" exceptions to NSR in order co
keep old facilities on li ne long past their initial useful life. EPA Ac
tion Needed to End Grandfathering. ENVTL. F., Mar.I Apr. 2000.
at 44.
387. CEQ regulations define mitiga1ion as avoiding the impact, minimiz
ing 1he impact, rectifying the impact, reducing or eliminating the im
pact over time, and compensating for the impact. 40 C.F.R.
§ l 508.20 (2000). In lhe permitting context, some of the stated regu
lalory wetland mi1iga1ion efforts may not be directly transferable to
the environmental justice cont.ext. Examples include "rectifying 1he
impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected environ
ment, or reducing or elim.ina1. i ng the impact over 1jme by preserva
tion and maintenance operations" Id. The use of pollution control
technologies, buffer zones, ahernative traffic route�. and other com
mon mitigation measures would tend to avoid the impaclS altogether
rather than restore the environment or reduce impacts over lime.
388. See Memorandum of Agree ment Between the Environmental Pro
tection Agency and the Department of Anny Concerning the Deter
minat ion of Mitigation Under the Clean Wat.er Ac t Sec tion
404(b)( l ) Guidelines, 2 ( Feb. 6, 1 990), available a1. http://w w w .
usace.army.mil/inellfunctions/cw/cecwo/reg/moafe90. htm (se,
quencing requirement).
389. One workable standard might be "technologically infeasible after
using the lowest ochievablc emissions control technology," in effect
requiring LAER-equivaJent technology for air pollutants or bes\
available technology for water pollutants.
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minimization approach could adapt some of the standards
390
and requirements involved in incidental takings permits
issued under the Endangered Species Act, modified to the
environmental j ustice context. In analogous terms, the per
mit app licant would submit a location-speci fic plan that es
tablishes that facility operations will not appreciably reduce

the like:lihood of a healthy recovery for the impacted com
munity. 39 1 Here, government-facilitated area-specific agree

ments could be used to meet this re quirement, albeit utilized
in a different manner than that contemplated by the Draft Ti
tle VI Guidance. Instead of using area poll utant reduction
plans to provide unquantified offsets for permitting new ac
tivities, the plans could be used as a benchmark to measure
progress. A permit should be issued onl y if there is an exist
ing plan-it could be an area-specific agreement or a com
m u n i ty recovery p lan-and the i mpacts fro m the
permirtee 's proposed project does not substantially interfere
with the gains sought to be made under such a plan. 392 For
example, closely tailored on-site mitigation as a primary
strategy is unlikely to interfere wi th such a recovery plan as
suming unmitigated effects are kept to a minimum. Con
versely, using onJy off-site miti gation may interfere with re
covery because the entire emission increases and other faci l
i ty-related impacts consume gains made by the recovery
p lan. An added incentive can be designed into the scheme by
gi ving industrial contributors to the recovery p1an priority in
permit issuances that are able occur in the area, i.e., contri
butors to the reduction strategies are first in line to get pa.rt of
the off-site reductions allowed by the plan. This require
ment would provide an ince ntive to governmental and in
dustry' stakeholders to design, commi t resources to, and im
plement pollution reduction strategies in advance of any
pe rmi t because, absent a comprehensi ve site-reduction
plan. an area recovery plan will be required to show that per
mitted activities will not interfere with real progress in
achieving heal thy communities.
Compensating for the i mpact should only be considered
as a last resort and only to the extent that adverse effects can
not otherwise be avoided or minimized at or near the facility.
This is a particularly sensitive issue because i t raises the po
tential that a vulnerable community may be forced to accept
risks and impacts that more affl uent communities can avoid.
At the same time, however, the potential for positive collab
orative problem solving is enhanced when the sel f-determi
nation and agency of the community is recognized. Thus,
because of the potential for abuse, compensatory measures
should not be approved without the support of impacted
communities after full independent technical review.
One compensation strategy that might directly pertain to
the impacts could involve offsetting the new emissions by
retiring existing emissions in the same location. There are
390. Primarily, the permit will issue if the plan set fonh by the applicant
"will not appreciably reduce the likelihood oft.he survival and recov
ery of Lhe species in the wild."" 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv), ELR
STAT. ESA § 10(a)(2)(B)(iv).
39 1 . Id.
392. Su Hsu, supra note 379, at I 0594 (noting I bat under § lO{aX l ) of the
BSA: ''The [U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)] may issue a land
owner a pennit to 'incidentally take' endangered or threatened spe·
cies if the landowner submits and agrees to abide by an FWS-ap
proved (Habitat Conservation Plan], which is a long-term plan of
mitigation measures aimed at conserving habitat and aiding endan
gered and threatened spec ies."). The provision was added to the ESA
in 1 982, H. R. REP. No. 97-835, at 29 ( 1 982), reprifl/ed in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2870.
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risks in this app roach, however. Environmental j ustice ad
vocates have been j ustifiably critical of market-based re
gimes because these programs have been instrumental in
393
al
shifting pollution to highly impacted communities,
though the disproportionate impact has been unintentional.
Here, the idea is to use the same approach to strategically
pull pollution away from the impacted community. Thus, if
such an offset strategy is employed, the offset ratio should
be greater than 1 to l (e. g . 1 5 tons per year of pollutants re
tired for every ton generated), and the"same location''
should be determined conservatively. Ideall y, the offsets
should come from the same neighborhood to avoid hot
spots, but ifit is clear that the emissions do not have a local
ized effect, a wider area may be considered. Here, it is im
portant that the community is given independent technical
assi stance to determine whether the emissions produce a lo
calized effect. Engineering esti mates should be conserva
tive to provide a wide margin of safety. Thus, the pennitting
a g e n c y s h o u l d r e ma i n e xc e e d i n g l y s k e p tic a l o f
point/nonpoint trades and cross-media trades, and should
not consider cross-pollutant trades. Generally, these trades
have not been proven i n practice and are inappropriate in
instances involvi ng little or no margin of error. Compensa
tory measures mi ght be a viable, last resort strategy if
they are wel l designed, if the benefits clearly outweigh
the potential risk, and if they do not interfere with gains
made under an existing communi ty recovery plan. Imple
mented in this manner, the compensation strate gy is a
form of off-site mitigation.
If it beco mes necessary to deny a perm.it at the proposed
site because of the availability of a suitable alternative site,
the permitting agency can mitigate the burden to the appli
cant-to the extent discretion allows-by affording favor
able regulatory treatment at the alternative site. For exam
ple, at the alternative site the permitting official might expe
dite the permit, facilitate an emissions trade, consider a pilot
project, or otherwise waive requirements if appropriate. A
local government might facilitate the purchase ofan alterna
ti ve site by imminent domain if the new facility will pro
mote a public purpose. The approach here is analogous to a
type of transferrable development right used in resolving the
conflicting interests presented by the preservation of his
toric buildi ngs, o pen s paces, and other valuable rc>
sources.394 This approach is hardly a radical one, as "si te
195
shifting" is inherent in PSD/NSR design and favorable
396
Rather, the
.regulatory treatment is a common incentive.
approach merely reduces the burden on the permit applicant
and the potential unfairness of disadvantaging the newest
(and possibly cleanest) faci1ity for the existing aggregated
or disparate impact, while at the same t.ime addressing that
very i mpact. The success of this approach depends in large
part on the corrunibnent to bring all stakeholders into the
393. See, e.g.. rucbard Toshiyuk.i Drury et al., Pollution Trading CJ1ld £n.
viro nmenJal Injustice: Los Angeles ' Failed Experiment in Air Qual

ity Policy, 9 DuKE ENvrL. L. & PoL'Y F. 23 1 ( 1999) .
394. See SELMI & KUSHNER, supra note 379, at 656 (noting that transfer
able development rights are one of the most promising alternative
ways of achieving environmental protection and "avoiding the situa
tion where environmental protection benefits, which accrue to the
society as a whole, are achieved by imposing large costs on individ
ual landowners'").
395. See Oren, supra note 323; Gauna, supra note 109.
396. See supra notes 234-373 and accompanying text (discussing
brownfields, Tier 2, and XLs).

5-200 1

NEWS & ANALYSIS

pre-permitting process early in order to assess all problems
and increase available options.
While there are no painless ways to achieve parity and
eliminate troubling aggregated risk and adverse impacts, a
more protective pennitting scheme is likely to be more effi
cient in the long run. An aggressive ''reasonable progress''
approach that promises real benefits would be the least
destabilizing to the permit process because it would im
prove conditions and reduce confl ict. Should EPA attempt
to continue its current approach, essentially one of attempt
ing to address environmental justice whi le preserving the
permitting status quo, it will in all likelihood fail. As long as
there are unaddressed disparities, there wiU be legal action,
direct action, and legislative action wherever possible. Per
mit proceedings will cont inue to be contentious and con
sume considerable agency and economic resources. And the
persistence of unequal environmental protection will con
tinue to erode the legitimacy ofEPA and its sister permitting
agencies . In the end, the permitting approach EPA ul ti 
mately devises will be successful only if it appreciably miti
gates impacts to nearby communities.

Conclusio n
EPA has spent one of its three decades directly addressing
the procedural and distributional claims of people of color
and poor communities. This has occurred within the time
that industrial sectors have pressed their demands for regu
latory rel ief and operational flexibility, demands that have
the support of most state and local regulators. These de
mands have coincided with a philosophical shift to the per
ceived efficiencies of market regimes and devol ution of au
thority to the local level. The result has been intense con
fUcting pressures on EPA. In response , the Agency has
elected to use its interpretive authority aggressively in pro
moting regulatory relief measures for industry stakeholders
and deference to state regulators, whi le at the same ti.me us
ing its authority much more conservatively in addressing
environmental j ustice concerns. The Agency appears partic
ularly hesitant to condition or deny perm.its on environmen
tal justice grounds, prefening instead voluntarily negotiated
off-site mitigation measures . The Agency has promoted this
approach to such a degree as to effectively eliminate the pos
sibility of a successful civil rights c l aim premised on the
granting of a permit. Given the severity of the problem in
many heavily impacted communities, such an alternative
compl iance approach is not likely to appreciably reduce or
eliminate long-standing disparities within the foreseeable
future, if at al.I .
This approach has been particularly frustrating to envi
ronmental justice stakeholders, who view a permit not only
as exacerbating siting disparities, but as the gateway to fur
ther environmental insult caused by inadequate standards,
compliance problems, potential contamination, and insuffi-
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cien t cleanup remedies . They are additionally concerned
about facility operations that impair quality of life and at
times damage cultural or rel igious resources. The Agency
has added to this frustration by promoting regulatory
flexibilities such as mobi le source offsets, emission caps,
and a menu approach to pe rmi tted processes, equipment.
and compliance protocols. These flexibilities stymie the
community's ability to technically evaluate the permit and
monitor compliance. The Agency has also promoted meth
ods to keep sources out of permit proceedings-proceed·
ings that not only require public participation but allow de
velopment of environmental justice criteria. In short, when
juxtaposing EPA's response to environmental j ustice
against its approach to regulatory relief, the difference ap
pears patently unfair. Because this j uxtaposition is not visi
ble in any one particular permit proceeding and because of
the normal judicial inclination toward agency deference, the
courts are not likely to put pressure on EPA to use its discre
tionary authority under the environmental statutes and regu
lations to more aggressively promote environmental justice.
All of this is unfortunate because environmental di spari
ties are likely to continue, and as long as communities do not
see an improvement in their environments, they will under
standably continue to launch campaigns against new and
expanded permitted activities. Thus, it is the environmental
conditions themselves-and not the Civil Rights Act or any
other legal remedy-that wil I continue to destabilize permi
proceedings. EPA has a timely opportunity to institute fair
ness-oriented reform of the permitting process at this criti
cal time, when many permit programs are under reevalua
tion and overhaul. lf environmental justice protections can
be built into regulatory processes at the front end, resulting
in a more protecti ve permitting scheme, there will be fewer
challenges upon granting the permit and, therefore, more
stabi lity over the long run. Meanwhile, the Agency can con
tinue testing the suspected superior environmental perfor
mance of alternative compliance approaches, either through
pilot projects or application in areas that provide a greater
margin of error because ofhealthier ambient conditions. lfit
becomes necessary to util ize more flexible permitting ap
proaches in heavi ly impacted communities, the Agency
should do so only after the approaches are proven in prac
tice, and at a minimum it should provide for independent
technical review and require compliance protocols that pro
mote rather than frustrate private enforcement. An added
benefit to a more protective permitting approach, if adopted,
is that EPA will be consistent with its message among al l
stakeholders, which will reduce stakeholder confusion and
misbust. Merging the alter egos of the Janus can only en
hance the Agency's legitimacy. Most importantly, however,
EPA now has the opportunity and ability to make healthy
and li veable communities for all the legacy of the fourth de
cade of environmental protection.

